dissenting.
[¶ 33] I respectfully dissent from Part IIA of the majority opinion.
I
[¶ 34] Although nuanced, the issues presented to the district court in this case were actually twofold: Whether an error occurred in the omission of a provision in the written judgment addressing mineral rights and whether that provision applied to the property transferred from Bobbi Kukla to Wayne Kukla. The district court, failing to differentiate between the two, addressed both issues under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60 and answered both questions in the affirmative.
[¶ 35] Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a), a district court “may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record.” (Emphasis added). However, this correction must be based on, and must be a reflection of, the record available to the court at the time of the original judgment, not an attempt to change the original judgment after the fact. See Gruebele v. Gruebele, 338 N.W.2d 805, 811-12 (N.D.1983) (“Rule 60(a) is not a vehicle ... to change what has been deliberately done.”).
[¶ 36] In this case, the parties reached an agreement in their divorce proceedings which was orally placed on the record in lieu of a trial. This oral agreement stated, in relevant part, that:
With regard to the property division, ... the real estate will be divided, as follows:
*444The farm real estate will be awarded to the Defendant and the Plaintiff shall execute any necessary deeds as quitclaim or whatever that’s needed to transfer that.
The residence in Killdeer will be awarded to the Plaintiff.
The mineral acres that are currently in existence will be divided equally. They will each have an undivided one-half interest in those mineral acres.
Between the oral agreement and entry of the written judgment, the judge presiding over the case was replaced. Proposed concluding documents were submitted to the new judge, which neglected to make any mention of the mineral interests. The new judge did not review a transcript of the oral agreement before entering the written judgment. As a result, the written judgment omitted the oral stipulation regarding mineral interests.
[¶ 37] The total absence of the mineral interest provision was a mistake arising from omission and thus could be corrected by the court under Rule 60(a). See Gruebele, 338 N.W.2d at 812 (reinstating a correction under Rule 60(a) where mineral reservation language was omitted from an order confirming the sale of property in a divorce matter). The district court recognized this mistake in its order:
The parties, when presenting their stipulation orally to the court, entered into a contract. That stipulation was merged into a written Judgment which was presented to the Court....
However, the divorce Judgment does not expressly grant any minerals to anyone. In fact, the divorce Judgment does not mention minerals at all. The parties addressed the division of the mineral estates in the course of the stipulation and settlement which was orally put in the record before Judge Graff. It is obvious by reading the transcript of the trial that the division of the mineral estate was a specifically negotiated part of the agreement between the parties.
[¶ 38] To use the legal bromide about intending facts to which legal consequences are attached, restated in Langer v. Pender, and urged by the majority opinion, at ¶ 19, to contradict the plain language of Rule 60(a), is problematic. This is particularly true when the trial judge who entered the judgment is forthright in her admission that she had not become familiar with the record or reviewed the stipulation of the parties and could not have made the certification required under N.D.R.Civ.P. 63. The trial judge could not “intend” much at the time of signing the order for judgment except to complete the paperwork. When the transcript of the hearing to enter the parties’ stipulation in lieu of trial is reviewed, there is an error of omission which “fail[s] to reflect what was intended at the time of trial,” Gruebele, 338 N.W.2d at 811, and which may be corrected under Rule 60(a) “whenever one is found in a judgment.”1 Under Rule *44560(a), it is the intent of the judge who ordered judgment that is crucial, not the subsequent intent of the parties. That, however, does not end the inquiry.
II
[¶ 39] The remaining question is whether this amended judgment entitles Bobbi Kukla to receive payment for one-half the mineral interests in the disputed property. Bobbi Kukla’s motion to the district court argued that the mineral rights provision applied to the property awarded to Wayne Kukla in the divorce judgment and asked that “the Court require Wayne to pay Bobbi her one-half share of all the income he has received from the mineral acres described above since the date of the parties’ divorce.” After amending the judgment to fix the error, Bobbi Kukla wanted the amended judgment enforced.
