concurring in result.
I concur with the majority's determination that the investigatory stop and pat-down of Clenna was proper. I also agree that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it did not hold a separate indigency hearing or include language in the sentencing order that prohibited Clen-na's imprisonment in the event that he failed to pay the fines and costs that he had been ordered to pay.
I must part ways, however, with the majority's declaration that "if a defendant is found to be indigent as to the subject of attorney's fees, then he is also as a matter of law indigent as to any fines and costs that are assessed." Op. at -- {(emphasis added). In my view, the determination of indigency with respect to a defendant's ability to pay fines and costs remains fact-sensitive, notwithstanding the trial court's decision to appoint pauper counsel at either the trial or appellate level or both.
When the trial court ordered the appointment of trial and appellate counsel to represent Clenna, it was certainly aware of Clenna's ongoing indigency. While the judge may have found that Clenna could not afford legal counsel, it may be gleaned from the record that he nonetheless made the determination that Clenna did have sufficient funds with which to pay his fines and costs because he was employed. It is apparent that the judge ordered such payments notwithstanding Clenna's contention that he had rent to pay and four children to support. Tr. pp. 26-27. Moreover, in light of the suspended sentence and nearly one-year probation period that Clenna received, the trial court likely afforded him that period of time in which to pay those amounts. Thus, inasmuch as the trial court properly ordered Clenna to pay fines and costs, notwithstanding its determination of indigeney with regard to the appointment of counsel, I vote to affirm the judgment in all respects.