(concurring in part, dissenting in part). I write only to further examine the telephone transaction aspect addressed by the majority. It is my belief that if all defendants had done was to communicate by means of the telephone, either by receipt of interstate calls or by *344initiating such calls in negotiating this loan, they would not ipso facto have become subject to in personam jurisdiction in this state.
The telephone conversations aspect of expanding jurisdiction in McGee v International Life Ins Co, 355 US 220; 78 S Ct 199; 2 L Ed 2d 223 (1957), was examined by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Agrashell, Inc v Bernard Sirotta Co, 344 F2d 583 (CA 2, 1965), which distinguished McGee when confronted with an issue similar to the issue at bar.
In Agrashell, defendants, residents of New York, bought walnut shells from the third-party defendant, Hammons Products Company, a Missouri corporation. When defendants resold the goods, plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, brought suit alleging that defendant had infringed plaintiffs patent rights. Defendants impleaded Hammons Company as a third-party defendant, alleging that it had warranted the fitness of the goods for resale and had agreed to indemnify defendants against a patent infringement suit. Hammons Company was served in Missouri. Hammons Company moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that it was not personally subject to the jurisdiction of the court. The Agrashell court stated:
"We fail to see in what material respect Hammons invoked the benefits and protections of New York law merely by negotiating and concluding goods contracts through the mails and by telephone with persons residing in New York. Other courts, construing similar state laws in like cases, have also found that these contacts are insufficient to give personal jurisdiction over the foreign corporation. Growbark v Addo Mach Co., 16 Ill2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959); Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4 Cir. 1956).” (Emphasis supplied.) 344 F2d at 587.
*345The court went on to distinguish McGee v International Life Insurance Co, supra, stating:
"[Defendant] relies heavily on McGee v International Life Ins Co., supra. There are certain resemblances between that case and ours. In McGee, California was allowed to exercise personal jurisdiction over a Texas corporation based on a single contract insuring the life of a California resident. Here, [defendant] asks us, in effect, to allow New York to exercise personal jurisdiction over a Missouri corporation based in part on a contract indemnifying New York residents against loss. However, the differences between the cases are even more significant than their resemblances. In McGee, the Supreme Court was concerned with 'an activity that the State treats as exceptional and subjects to special regulation.’ Hanson v Denckla, supra, at 252, 78 S.Ct. at 1239. Moreover, the Supreme Court emphasized the fact that because many life insurance claims are small or moderate, 'individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum —thus in effect making the company judgment proof.’ McGee v International Life Ins. Co., supra, at 223, 78 S.Ct. at 201. Neither of these remarks would seem to apply to contracts of indemnity against patent infringement suits. Accordingly, while we do not by any means regard these contacts as irrelevant to the question of personal jurisdiction, we hold that something more is needed to sustain the service of process on Hammons in Missouri.” 344 F2d at 588.
The Agrashell rationale seems applicable to the instant facts.
Furthermore, this Court’s decision in Kiefer v May, 46 Mich App 566; 208 NW2d 539 (1973), which suggests that in personam jurisdiction is properly found when the telephone and mails are utilized to consummate a contract, is also distinguishable. In Kiefer, supra, defendant, a resident of Arizona, purposely elicited business opportunities through a national advertising campaign for *346the sale of a 1931 Cadillac. The defendant in Kiefer was also subject to possible tort liability, aside from breach of contract. See Norton v Local Loan, 251 NW2d 520 (Iowa, 1977), cited in Aaron Ferer & Sons Co v Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal Co, 558 F2d 450, 455, n 7 (CA 8, 1977).1 See, generally, Cole v Doe, 77 Mich App 138, 142; 258 NW2d 165 (1977).
To gain personal jurisdiction over a party, the party must be involved in some purposeful activity within the state. Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235; 78 S Ct 1228; 2 L Ed 2d 1283 (1958). The mere use of the telephone from out of state for consummating a contract cannot be considered as purposefully availing one’s self of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state. Agrashell Inc v Bernard Sirotta Co, supra, Arthur, Ross & Peters *347v Housing Inc, 508 F2d 562 (CA 5, 1975). The telephone is a quick, convenient means to consummate a bargain without having to travel to another state. Modern communication as a means of facilitating commerce should not be hindered by an automatic submission to the personal jurisdiction of a state to which the communication has been directed.
I would hold, in accordance with a number of other jurisdictions, that the mere use of the telephone is not sufficient to give personal jurisdiction over a party in a lawsuit. See Aaron Ferer & Sons Co v Diversified Metals Corp, 564 F2d 1211 (CA 8, 1977), Aaron Ferer & Sons Co v Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal Co, supra, Peterson v Crown Financial Corp, 435 F Supp 901 (Neb, 1977), Arthur, Ross & Peters v Housing, Inc, supra, Agrashell, Inc v Bernard Sirotta Co, supra, American Steel, Inc v Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc, 425 F Supp 301 (SD Tex, 1975), Hamilton Brothers, Inc v Peterson, 445 F2d 1334 (CA 5, 1971). See, generally, Anno: Construction and Application, as to Isolated Acts or Transactions, of State Statutes or Rules of Court Predicating In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents or Foreign Corporations Upon the Doing of an Act, or Upon Doing or Transacting Business or "Any” Business, Within the State, 27 ALR3d 397, §§ 8, 9[c], 10, 17[b, c], 21[b], 23, 29, 34, 35, pp 437-440, 449-457, 471-492, 508-512, 517-520, 542-544, 554-557 (jurisdiction over nonresident, telephone calls into state, effect).
I concur in the result reached by the majority only because the loan agreement and the promissory note provide that the place of payment was at plaintiff’s home in Detroit, Michigan. I agree that this factor, in the context of this entire transaction, constitutes a sufficient minimum contact to confer jurisdiction over the defendants.
“While no one of these factors is alone determinative, there is lacking in these cases any contact between an appellee corporation and the State of Nebraska sufficient to satisfy due process. The letters and telephone calls in this purely commercial setting did not supply the necessary minimal contact. See Benjamin v. Western Boat Building Corp., 472 F.2d 723, 729-30 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 830, 94 S.Ct. 60, 38 L.Ed.2d 64 (1973); Hamilton Brothers, Inc. v. Peterson, 445 F.2d 1334, 1336 (5th Cir. 1971); Smith v Piper Aircraft Corp., 425 F.2d 823, 825 (5th Cir. 1970); Scheidt v. Young, 389 F.2d 58, 60 (3d Cir. 1968); Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583, 587 (2d Cir. 1965). See also Arthur, Ross & Peters v. Housing, Inc., 508 F.2d 562, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1975); American Steel, Inc. v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 301, 303 (S.D.Tex. 1975), aff’d, 548 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1977).7” (Footnote omitted.)
. "The recent decision in Norton v. Local Loan, 251 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1977), to which appellant directed our attention subsequent to oral argument, is readily distinguishable. There, in the context of a tort suit, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a telephone call from the defendant’s agent in Nebraska to the plaintiff in Iowa constituted 'conduct in [the] state’ sufficient for Iowa to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Not only did the cause of action and the damages alleged arise directly from the telephone call, but tort cases involve interests of the state not present in contract cases. See Fulghum Industries, Inc. v. Walterboro Forest Products, Inc., 477 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 1973). Nebraska’s long-arm statute also provides for jurisdictional differences between tort and contract actions. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-536, supra note 4.”