(concurring specially).
Although I concur in the result the court reaches today, I disagree with the majority’s reasoning with respect to the temporary detention of the traffic violator in this case. Inasmuch as our criminal rules place strict limitations on custodial arrests for minor crimes, I see no principled basis for resort to our state constitution to make a break from the Atwater majority. The criminal rules require a reasonable and proportional response to the circumstances of the offense; and we have long held that a temporary detention in a squad car is not a de facto arrest. In my view, the placement of an unlicensed driver in a squad car in the early morning hours for purposes of ascertaining and verifying the driver’s identity and to abate criminal con*372duct is permissible under our criminal rules and prior case law. ' Nevertheless, because the detention in this case went beyond the scope and duration of the traffic stop, I would reverse.
The relevant facts, briefly stated, are these. At about 12:40 a.m. on April 21, 2001, while on routine patrol and working alone, St. Paul Police Officer Thaddus Schmidt observed a van run a stop sign at Burgess and Farrington. The officer activated the squad car’s emergency lights and followed the van for a block and a half before the vehicle pulled over. The officer approached the van and aáked the driver, the only occupant in the van, for his driver’s license. The driver said he did not have one. The officer asked the driver to step out of the vehicle, did a quick pat-down for weapons and placed the driver in the back seat of the squad car. The driver identified - himself as .Todd Askerooth and provided his date of birth and address. A records check verified that 'Askerooth’s driver’s license had been revoked. While Officer Schmidt was talking to Askerooth in the squad car, two other officers arrived.
Officer Schmidt told Askerooth that he was going to issue a ticket for driving after revocation and running the stop sign. While ■ still in the squad car, the officer asked for and obtained Askerooth’s consent to search the van. As Askerooth sat in the back of the squad car, the officers searched the van. After the search, Officer Schmidt issued a citation for the traffic violations and advised Askerooth to lock the van and walk home. As Askerooth walked away, the officer found the methamphetamine that Askerooth later admitted he had “dumped” in the back seat.
Askerooth moved to suppress the methamphetamine, arguing that while the initial detention in the squad car was permissible, the continued detention for the consent inquiry and search of the van was unreasonable. The district court found that Askerooth was temporarily placed in the squad car for purposes of ascertaining identity and that beyond that point, it was an issue of abandonment and denied the motion to suppress. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that on the facts of this case, the temporary detention in the squad car was not unreasonable. State v. Askerooth, No. C6-02-318, 2003 WL 230673, at *2 (Minn.App. Feb.4, 2003).
The Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures * * U.S. Const, amend. TV. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001). But states may provide their citizens with a higher level of protection than that afforded by the United States Constitution. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (states may develop laws regarding search and seizure but may not authorize conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment). At-water recognized that many jurisdictions have chosen to impose more restrictive limitations on warrantless arrests for minor offenses and indicated that it might be easier “to devise a minor-offense limitation by statute than to derive one through the Constitution * * *.” Atwater, 532 U.S. at 352, 121 S.Ct. 1536.
Minnesota has had the “limiting proviso” referred to in Atwater for nearly 30 years. Since their inception in 1975, the criminal procedural rules have required law enforcement officers to issue citations in misdemeanor cases “unless it reason-
*373ably appears to the officer that arrest or detention is necessary to prevent bodily harm to the accused or another or further criminal conduct, or that there is’ a substantial likelihood that the accused will fail to respond to a citation.” Minn. R.Crim. P. 6.01, subd. l(lXa).1 The limitations on full custodial arrests for misdemeanors have long been enforced through exclusionary rules. See State v. Martin, 253 N.W.2d 404, 406 (Minn.1977) (search not justified as incident to an arrest that violated Rule 6.01); State v. Richmond, 602 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Minn.App.1999) (same); State v. Evans, 373 N.W.2d 836, 838 (Minn.App.1985) (same); cf. State v. Brown, 345 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Minn.1984) (full custodial misdemeanor arrest justified because officer “was aware that defendant had previously failed to appear for citations issued to him.”). For felonies and gross misdemeanors, the rules permit, rather than require, citations in lieu of arrest. Minn. R.Crim. P. 6.01, subd. 2.2 Consistent with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 26-27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), Minnesota’s criminal rules require that custodial arrests be a reasonable and proportional response to the circumstances of the offense.3 Consequently, *374I see neither the need nor the purpose in recognizing limitations on custodial arrests under the state constitution, particularly where the criminal rules have been workable and easily applied by officers on the street. See Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking ? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 Fordham L.Rev. 329, 415 (2002) (“The experience of Minnesota * * * shows that strict limitations on police powers to arrest for minor offenses are workable in practice and pose no threat to law enforcement and public safety.”).4
During the course of a lawful Terry stop for a traffic offense, a police officer may direct a person to provide identification. State v. White, 489 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Minn.1992) (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985)). An officer may also order the driver and passengers out of the vehicle. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (per curiam).- And the placement of a lawfully stopped motorist in a police car for a,short period of time does not automatically “take the situation beyond the realm of the ordinary traffic stop.” State v. Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d 116, 120 (Minn.1990) (quoting State v. Herem, 384 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn.1986) (lone deputy’s separation of occupants of motorcycle, placing one in a police car, was prudent under the circumstances)); but see State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 891 (Minn.1998) (officers could not circumvent the reasonableness requirement for a Terry-type frisk by requiring a minor traffic violator to sit in the squad car).5 In evaluating the reasonable*375ness of a traffic stop, the subjective intent of the police officer is not a relevant consideration. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).
