dissenting.
While our legislature could write a statute making it a crime to deal drugs within one thousand feet of a school whether the dealer knew he was within one thousand feet of a school or not, I agree with Justice DeBruler that the legislature did not write Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1 that way. In particular, I think the majority is wrong not to take into *248account in its analysis Indiana Code § 35-41-2-2(d) which provides:
Unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if a kind of culpability is required for the commission of the offense, it is required with respect to every material element of the prohibited conduct.
The statute at issue here requires "knowing or intentional" culpability for the commission of the offense and does not provide for any lesser degree of culpability with respect to the "one thousand feet of a school" element.
Finally, I agree with Justice DeBruler that Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis of the scienter requirement in a federal criminal statute provides useful guidance here:
Our reluctance to simply follow the most grammatical reading of the statute is heightened by our cases interpreting criminal statutes to include broadly applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its terms does not contain them.
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, -, 115 S.Ct. 464, 468, 130 LEd.2d 372 (1994) (emphasis added).
For these reasons, I dissent.