[¶ 1] The State of North Dakota appealed from a district court order dismissing charges against Korsiba Arot for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
I.
[¶ 2] Arot was charged in district court with three counts of gross sexual imposition for incidents that occurred in the summer of 2011, the latest of which occurred on August 24, 2011. Arot moved to dismiss the criminal charges arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because Arot was not eighteen at the time of the incidents. Attached to the motion was an affidavit from Arot’s father. The affidavit stated that Arot and his family are refugees who immigrated from Sudan in 2004. Arot was born in southern Sudan in the village of Juba. When they arrived in the country, the family had no documentation of their birth dates. Each member of the family was assigned an arbitrary birth date. In Arot’s case, it is January 1, 1993. The affidavit also stated Arot’s birthday was in late summer of 1993, and his father knew it was late summer because it was the dry season. Arot also submitted an exhibit showing dry season in Sudan begins in September in the north *411and moves south so it covers the whole country by the end of December. The State resisted the motion, and a hearing was held.
[¶ 3] At the hearing, the State presented three witnesses. First, the State called Dawn Peters, Arot’s juvenile probation officer. She testified to several documents from the juvenile court on which Arot’s birthday is listed as “1/1/1993.” These documents were filled out by either Arot or one of his parents. She also testified on cross-examination that many of her immigrant clients from Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia have a January 1 birthday.
[¶ 4] The State also called Vanessa Boehm, Arot’s high school counselor. She testified to several documents filled out by Arot or his parents where his birthday is listed as “1/1/1993.” Additionally, Boehm testified that she held a “senior conference” with Arot in late September 2011. His parents did not attend. She stated that if he had not been eighteen, the meeting would not have been held without his parents. She testified that Arot told her he was eighteen, so she could conduct the meeting without his parents. Boehm also testified that many students who immigrated from places like Sudan have a January 1 birthday, and that as far as she knew, the birthday was arbitrarily assigned.
[¶ 5] The State’s final witness was Christopher Novak, a manager from Mexican Village, where Arot worked. Arot was hired on April 17, 2011. Novak testified to several exhibits, including a job application, a copy of Arot’s driver’s license, and an 1-9 form, where Arot wrote that his birthday was “1/1/1993.” Novak testified that Arot was not required to be eighteen to work at Mexican Village. Novak did not testify that Arot claimed to be eighteen. Novak also testified that in his experience it was common for immigrants to have a January 1 birthday.
[¶ 6] Arot’s father was available for cross-examination on his affidavit, but the State declined to cross-examine him. The district court found the State failed to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that Arot was eighteen at the time of the incidents. The charges were dismissed.
II.
[¶ 7] “The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction of ... [proceedings in which a child is alleged to be delinquent, unruly, or deprived.” N.D.C.C. § 27-20-03(l)(a). “‘Child’ means an individual who is ... [ujnder the age of twenty years with respect to a delinquent act committed while under the age of eighteen years.” N.D.C.C. § 27-20-02(4)(b). “When jurisdictional facts are disputed, the district court’s decision on subject matter jurisdiction necessarily involves findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, when disputed facts surround a challenge to the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, we are presented with a mixed question of law and fact.” Schirado v. Foote, 2010 ND 136, ¶ 7, 785 N.W.2d 235. “Under this standard, we review the ‘questions of law subject to the de novo standard of review [and the] findings of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.’ ” Id. (quoting Wigginton v. Wigginton, 2005 ND 31, ¶ 13, 692 N.W.2d 108). In this case, there are questions of fact and questions of law. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support it, or if, upon review of the entire record, this Court believes a mistake has been made.” Wigginton, at ¶ 8.
[¶ 8] This Court has stated that “the standard of proof denominated as *412proof beyond a reasonable doubt is inapplicable to waiver of jurisdiction proceedings because it applies in the context of a criminal trial and not to the initial stages of the criminal process.” Interest of AD.L., 301 N.W.2d 380, 384 (N.D.1981). While the standard of proof for waiver is set by statute, the same principle generally applies to the initial determination of jurisdiction. See N.D.C.C. § 27-20-34(1)(c)(4). The determination is not one of guilt or innocence, requiring a proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether the district court has the power to act. Notably, the majority of courts who have confronted this issue have held that the correct standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 50 F.Supp.2d 908, 909 (D.Minn.1999); State v. Ali, 806 N.W.2d 45, 54 (Minn.2011); but see State v. Mohamed, 178 Ohio App.3d 695, 899 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (2008) (finding the State must prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt). Therefore, the district court correctly required the State to prove Arot’s age by the preponderance of the evidence.
