dissenting:
The majority has either overlooked or chosen not to apply several cases of our supreme court which clearly indicate that the motion to suppress in question should have been denied. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
In People v. Wiseman, 59 Ill. 2d 45, 319 N.E.2d 225, the supreme court pointed out that a distinction between the search of an automobile and the search of a dwelling house has long been recognized, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280, and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 90 S. Ct. 1975.
In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 11 L. Ed. 2d 777, 84 S. Ct. 881, the supreme court held that searches of motorcars must meet the test of reasonableness under the fourth amendment before evidence obtained as a result of such searches is admissible and said that common sense dictates that questions concerning searches of motorcars or other things readily moved cannot be treated identically with searches of fixed structures like houses.
In People v. Palmer, 62 Ill. 2d 261, 263-64, quoting from People v. Brown, 38 Ill. 2d 353, the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
“ ‘It has long been established that the constitutional safeguards contained in section 6 of article II of the Illinois constitution, and the fourth amendment to the United States constitution, do not prohibit all searches made without a warrant, but only those which are unreasonable, and that the determinations of the reasonableness of any given search must depend upon the facts in the particular situation. (United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 94 L. Ed. 653; People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11.) In Watkins we held that a search incident to an arrest is authorized when it is reasonably necessary to protect the arresting officers from attack, to prevent the prisoner from escaping, or to discover the fruits of a crime. We went on to state that the total absence of license plates on a car could reasonably suggest a serious violation of the law which would justify a search.
In People v. Thomas, 31 Ill. 2d 212, we held that if circumstances reasonably indicate that the police may be dealing, not with an ordinary traffic violator, but with a criminal, then a search of the driver and his vehicle is authorized in order to insure the safety of the police officers and to prevent an escape.’ 38 Ill. 2d 353, 355.”
Were we to apply the guidelines of the above cases to the facts present here, there is no question but that the motion to suppress would be denied.
Another case, People v. McKnight, 39 Ill. 2d 577, 237 N.E.2d 488, is practically identical on its facts with the case under consideration. In McKnight the car was stopped for a mere traffic violation, no light over the license plate, there were suspicious movements of the defendant when a police spotlight was turned on him, the car did not belong to defendant, and, “most important of all,” defendant’s companion was armed. These factors the court found sufficient to give the police reasonable cause to believe that they were not dealing with ordinary traffic offenders and a warrantless search of the car which disclosed weapons was sustained.
Aligning the facts of this case with McKnight: deputy Beam followed defendant away from the Kraft house at night, he stopped defendant for not having an illuminated light over his license plate, after the stop the defendant jumped out of his car and hurried back to deputy Beam’s car before Beam could get out of his car, the defendant appeared “shaky,” upon a search of defendant and his brother, the brother was found to be armed with a hunting knife.
At this point the officers were fully justified in believing that they were dealing with something more than a mere traffic violator and conducting a search of defendant’s automobile for fruits and instrumentalities of crime. People v. McKnight; People v. Thomas.
Although the parallel with McKnight would suffice to provide probable cause, there is much more evidence that could be used to furnish probable cause in this case. The sheriff’s department had been keeping the house of George Kraft under surveillance for about a week and deputy Beam was but one of the officers involved. On the night in question Beam was on surveillance duty at the house. Other deputies told him that a reliable source had advised them that drugs were being sold at that particular house. The previous night one of the deputies on surveillance duty advised Beam that they had information that a shipment of drugs was coming in. Beam remained at his post for about 15 or 20 minutes during which time he noticed four to six cars drive up and leave after 5 or 10 minutes. Beam noticed a man named Michael Blitz (the defendant’s brother) get out of a car, go into the house, leave about 5 minutes later and put a brown bag in the trunk of the car. Beam noticed that each time he used his radio to call for assistance the occupants of the car he was following would turn around and look although he was in an unmarked car at the time. When Beam walked to defendant’s car he noticed that an eight-channel radio was in the back seat and he heard the defendant’s brother change the channel upon his approach.
The use of electronic technology by the defendant to monitor the police radio calls by deputy Beam adds a new dimension to fourth amendment reasonableness. It makes the rationale for warrantless search of automobiles of Carroll v. United States, Chambers v. Maroney, and Preston v. United States even more compelling.
In view of the fácts and circumstances as they were disclosed to and discovered by deputy Beam he would have been derelict in his duty had he not made the stop and search in question here. A marshalling of the facts and circumstances surrounding the search places the case well within the limits of reasonable search and seizure permitted under the constitutions of the United States and the State of Illinois as those limits have been defined by the supreme courts of both jurisdictions.
Additional cases that would sustain the search in this case are People v. Wolf, 60 Ill. 2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 766; People v. Holloman, 46 Ill. 2d 311, 263 N.E.2d 7; People v. Brown, 38 Ill. 2d 353, 231 N.E.2d 577; People v. Jones, 38 Ill. 2d 427, 231 N.E.2d 580; People v. Davis, 33 Ill. 2d 134, 210 N.E.2d 530; People v. Hendrix, 25 Ill. App. 3d 339, 323 N.E.2d 505; and People v. Babic, 7 Ill. App. 3d 36, 287 N.E.2d 24.
Notwithstanding the large number of cases which directly deal with the question, not one case is cited by the majority for their conclusion. Neither do they attempt to draw analogies or make comparisons of the facts present here with the facts of the decided cases, despite the striking similarity of McKnight. I would observe, too, that the majority participated in a panel that decided People v. Jefferies, 6 Ill. App. 3d 648, 285 N.E.2d 592, that upheld the warrantless search of an automobile under circumstances considerably less compelling than those present here.