[¶ 40] Relying on the testimony and evidence presented at a 2012 evidentiary hearing on the issue, the district court interpreted the oral agreement as if it were in the judgment and as if it applied to the property in question and enforced the judgment “pursuant to Rule 60(a) and Rule 60(b)(6),” granting an undivided one-half interest in both the severed and un-severed mineral interests owned by the parties at the time of divorce and ordering Wayne Kukla to pay Bobbi Kukla for one-half of any proceeds received from these shares since the divorce. The problem arose at the district court level when issues of interpretation and enforcement were confused with issues of whether relief was available under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
[¶ 41] Where the language of a stipulated agreement is incorporated into the decree, the provisions of the agreement are superseded by and merged into the decree. Sullivan v. Quist, 506 N.W.2d 394, 400 (N.D.1993). “Once a settlement agreement is merged into a judgment, the agreement is interpreted and enforced as a •final judgment and not as a separate contract between the parties.” Slorby v. Slorby, 2009 ND 11, ¶ 4, 760 N.W.2d 89 (quoting Silbernagel v. Silbernagel, 2007 ND 124, ¶ 10, 736 N.W.2d 441). This Court recognizes motions for clarification without reference to any particular rule of procedure when an ambiguous provision in the judgment creates an actual controversy between the parties. Neubauer v. Neubauer, 524 N.W.2d 593, 595 (N.D.1994) (citing Anderson v. Anderson, 522 N.W.2d 476 (N.D.1994); Sullivan, 506 N.W.2d 394; Conitz v. Conitz, 467 N.W.2d 93 (N.D.1991); Gross v. Gross, 466 N.W.2d 154 (N.D.1991); Wastvedt v. Wastvedt, 371 N.W.2d 142 (N.D.1985)).
[¶ 42] When the language of a judgment is unambiguous, “the effect of the language must be based on the language’s literal meaning.” Slorby, 2009 ND 11, ¶ 5, 760 N.W.2d 89 (quoting Glasser v. Glasser, 2006 ND 238, ¶ 10, 724 N.W.2d 144). However, if the language is ambiguous, construction is allowed. Slorby, at ¶ 5. ‘When interpreting a judgment, the language of the judgment should be ‘construed as to give effect to each and every part of it, and bring all different parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation.’ ” Id. (quoting Sullivan, 506 N.W.2d at 401). Extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent may be considered if the incorporating court’s intent cannot be determined. Silbernagel, 2007 ND 124, ¶ 10, 736 N.W.2d 441 (citations omitted). Interpretation of a judg*446ment is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal. Slorby, at ¶ 4 (citations omitted). “Whether a judgment is ambiguous is also a question of law.” Leverson v. Leverson, 2011 ND 158, ¶ 11, 801 N.W.2d 740 (citations omitted). However, this Court has said that if the clarification has been provided by the same district court that ordered entry of the original judgment, we will afford such a clarification considerable deference. Anderson, 522 N.W.2d at 478-79.
[¶ 43] Because the district court’s grant of relief under Rule 60(a) should have effectively incorporated the mineral rights provision of the oral agreement into an amended judgment, the next step should have focused on interpretation of the amended judgment, not the underlying contract. Thus, the district court’s application of contract interpretation to the oral stipulation was erroneous, although harmless, since “the rules for interpreting judgments mirror the rules for interpreting contracts.” Slorby, 2009 ND 11, ¶ 6, 760 N.W.2d 89 (quoting Silbernagel, 2007 ND 124, ¶ 10, 736 N.W.2d 441).
[¶ 44] The language of the oral stipulation, if incorporated into an amended judgment, is arguably ambiguous. The trial judge, however, held to the contrary. This appeal should be raising issues of whether the district court properly interpreted an amended judgment. It does not. However, I cannot join in the analysis of the majority that Rule 60(a) does not apply.
[¶ 45] MARY MUEHLEN MARING.
. "Our Rules of Civil Procedure were derived from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and any construction and interpretation given to the federal rules is entitled to appreciable weight by this Court in interpreting and construing our rules.” Larson v. Unlimited Bus. Exch. of North Dakota, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 518, 520 (N.D.1983). The first sentence of Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a) mirrors the first sentence of North Dakota's Rule. Prior to a 2007 amendment, which was intended to be stylistic only, the federal rule read "Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.” Advisory Committee Notes, 2007 Amendment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 60; Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(a) (2006). This language has consistently been interpreted to mean that no time limit is placed on the correction of mis*445takes under Rule 60(a). See 12 J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 60.12 (3d. ed.2013).