Here, Askerooth, who said he had no driver’s license, was detained in the back seat of the squad car in the early morning hours in mid-April while the lone officer verified his identity and checked his driving record. The check came back that Askerooth’s driver’s license had been revoked, and the officer issued a citation for driving after revocation and running the stop sign. It seems to me that the temporary detention under these circumstances was prudent and permissible. See Minn. R.Crim. P. 6.01, subd. 1 (detention permissible to prevent further criminal conduct or if there is a substantial likelihood that the suspect will fail to respond to a citation); cf. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 365, 121 S.Ct. 1536 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (war-rantless arrest permissible “to abate criminal conduct[,] * * * verify the offender’s identity and, if the offender poses a flight risk, to ensure her appearance at trial.”). In my view, allowing an unidentified and unlicensed driver to retain control of his vehicle or stand along the roadway while the lone police officer returns to his squad car to do a computer search of a database and complete the investigation, including a determination of the identity of the driver, neither follows sound jurisprudence nor serves sound police protocol.
The scope and duration of a traffic stop investigation, however, “must be limited to the justification for the stop.” State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Minn.2003) (citing State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn.2002)). In Fort, the defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that had been stopped for a routine traffic violation; but the police proceeded with a drug investigation without any reasonable articulable suspicion. We reinstated the district court’s suppression order, holding that the police expansion of the routine traffic stop beyond the underlying justification for the stop violated the state constitution. Id. at 419.
Here, after concluding the traffic violation investigation, the officer asked for consent to search the van; and while Aske-*376rooth was still locked in the back seat of the squad car, three police officers searched his van. Although Askerooth asserted that his detention in the squad car “became absolutely unreasonable” because of the consent inquiry and' subsequent search, the district court concluded that it was simply a matter of abandonment. However, abandonment will not be found where property is discarded by the unlawful presence or pursuit by police officers. In re E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn.1993); City of St. Paul v. Vaughn, 306 Minn. 337, 345, 237 N.W.2d 365, 370 (1975).
The state bears the burden of establishing the validity of a warrantless search or seizure. See State v. Fitzgerald, 562 N.W.2d 288, 288 (Minn.1997) (state bears the burden of establishing the existence of an emergency justifying a warrantless entry under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement); State v. Mastrian, 285 Minn. 51, 56, 171 N.W.2d 695, 699 (1969) (upon challenge to a warrantless arrest, state has the burden of proving that the arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment). On the record before us, I agree with the majority that it cannot be said the state sustained its burden of showing that the methamphetamine was discarded during the lawful portion of the detention, thus requiring reversal of the conviction and suppression of the evidence.
. Minn. R.Crim. P. 6.01, subd. l(l)(a) provides:
Law enforcement officers acting without a warrant, who have decided to proceed with prosecution, shall issue citations to persons subject to lawful arrest for misdemeanors, unless it reasonably appears to the officer that arrest or detention is necessary to prevent bodily harm to the accused or another or further criminal conduct, or that there is a substantial likelihood that the accused will fail to respond to a citation. The citation may be issued in lieu of an arrest, or if an arrest has been made, in lieu of continued detention. If the defendant is detained, the officer shall report to the court the reasons for the detention. Ordinarily, for misdemeanors not punishable by incarceration, a citation shall be issued.
. Minn. R.Crim. P. 6.01, subd. 2 provides:
When a law enforcement officer acting without a warrant is entitled to make an arrest for a felony or gross misdemeanor or a person arrested without a warrant for a felony or gross misdemeanor is brought to a police station or county jail, the officer in charge of the police station or the county sheriff in charge of the jail or an officer designated by the sheriff may issue a citation in lieu of arrest or in lieu of continued detention if an arrest has been made; unless it reasonably appears to the officer that arrest or detention is necessary to prevent bodily harm to the accused or another or further criminal conduct or that the accused may fail to appear in response to the citation.
