(concurring). I concur in the court’s decision. Other States have concluded that roadblocks subject to guidelines that restrict police discretion are constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 845 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981); State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45 (1984); State v. Garcia, 481 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. *95529 (1983); Kinslow v. Commonwealth, 660 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1105 (1984); State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143 (Me. 1985); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485 (1984); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518 (1984); State v. Shankle, 58 Or. App. 134 (1982); State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562 (1985); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575 (1980). See also People v. Meitz, 95 Ill. App. 3d 1033 (1981). See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R. 4th 10 (1985).
Although “there is no ‘typical’ sobriety checkpoint roadblock,” Rogers, The Drunk-Driving Roadblock: Random Seizure or Minimal Instrusion?, 21 Crim. L. Bull. 197, 204 (1985), it is possible to distill from the case law and legal commentators the principles necessary to pass constitutional muster. There must exist “(1) a checkpoint or roadblock location selected for its safety and visibility to oncoming motorists;1 (2) adequate advance warning signs, illuminated at night, timely informing approaching motorists of the nature of the impending instrusion; (3) uniformed officers and official vehicles in sufficient quantity and visibility to ‘show ... the police power of the community’; and (4) a predetermination by policy-making administrative officers of the roadblock location, time, and procedures to be employed, pursuant to carefully formulated standards and neutral criteria.” State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Iowa 1980). See State v. Deskins, supra at 541; State v. Coccomo, supra at 581. See generally Rogers, *96supra at 204; Comment, Filling in the Blanks after Prouse: A New Standard for the Drinking-Driving Roadblock, 20 Land & Water L. Rev. 241, 254-257 (1985); Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver Under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 Geo. L.J. 1457, 1482-1484 (1983). In these cases there is no suggestion that the guidelines do not meet these standards or that the police did not follow the promulgated guidelines.2
As I read Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1979), the linchpin for constitutional roadblocks is that police officers not possess “unconstrained discretion.” The guidelines here provided for record keeping; for tailoring the application of roadblocks to places of previous injuries; for use of “areas adjacent to rest area or parking lots”; and for advance public announcement of the intended checkpoint. The guidelines approached more closely than may be strictly necessary those needed for the minimization of intrusion and the maximization of safety.3 See, e.g., Comment, Filling in the Blanks after Prouse: A New Standard for the Drinking-Driving Roadblock, 20 Land & Water L. Rev. 241 (1985).
The thrust of the defendants’ argument is that “[b]y eliminating the requirement that an officer act only on reasonable and articulable facts or probable cause, which is subject to judicial review, the standardless intrusion by an officer eludes scrutiny and renders the Fourth Amendment (as well as art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights) a virtual nullity.” The Supreme Court, however, has already indicated that, in the appropriate circumstances, roadblock stops do not violate motorists’ Federal constitutional rights. See Delaware v. Prouse, supra at 663.
*97I also reject the defendants’ argument that a failure to follow G. L. c. 30A (1984 ed.) in issuing the guidelines would make constitutionally infirm any seizure made at any roadblock conducted pursuant to the guidelines. The State’s violation of its own statute does not necessarily amount to a Federal or State constitutional violation. “[E]yen the outright violation of state law by local officers ‘is a matter primarily of concern to the state and does not implicate the Constitution’ — absent ‘fundamental procedural irregularity, racial animus or the like.’ ” Roy v. Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517, 1523 (1st Cir. 1983), quoting Creative Env’ts, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982). See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 492 F.2d 937, 941 n.8 (7th Cir. 1974) (not every violation of State law or agency regulation constitutes a denial of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest); United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1970) (agencies do not always violate due process when they fail to adhere to their procedures). Moreover, the defendants made no showing that the Commonwealth’s failure to promulgate the guidelines under c. 30A procedures offends due process by denying citizens a constitutionally protected liberty or property right.
Last, although we said that roadblocks coupled with advance publicity “may achieve a degree of law enforcement and highway safety that is not reasonably attainable by less intrusive means,” Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 143-144 (1983), we have never considered whether the Commonwealth must show that roadblocks are the least intrusive means or must meet some lower standard in order to pass constitutional muster. That issue has not been briefed or argued by the defendants. Generally, issues not briefed or argued to the court are deemed waived. Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 38 n.13 (1983). Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 367 Mass. 919 (1975). I think it would be unfair to the Commonwealth to reach this issue, as the dissenting Justices urge us to do, because the defendants have not briefed or argued the issue and the Commonwealth was compelled to stipulate to facts in order to facilitate this appeal. This issue *98should be decided on a record fully developed by the adversary process.
The guidelines here at issue are an attempt to reduce the threat of drivers who drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquor while remaining sensitive to the individual motorist’s expectation of privacy. “No one can deny the State’s vital interest in promoting public safety upon our roads by detecting and prosecuting drunk drivers. These drivers are a threat to other motorists, to pedestrians and to themselves.” State v. Coccomo, supra at 582. On the issues raised by the defendants, there was no error in denying the motions to suppress.
Decisions involving fixed or permanent immigration checkpoints lend further guidance in determining the reasonableness of a roadblock. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). Some courts have extrapolated from the Border Patrol cases the requirement that a checkpoint be “permanent,” See, e.g., State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 394 (S.D. 1976).
In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), however, the Court did not refer to “permanent" checkpoints. Rather, it allowed “for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative.” Id. at 663.
The defendants, however, have not raised the issue of “permanence” and the court need not reach it. I only note, however, that the roadblock here was not a roving patrol; it was in a fixed location not subject to police officers’ discretion.
In their brief, the defendants suggest that, even with the guidelines, an individual driver who is detained may be subject to arbitrary police conduct during the detention. Nothing the court holds prevents an individual driver from raising a claim of violation of constitutional rights during a particular seizure and detention. The burden of justifying police conduct during the challenged warrantless seizure and detention is on the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51 (1974).
On this issue, the defendants do not make any separate argument that the State Constitution’s standard differs from the Federal standard.