I do not concur in reversal. I agree with Mr. Justice Bitshnell that the nonindorsement upon the information of. the names of certain persons, referred to by defendant on appeal as res gestae witnesses, did not, under the circumstances of this case, amount to reversible error, particularly because such indorsement was at no time before verdict requested by the defense and there is no showing that the defense was less aware at time of trial than now of the existence and identity, of those persons, they having assisted defendant in tipping over the automobile. See People v. Fleisch, 321 Mich 443, and People v. Prescott, 268 Mich 606.
I am not in accord with the conclusion that the information should have been laid under CL 1948, § 750.416 (Stat Ann § 28.648), which is a part of the penal code enacted in 1931 (No 328). Where the damage exceeded $50, defendant was properly charged with a felony in violation of CL 1948, § 750.-377a (Stat Ann 1949 Cum Supp § 28.609[1]), added to the penal code in 1941 by Act No 51. This later, amendment declares it .to be a felony for a person to wilfully and maliciously destroy or injure .any *141personal property of another where the damage exceeds $50. The legislative intent is plain. If we were to agree that the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act would control. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Stoll, 276 Mich 637. In this connection of interest is the following from People v. McHugh, 286 Mich 336:
“That defendant might have been charged and convicted under PA 1931, No 328, § 174 (CLS 1935, § 17115-174, [CL 1948, § 750.174], Stat Ann § 28.371), as well as section 362 of that act, does not vitiate the information or render the conviction erroneous. Williams v. United States, 168 US 382 (18 S Ct 92, 42 L ed 509). There was testimony tending to show the statute was directly applicable to the offense with which defendant was charged.”
I do not agree that reference by the prosecuting attorney, in his opening statement and in his cross-examination of defense witnesses, to the- tipping over of another automobile at the place of and' a few moments before the occurrence of the offense here involved constituted reversible error. The prosecuting attorney not only made the statement quoted in Justice Bushnell’s opinion, disavowing any claim of connection between defendant and the- previously committed offense, but also stated definitely, before the jury, “Wo don’t claim any place this man (defendant) had anything to do with the first incident.” The case of People v. Thompson, 238 Mich 171, quoted by Justice Bushnell, and other cases cited by defendant in this connection, viz., People v. Moyer, 77 Mich 571, People v. Padgett, 306 Mich 545, and People v. McHugh, supra, do not support defendant’s claim of reversible error in' this regard. In the Thompson Case, in which defendant was charged with keeping a place where intoxicating liquors were illegally stored and possessed, the admission of testi*142mony concerning Inis drunkenness during tile previous year was held to be-prejudicial. In the Moyer Case defendant was charged with receiving stolen goods. The prosecuting attorney’s statement to the jury that he was prejudiced against the defendant because he had committed perjury in another' court, and the trial court’s apparent indorsement of that statement, were held to be reversible error.. In the Padgett Case, we held reversible error the admission of testimony, in a murder case, that defendant had some 15 days before the murder committed an utterly unconnected robbery, the only issue of fact in the case having related to the identity of the killer. In the McHivgh Case, evidence of defendant’s- commission of previous offenses was held properly adr mitted under CL 1948, § 768.27 (Stat Ann § 28.1050). It will be noted that in -each of these cases the question pertainéd to the admissibility of evidence concerning offenses previously committed by the de, fendant. They do not hold, and we are cited to no authorities holding that reference by the prosecuting attorney to previous offenses committed by persons other than the defendant is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant so as to amount to reversible error, although it might be so in some cases and under certain circumstances. Defendant was charged witbi overturning an automobile feloniously, wilfully and maliciously. As touching on the question of whether the tipping of the automobile by defendant was felonious, wilful and malicious, evidence tending to show the situation then and there existing was material and admissible. Even though it were to be held, however, that testimony concerning the previous tipping of another automobile by other persons, at the scene of and shortly before the occurrence of the offense in question, was incompetent and immaterial and for that reason objectionable, it in nowise appears that the jury was or could have been improper*143ly influenced or defendant’s rights prejudiced or impaired by tbe prosecuting attorney’s reference to the offense previously committed by others coupled with his explanation that it was not claimed that defendant had any connection therewith. Prejudicial or reversible error did not occur in this connection.
The conviction is affirmed..
Reid, C. J., and Boyles, North, Butzel, and Carr, JJ., concurred with Dethmers, J.