concurring.
I concur in the opinion of the majority. However, I write separately to emphasize that I am extremely troubled by the absence of a reasonableness limitation on Rivera’s waiver of his Fourth Amendment right to search and seizure.
On its face, the probation condition imposed upon Rivera allows a search by the probation department or any law enforcement officer with or without reasonable suspicion. This all-encompassing condition conflicts with the dictates of Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). See United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 576 (1st Cir.1990). In Griffin, the Court held that the special needs of the probation system make the warrant requirement impracticable and justify the replacement of the standard of probable cause by “reasonable grounds.” Griffin, supra, at 875-76, 107 S.Ct. at 3170. However, the Court noted that the permissible degree of impingement upon a probationer’s right to privacy is not unlimited. Id. at 875, 107 S.Ct. at 3170.2
As the majority notes, other federal courts have held that “reasonableness” can also be established by narrowly tailored restrictions included within a probation agreement. See United States v. Wryn, 952 F.2d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir.1991); Giannetta, supra, at 575; United States v. Schoenrock, 868 F.2d 289, 292-93 (8th Cir.1989) (emphasis added). However, in this case, Rivera’s probation order did not authorize a search based upon *768reasonable grounds nor was the condition narrowly tailored. Instead, it ordered Rivera to “permit the Probation Officer to visit [him], in [his] home or elsewhere” and “[W]aive 4th Amendment Rights to search and seizure and submit to random drug screens as requested by the Probation Dept or any Law Enforcement Officer and pay for such drug screens.” Record at 411. This waiver impermissibly subjects a defendant to submit his person, residence, vehicle, and “elsewhere” to search and seizure at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant, whenever requested to do so by a probation officer or law enforcement officer. Submission to such searches should not be the price of probation. See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir.1975). A probationer is entitled to some limited protection of their privacy interest. Griffin, supra, at 875, 107 S.Ct. at 3169.
Despite the fact that the authority granted in the probation order is overly broad, I concur because the absence of a reasonableness limitation is not objectionable so long as the decision to search was in fact narrowly and properly made on the basis of reasonable suspicion. Giannetta, supra, at 576 (broad probation search condition was warranted wherein the defendant’s criminal propensities were not strictly limited to drug-related activities); Schoenrock, supra, at 290-93 (approving a condition that authorized probation officers to search for drugs or alcohol); United States v. Williams, 787 F.2d 1182, 1185 (7th Cir.1986) (approving a urinalysis and drug screening condition); United States v. Jeffers, 573 F.2d 1074, 1075 (9th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (approving reasonable search where probation officer had reason to believe defendant was violating probation).
The facts in this case indicate that the probation officer had reasonable grounds to search the defendant’s residence. Rivera’s urinalysis indicated a positive result for cocaine. In addition, the probation officer learned from a detective that Rivera may have been in possession of cocaine. These circumstances were sufficient to give the probation officer reasonable grounds to believe the search would reveal a violation of probation. Therefore, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the search of Rivera’s home was not unreasonable. Nevertheless, trial courts should be strongly discouraged from using an all-encompassing waiver of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights in probation orders.
For these reasons, I concur.
. The Griffin Court also expressly declined to consider the state’s argument that “any search of a probationer’s home by a probation officer is lawful when there are ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe contraband is present.” Griffin, supra, at 880, 107 S.Ct. at 3172 (emphasis in original).