The principal issue on appeal is whether the doctrine of claim preclusion prevents an action for tortious interference with a bequest when the action is not brought with the underlying will contest. The district court and the court of appeals held that the failure to join the tort action with the will contest bars a later action. We disagree.
This is a dismissal of the action based on the pleadings; therefore, we accept those allegations as true. We also take judicial notice of the appellate decision involving the will contest, Matter of Estate of Olson, 451 N.W.2d 33 (Iowa App.1989).
This appeal has its genesis in the wills of Hjalmar Olson and his wife Margaret, whose maiden name was Lea. Following their marriage in 1946, Margaret and Hjal-mar lived on a farm until their deaths in 1986. The Olsons did not have children; however, they had a close relationship with Hjalmar’s nephew, George Huffey. Huf-fey lived with the Olsons for several years and after that was a tenant on the Olson farm. For further details of the relationship, see Matter of Estate of Olson, 451 N.W.2d at 35.
On June 18, 1986, two days after Hjal-mar’s death, Margaret executed a will. Under this will, she, like her husband before her, provided that the Olson farm should become the property of George Huf-fey. In July 1986, Margaret executed a new will revoking her June 18 will. Under the new will, George Huffey would not receive the Olson farm and her brother, Ambrose Lea, and his children would receive the bulk of her estate.
Margaret died in August 1986 and the July will was admitted to probate. George and Jean Huffey (Huffeys) commenced an action contesting the will. The case was tried to a jury which found that Margaret lacked testamentary capacity and that the July will was procured by undue influence. The defendants to the will contest successfully moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. On appeal, the court of appeals reinstated the jury verdict. Id. at 37.
On December 5, 1990, plaintiffs commenced this action against defendants Ambrose Lea, Eunice Lea, his wife, and *520their children (Leas). We are concerned with the tort actions which are counts one and two of the petition, maintaining that the defendants unduly influenced Margaret and tortiously interfered with her intent to devise her farm to George. They seek money damages for legal fees, loss of farming time, mental anguish and embarrassment.
In addition to dismissing the tort action under the doctrine of claim preclusion, the district court gave an additional ground for dismissing Jean Huffey’s claim by ruling that she was not a real party in interest. The court also granted Donna Lea-Faber’s motion to quash service. The court did not rule on the affirmative defense that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.1 Huffeys challenge these rulings on appeal. Leas cross-appeal on the court’s failure to rule on their limitation defense. Our review is for errors at law. See Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.
I. Tortious interference with a bequest. In Frohwein v. Haesemeyer, 264 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1978), we recognized a law action for tortious interference with a bequest. Id. at 795. We explained that we could see no compelling reason for not extending the tort of wrongful interference with business advantage to a noncommercial context. Id. Intentional interference with an existing or prospective contract is described in Restatement (Second) of Torts, sections 766A and 766B (1979), and continues to be recognized in Iowa as a basis for recovery of damages in civil tort actions. Nesler v. Fisher & Co., Inc., 452 N.W.2d 191, 194-96 (Iowa 1990).
The Restatement also has addressed the concept of wrongful interference within other forms of advantageous economic relations. Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 37A (1979). Under this chapter, section 774B relates to the tort of intentional interference with inheritance or gift. This section provides:
One who by fraud or other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to liability to others for the loss of the inheritance or gift.
In discussing the remedies available under this section, the Restatement recognized that the normal remedy for the loss suffered by the one deprived of the legacy or gift is an action in tort. § 774B cmt. e. These remedies include recovery of damages for pecuniary loss, consequential loss and emotional distress. Restatement § 774A. A claim for emotional distress in tortious interference claims does not require proof of outrageous conduct. Nesler, 452 N.W.2d at 199-200.
II. The doctrine of claim preclusion. As previously indicated, the fighting issue involves application of the doctrine of claim preclusion to Huffeys’ tort action. Leas defend the district court’s ruling by asserting that the tort action involves the same “claim” that was advanced in Huffeys’ pri- or will contest. As an initial matter, we discuss the doctrine of claim preclusion.
As a general rule, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars further litigation on the same “claim” or cause of action. See Leuchtenmacher v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 460 N.W.2d 858, 859-60 (Iowa 1990). Under this doctrine, an adjudication in a former suit between the same parties on the same claim “is final as to all matters which could have been presented to the court for determination, and a party must litigate all matters growing out of its claim at one time rather than in separate actions.” Id. at 860. The court explained:
Claim preclusion under the doctrine of res judicata is based on the principle that a party may not split or try his claim *521piecemeal, but must put in issue and try his entire claim or put forth his entire defense in the case on trial.