[¶ 9] The State argues the district court clearly erred by finding the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Arot was eighteen years of age at the time of the alleged offenses. To prove that Arot was eighteen at the time of the incidents, the State offered various documents from Arot’s school, work, and the juvenile court filled out or signed by Arot that showed his date of birth as “1/1/1993.” It is virtually undisputed, however, that “1/1/1993” is not Arot’s actual date of birth. The State concedes that “1/1/1993” was assigned as Arot’s birthday when he immigrated to the United States because his parents did not have records of his actual date of birth. Further, all three of the State’s witnesses confirmed that it was quite common for an immigrant to have an arbitrary date of birth like Arot’s. School records submitted at the hearing show that two of Arot’s siblings have a January 1 birthday.
[¶ 10] To rebut the State’s evidence that Arot’s birthday is “1/1/1993,” Arot’s father submitted an affidavit stating Arot was born in the late summer of 1993, placing his eighteenth birthday after the dates of the alleged offenses. The State argues the affidavit was unreliable and self-serving because Arot translated for his father. Arot’s father was available for cross-examination, however. The State could have asked him about the contents of the affidavit to determine whether Arot misinterpreted anything, or to clarify exactly when Arot was born. The State chose not to cross-examine Arot’s father. Under the “clearly erroneous” standard of review, this Court will not re-weigh evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses. See Hammeren v. Hammeren, 2012 ND 225, ¶8, 823 N.W.2d 482. The State failed to successfully rebut this evidence. The State presented no evidence that Arot was eighteen at the time of the incidents except the documents showing “1/1/1993.”
[¶ 11] The district court found that the State had not met its burden in part because the State had not presented any admissions by Arot that he was eighteen prior to the dates of the alleged offenses. The State argues the district court should not have restricted consideration of Arot’s admissions of age to those admissions made before the alleged dates of the offenses. But, Arot’s affirmation to his high school counselor that he was eighteen did not occur until about two months after the alleged crimes. Arot affirmed that he was eighteen at the time of that meeting, not two months before. Therefore, the State could only show he was eighteen at the time of Arot’s admission, not at the time of *413the alleged offenses. An admission that he was eighteen before the offenses would have rebutted Arot’s father’s affidavit that Arot did not turn eighteen until after the dates of the offenses.
[¶ 12] The State argues that Arot has adopted “1/1/1998” as his date of birth because it is listed on his official documents and he uses it on various official forms. This evidence, however, is’ inconclusive. Arot was simply reciting the birthday assigned to him by the United States on his immigration documents. Arot could not leave the space blank, and entering any other birthday would presumably lead to problems because it would not match his immigration documents. The State is apparently asking this Court to apply an irrebuttable presumption that the date of birth on his government-issued documents is his actual date of birth. We refuse to do so. While Arot remains a non-citizen, legal permanent resident, there is no procedure in North Dakota for him to correct his official date of birth. See N.D.C.C. § 32-37-01 (“Any citizen of the United States, either natural born or naturalized, may maintain a proceeding ... for the purpose of having a judicial determination of the date and place of the person’s birth.”). There is a procedure for Arot to correct his date of birth on his immigration documents, but he has no documentation of his actual date of birth required to make such a correction. Application to Replace Permanent Resident Card, USCIS Form 1-90. An irrebuttable presumption that the date of birth on an immigrant’s official documents is the actual date of birth would necessarily result in children who are subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts being tried in district court. This is inconsistent with stated public purposes of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, specifically, “to remove from children committing delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior and to substitute therefor a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation.” N.D.C.C. § 27-20-01(2).
III.
[¶ 13] We affirm the district court order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
[¶ 14] CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, MARY MUEHLEN MARING, and DANIEL J. CROTHERS, concur.