{concurring). I concur in the lead opinion’s reasoning and result. I write separately because the relationship between promissory estoppel and Crown Technology’s negligence claim is not easy to understand and should be addressed fully.
Negligence and promissory estoppel are ordinarily distinct causes of action. The record in this case leaves no doubt that Crown Technology pleaded a prima facie case of negligence by alleging duty, breach, causation, and damages. Schultz v Consumers Power Co, 443 Mich 445, 449; 506 NW2d 175 (1993). I note, in particular, that the damages Crown Technology alleged in the complaint went beyond the prepayment penalty. There is, therefore, a chance that the negligence claim in this case was not merely an attempt to restate the losing promissory estoppel argument. Accordingly, I address D&N Bank’s argument that summary disposition was appropriate for the negligence claim because it did not have a duty to avoid making the oral statements Crown Technology alleged as the basis of its negligence claim.
Crown Technology claims that D&N Bank had a duty to
be aware of the loan terms, including the prepayment restrictions, and to apprise Crown Tech when asked that it intended to enforce those restrictions if it really intended to. This duty also required D&N [Bank], when made aware through internal memoranda that Crown Tech intended to repay the loan early, to contact Crown Tech and inform it that D&N [Bank] intended to enforce the restriction prior to Crown Tech irrevocably committing itself to prepaying the loan.
Because Crown Technology has not pointed to any authority establishing these specific duties of care, I *556employ the traditional analysis to determine if D&N Bank was under these duties when dealing with Crown Technology.
In Terry v Detroit, 226 Mich App 418, 424; 573 NW2d 348 (1997), this Court outlined the role duty plays in a negligence claim and how to determine when a duty exists:
In order to establish a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff must prove: “(1) that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant breached that duty; (3) that the defendant’s breach of duty was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered damages.” Baker v Arbor Drugs, Inc, 215 Mich App 198, 203; 544 NW2d 727 (1996). Duty is an obligation that the defendant has to the plaintiff to avoid negligent conduct. Id. Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court. Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 655; 532 NW2d 842 (1995). If a court determines as a matter of law that a defendant owed no duty to a plaintiff, summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Dykema v Gus Macker Enterprises, Inc, 196 Mich App 6, 9; 492 NW2d 472 (1992).
In determining whether a duty exists, courts look to different variables, including the (1) foreseeability of the harm, (2) degree of certainty of injury, (3) existence of a relationship between the parties involved, (4) closeness of connection between the conduct and injury, (5) moral blame attached to the conduct, (6) policy of preventing future harm, and (7) the burdens and consequences of imposing a duty and the resulting liability for breach. Buczkowski [v McKay, 441 Mich 96, 101; 490 NW2d 330 (1992)] citing Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 53, p 359, n 24; Baker, supra. The mere fact that an event may be foreseeable is insufficient to impose a duty upon the defendant. Buczkowski, supra at 101.
Under Terry, D&N Bank did not owe the duties Crown Technology enumerated. The harm alleged in the complaint, including the expenses Crown Tech*557nology incurred while seeking out a mortgage broker and fulfilling its obligations under the lease with its new tenant, have very little connection to the ability of D&N Bank’s staff to recall and restate the terms of the written loan agreement at any time. The written loan agreement itself is the best evidence of the parties’ legal obligations. Thus, a certain and foreseeable injury would not clearly result from D&N Bank’s representations following binding execution of the loan agreement.
While D&N Bank’s alleged misrepresentation might have a close connection with some of the injuries Crown Technology said it sustained, that is not necessarily so. For instance, Crown Technology’s decision to go to a mortgage broker was likely a function of D&N Bank’s refusal to offer refinancing terms that Crown Technology desired and not a product of the statements concerning the prepayment penalty. Similarly, Crown Technology chose to discharge Michigan Mutual Insurance Company from its remaining lease obligations and to carry out the terms of its agreement with GE Leasing because of business dealings it commenced before approaching D&N Bank about the prepayment penalty. Consequently, even if certain and foreseeable injuries could flow from the misstatements, they were not intimately connected to the injuries alleged in this case.
Although I emphasize that courts do not, and should not, condone purposefully misleading statements, the duty Crown Technology asks this Court to recognize would set a dangerous precedent. Taken at its extreme, Crown Technology’s proposed duty of care would require a financial institution to waive its unequivocal legal rights because of an inadvertent *558statement contrary to a loan’s written terms. It simply is unnecessary to require a bank to make every employee affirm, in every conversation, that it intends to enforce the plain language of its lending contract with a borrower to protect against unfair, improper, or injurious conduct. A reasonable person would simply assume that the written contract would be enforced by its plain terms even while negotiations continue. Thus, I see no negligence in a bank’s failure to carry out the duty Crown Technology identifies, namely, constant reaffirmation of the bank’s previously stated intent to hold a borrower to a written prepayment penalty.
Terry's last two factors examine the consequences of imposing or withholding the duties Crown Technology asks this Court to recognize. In this regard, I go back to 1992 PA 245, which embodies a policy favoring definiteness and security in loan transactions. MCL 566.132(2); MSA 26.922(2) now requires borrowers to protect their own interests by obtaining written, signed agreements to modify original loan agreements. Consequently, with this statute of frauds in force, oral representations become of only minor importance, if at all important, and there is no need to recognize a duty of care concerning oral representations in this context.
Even if there may be cases in which a duty should arise concerning oral representations, this is not such a case. Stefani, an attorney and sophisticated businessman, knew the terms of the written loan agreement and, nevertheless, persisted in his attempts to persuade D&N Bank to waive the prepayment penalty and offer refinancing. The parties were certainly free to negotiate concerning these matters. However, I *559would have to ignore firm principles of contract law to conclude that after the parties fail to agree, one party is free to seek recovery in tort for the expenses it sustained because an agreement did not result from the negotiations. See generally Kamalnath v Mercy Memorial Hosp Corp, 194 Mich App 543, 548; 487 NW2d 499 (1992), quoting Stanton v Dachille, 186 Mich App 247, 256; 463 NW2d 479 (1990) (“ ‘In order to form a valid contract, there must be a meeting of the minds on all the material facts.’ ”). Read carefully, none of the damages Crown Technology alleged in its complaint under the negligence count would have existed had D&N Bank canceled the prepayment penalty and refinanced the original loan in accordance with Crown Technology’s terms.1 However, with a presumably2 valid and enforceable loan agreement in place, D&N Bank was under no obligation to accede to these terms.
In sum, I see no reason in the context of this case to impose a duty of care on D&N Bank in answering Stefani’s inquiries on behalf of Crown Technology or participating in the negotiations he instigated when he was fully, aware of the terms of the preexisting written loan agreement. I conclude that the trial court erred in denying summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) for the negligence claim because no duty of care existed. Therefore, in addition to the reasons articulated in the lead opinion, I would also reverse the judgment of the trial court on this ground.
This is why our initial impression of this claim is that it was merely a promissory estoppel claim masquerading as negligence.
The parties do not ask this Court to determine whether the original loan agreement was valid and enforceable.