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[To make that determination, it] is necessary to determine whether plaintiffs first and second actions were the same claim or cause of action within the meaning of this principle.
Id. (quoting B & B Asphalt Co. v. T.S. McShane Co., 242 N.W.2d 279, 286 (Iowa 1976)). A second claim is likely to be considered the same as a first claim, and therefore precluded, “if the acts complained of, and the recovery demanded, are the same, or when the same evidence will support both actions.” Leuchtenmacher, 460 N.W.2d at 860. We now examine whether the will contest and the tort action are the same claim or cause of action within the meaning of claim preclusion. We do not believe that they are.
When a will is contested on grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity, as it was here, the required proof focuses on the testator’s mental strength and intent and whether infirmities or undue influence have affected the disposition of property under the will. See Olson, 451 N.W.2d at 36. The necessary proof in an action for intentional interference with a bequest or devise focuses on the fraud, duress, or other tortious means intentionally used by the alleged wrongdoer in depriving another from receiving from a third person an inheritance or gift. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B (1979). Stated simply, in a will contest, the testator’s intent or mental state is the key issue; in an intentional interference case, the wrongdoer’s unlawful intent to prevent another from receiving an inheritance is the key issue. Because of the differences in proof, the actions are not the same nor will the same evidence necessarily support both actions.
In addition, the recovery demanded in the will contest and in this action for intentional interference is not the same. In the will contest, the recovery demanded was the setting aside of the will procured by undue influence. In this action for intentional interference, the recovery demanded is for attorney fees, value of Huffey’s time lost in his farm operation, and mental anguish incurred in contesting the will. Obviously, the setting aside of the will did not provide Huffey with recovery of his consequential damages. Huffey also requested an award of punitive damages based on intentional and malicious conduct of defendants. An adequate remedy has not been provided by the mere setting aside of the will.
Our research has produced one case that seems to be relevant and corresponds with our situation. In Peffer v. Bennett, 523 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir.1975), the plaintiff brought an action in federal court for malicious interference with prospective right of inheritance to recover attorney fees and other expenses incurred in a will contest in state court. In the will contest, the probate court found that there was undue influence and invalidated a portion of the will. The plaintiff sought to estop the defendant from litigating the issue of actual fraud in her action for malicious interference. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that under Colorado law, the issues of undue influence and intentional interference were not the same. Id. at 1326. The Tenth Circuit court reasoned that the probate court found only that there was undue influence which affected the disposition of property made in the will; while the tort of malicious interference with the prospective right of inheritance requires proof of actual intent whether the unlawful means employed is a fraud or undue influence. Id. Although the court in Peffer considered issue rather than claim preclusion, the discussion of issue preclusion presupposes that the court believed undue influence and malicious interference were separate claims. We agree with this reasoning and result.
We are aware that other jurisdictions have held that successful will contestants cannot bring a subsequent action for tor-tious interference with inheritance rights. See, e.g., Smith v. Chatfield, 797 S.W.2d 508 (Mo.App.1990). We believe these cases are either distinguishable or do not fit within the principles of our tort law.
*522The damages sought in Smith were for costs and attorney fees in contesting the will. The Missouri court concluded that plaintiff received a complete remedy in the prior will contest. Smith, 797 S.W.2d at 510. We are strongly committed to the rule that attorney fees are proper consequential damages when a person, through the tort of another, was required to act in projection of his or her interest by bringing or defending an action against a third party. Kimmel v. Iowa Realty Co., Inc., 389 N.W.2d 374, 380 (Iowa 1983). Moreover, the court in Smith noted that it was “not convinced that the rule against splitting causes of action will always preclude a subsequent tort action.” Smith, 797 S.W.2d at 509-10 (quoting McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Mo.App.1988)).
An Illinois appeals court held that a litigant cannot bring a tortious interference action unless it can be shown that a will contest was not available or would not provide adequate relief. In re Estate of Knowlson, 204 Ill.App.3d 454, 149 Ill.Dec. 813, 562 N.E.2d 277, 280 (1990). Thus, that jurisdiction does not recognize a second action except in those cases where there is not adequate relief in the will contest. The Illinois court did not speak to the matter of attorney fees and costs.
Other courts have held that a person cannot bring an action for intentional interference if adequate relief is available in a probate proceeding. DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218-20 (Fla.1981); Johnson v. Stevenson, 269 N.C. 200, 152 S.E.2d 214, 217 (1967).
