dissenting:
Respectfully, I must dissent.
I am troubled by the course the majority has taken in this case with its affirmation of the Commission’s decision. It appears to me that the majority has given its blessing to the Commission’s decision to ignore the plain language of the statute. The wording of the disputed statute in this case could not be more clear. Injuries incurred in the course of recreational activities are not compensable unless the employee was ordered or assigned by the employer to participate in the recreational activity. The majority initially engages in an irrelevant discussion on the funding of the basketball league by the CTA. The statute itself makes funding by the employer a nonissue.
The majority then goes on to say that the claimant was assigned to play basketball for the CTA. The majority’s decision seems to imply that there is a difference between “ordering” and “assigning.” I do not believe that there is an important difference between these two words; they both have the same implication — lack of voluntary behavior. The words seem to be interchangeable in describing an absence of voluntary participation. Support for this position is found in our previous decision Cary Fire Protection District v. Industrial Comm’n (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 20, 25, 569 N.E.2d 1338, 1342, wherein we stated “[i]t is undisputed that the claimant was not ordered to participate in the tournament; accordingly, his participation was voluntary.” Similarly, in this case the claimant was not ordered to participate in the basketball league. This was a voluntary undertaking. Players had to try out for the league and win a spot on one of the teams; they were not ordered or assigned to do so. The CTA certainly accommodated the players by arranging their schedules so that they could play in the games, but this does not in any way show that participation was required of anyone.
I am troubled by the precedent we are setting with this decision. In my opinion, the majority’s view does violence to the plain meaning of section 11. If we are willing to ignore so flagrantly the express language of the statute, I am uncertain as to what meaning the statute will have after this decision. It appears to me that we have rendered section 11 meaningless. There is no rule of construction authorizing a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports." (County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 143, 485 N.E.2d 1076.) Because I believe the Commission’s decision to award benefits to the claimant was patently in violation of section 11, I would reverse the circuit court’s confirmation of the Commission’s decision and reinstate the ruling of the arbitrator.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.