. "There are significant qualitative differences between a traffic stop and a full custo- . dial arrest.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. at 363, 121 S.Ct. 1536 (O'Connnor, J., dissenting). The former is limited in scope and permits a warrantless pat-down of the detainee’s outer clothing only if the officer has a reasonable belief that the detainee is "armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Unlike the limited pat-down search, as a search incident to an arrest, an officer may conduct a full search of the arrestee and of the area within the arrestee’s immediate control for weapons and evidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). The search-incident rules apply so long as the custodial arrest is valid, although in 1973 members of the Supreme Court questioned the validity of a full custodial arrest for a minor traffic offense. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266-67, 94 S.Ct. 494, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[A] persuasive claim might have been made * * ⅜ that the custodial arrest of the petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated [the Fourth Amendment], But no such claim has been made.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 n. 2, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that the validity of the custodial arrest for a minor traffic offense was not "self-evident”). Minnesota's criminal procedural rules addressed the Robinson-Gustafson rule with strict limitations on custodial arrests for minor offenses. State v. Martin, 253 N.W.2d 404, 405-06 (Minn.1977) (issue of constitutional validity of a full custo*374dial arrest for the minor offense not reached because Minn. R.Crim. P. 6.01, subd. l(l)(a) provides for citations in lieu of arrest). In Minnesota, Terry principles apply to traffic stops. State v. McKinley, 305 Minn. 297, 304, 232 N.W.2d 906, 911 (1975).
. There is no tension, as the majority suggests, between Minn.Stat. § 629.34 (2002) (common-law in-presence ’requirement for misdemeanor arrests) and Rule 6.01 that recognizes the concept of the " 'custodial arrest,' a special subset of the broader category of 'arrest' that did not even exist [under federal law] until created in United States v. Robinson [.]" 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(h) at 34 (Supp.2004). Minnesota, however, had recognized that special subset of arrests for traffic offenses before Robinson. See Minn.Stat. § 169.91, subd. 1 (2002) (limiting full custodial arrests for traffic offenses). Rule 6.01 extended the limitation on custodial arrests for all misdemeanors and ordinance violations. Minn. R.Crim. P. 6 cmt.-Rule 6. As for the exclusionary rule, we have said that ''[procedural defects which are minor and relatively insignificant need not require suppression. On the other hand, serious violations which subvert the purpose of established procedures will justify suppression.” State, City of Minneapolis v. Cook, 498 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn.1993). Violations- of Rule 6.01 are far from "minor and relatively insignificant.” It may be that state constitutional policymak-ing is justified when necessary to "clarify sometimes confusing federal case law so that the * * * courts can apply rules more easily” or, when "effective, law enforcement is not hampered, * * * in order to increase the amount of privacy protection a state affords its citizens.” Wesley D. Dupont, Automobile Searches and Judicial Decisionmaking Under State Constitutions: State v. Miller, 27 Conn. L.Rev. 699, 721-22 (1995). Our criminal rules, however, accomplished those objectives long ago: "Minnesota * * * has had [the At-water limiting proviso] for more than 25 years and enforces the limitation via an exclusionary rule, all suggesting that the police there have managed to make the judgments provided by their proviso.” LaFave, supra at 27. By excepting traffic stops from that limiting proviso and undermining- the case law that enforced limitations on custodial arrests, it may very well be that the majority has also undermined the limitations on custodial arrests for all other non-traffic misdemeanors and ordinance violations.
. Courts, elsewhere have concluded that a traffic violator can be detained in a police car while the officer verifies the driver’s license, *375checks on the status of the license and registration and issues a citation as these acts are within the purposes of the initial stop. See, e.g., United States v. White, 81 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1011, 117 S.Ct. 518, 136 L.Ed.2d 406 (1996) (stating that officer may ask for license and registration, request driver to sit in patrol car, and check for outstanding warrants); United States v. Bradshaw, 102 F.3d 204, 212 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1178, 117 S.Ct. 1453, 137 L.Ed.2d 558 (1997) (detention in patrol car during radio checks and issuance of citation); United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 477 (9th Cir.1994) (detention in patrol car during computer check of identification card to verify that driver's license had been suspended); United States v. Parr, 843 F.2d 1228, 1230-31 (9th Cir.1988) (defendant’s failure to produce a valid driver's license "justified the request that he get out of his car and sit in the police car while a standard police identification process took place" but the request did not constitute an arrest). Cases cited by the majority for a contrary conclusion are inapposite, having more to do with a pat-down search for weapons. E.g., United States v. Glenn, 152 F.3d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir.1998) ("An officer's decision to place a traffic offender in the back of a patrol car does not create a reasonable, artic-ulable suspicion to justify a pat-down search that the circumstances would not otherwise allow.”); Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1049 (Del.2001) (valid traffic stop for parking violation ended when officer frisked and handcuffed driver and waited for backup). In Goss v. State, 744 So.2d 1167 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999), the court there held that an officer was not justified in placing an individual in a patrol car during an investigatory stop for suspicion that the individual had charged a motorist to park in a city-owned parking lot. Id. at 1168-69.