Our review of the cases indicates that there is no bright-line rule requiring that the two actions be brought together. Rather, the case law suggests that those courts considered factors such as: (1) whether the plaintiff first sought a probate remedy or whether bringing a probate remedy was even possible (e.g., in the case of a destroyed will or in a case in which the alleged wrong was not discovered until after the probate proceedings were completed); (2) whether any probate remedy obtained by the plaintiff was adequate and provided plaintiff with a complete remedy; (3) whether it was possible to litigate all issues in the probate court; and (4) whether the particular state probate court had jurisdiction of the tort claim.
Although there is some overlap, we do not believe the same evidence supports the will contest and the action for intentional interference with a bequest. Further, we agree with plaintiffs that a complete remedy could not be provided in the will contest because of additional costs involved in the appeals process. Therefore, we hold the district court erred in dismissing Huffeys’ action against these defendants under the doctrine of claim preclusion.
III. Jean Huffey ⅛ claims. Huf-feys’ petition alleges that Margaret executed a will on June 18 in which she gave the residue of her estate, which included the farm, to George Huffey. Huffeys did not allege any loss of property interest by George’s wife, Jean. In response to Leas’ motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that Jean had failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and is not a real party in interest. On appeal, Huffeys maintain Jean has an interest because she was a beneficiary under the July will, annulled in the will contest, and because she has a statutory share of real property possessed by her husband at anytime during the marriage.
A party plaintiff must have capacity to sue in order to commence and maintain an action. Dumbaugh v. Cascade Mfg. Co., 264 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Iowa 1978). Our test for standing is that “the complaining party have a specific, personal, and legal interest in the litigation, and be injuriously affected.” Hawkeye Bancorporation v. Iowa College Aid, 360 N.W.2d 798, 801 (Iowa 1985). We fail to see where plaintiffs’ pleadings alleged Jean’s interest in the litigation. Her claim of such an interest pursuant to Iowa Code sections 633.211 and 633.212, provisions for share of surviving spouse, vests upon the death of the spouse. In re Estate of Jones, 239 Iowa 1364, 1366, 35 N.W.2d 36, 38 (1948). Unlike her husband, Jean Huffey was not a beneficiary to the June will and cannot *523claim that she had a direct interest in contesting the July will. We conclude the trial court correctly dismissed her cause of action.
IV. Lea-Faber’s motion to quash service. Huffeys attempted service on defendant Donna Lea-Faber through the provisions of Iowa Code section 617.3 (1989), the long-arm statute. Lea-Faber sought to quash the service of notice, claiming she had not received notice because it had not been mailed to her current address. Prior to a ruling by the district court, Lea-Faber joined a motion to enlarge rulings filed by defendant Joseph Lea. We conclude that Lea-Faber generally appeared when she joined this motion. Cf. Fisher v. Keller Indus., Inc., 485 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Iowa 1992). Consequently, we hold the district court erred in quashing the service of notice and dismissing Lea-Faber from the cause of action.
V. Statute of limitations. In their motions to dismiss, Leas raised the affirmative defense that the action was barred by the statute of limitation, Iowa Code section 614.1(2) (1989). This section provides that actions, “founded on injuries to the person or reputation, including injuries to relative rights, whether based on contract or tort, or for a statute penalty,” be brought within two years after the cause accrues. Huf-feys claim that the five-year period of Iowa Code section 614.1(4) (1989), covering damage to property, is applicable. Under its ruling dismissing the action, the district court did not address this matter. Upon remand, the district court, at an appropriate time, must rule on these defenses.
VI. Summary. In summary, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm that portion of the district court’s ruling dismissing Jean Huffey’s action against the defendants. We reverse the district court’s ruling quashing service on Donna Lea-Faber and the dismissal of George Huffey’s action on grounds of claim preclusion against all defendants. We remand to the district court for further proceedings by George Huffey against all defendants. Costs are assessed one-half to Jean Huffey and the balance to all other defendants.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
All Justices concur except McGIVERIN, C.J., joined by NEUMAN, J., who dissent.. We note that some of the defendants have raised an issue not addressed by the trial court. They claim that during the will contest the trial court specifically instructed the jury that they could only find that Dorothy and Theresa Lea were disposed to unduly influence Margaret 01-son and there was no legal issue of undue influence on the part of the other defendants. A ruling on a motion to dismiss is confined to the pleadings, and we believe that this is a matter more suited for a ruling after the record is expanded.