(dissenting). Leave to appeal should be denied.
The issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing McCarver’s conviction for possession of amphetamines on the ground that marijuana seized with the amphetamines should not have been admitted in evidence.
The marijuana was offered to show that McCarver knew that the pills were amphetamines. The Court of Appeals said that possession of marijuana and possession of amphetamines "are not sufficiently alike to permit evidence of one to be admis*384sible under the statute in a prosecution for the other”.1 This Court, in reversing the Court of Appeals, states that the marijuana
"tends to show the absence of mistake on the part of defendant with regard to his possession of amphetamines. Both marijuana and amphetamines are presently controlled substances, possession of which is illegal. Proof that the defendant possessed, at the same time, a controlled substance other than the one for possession of which he is being prosecuted is a sufficiently similar act to warrant admission pursuant to the statute to show absence of mistake.”
I
Assuming, arguendo> that possession of the two substances are "like” acts,2 it does not follow that possession of one tends to indicate knowledgeable possession of the other.
The statute makes it "unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance” unless it was obtained pursuant to a valid prescription or order of a practitioner or is otherwise authorized by the act.3 It therefore appears that it would be a defense that McCarver did not know that the pills were amphetamines. Since he claimed that he had been led to believe that the pills were caffeine diet pills, similar acts evidence that was probative of his knowledge that they were amphetamines might be admissible under the statute.
The probative value of the marijuana on the issue on which it was offered (whether these pills were amphetamines), depends on whether users or *385possessors of marijuana know, in significantly greater numbers than the general population, that pills of the kind seized are amphetamines and not caffeine. No empirical evidence was offered, and it does not appear that either the trial judge or the members of this Court can decide the probativeness of marijuana on the amphetamine issue based on personal experience. There is, therefore, no rational basis on or apart from the record for drawing the inference that a user or possessor of marijuana on that account would know that the pills in question were amphetamines and not caffeine.
The marijuana was not admissible on the premise that one who would violate the law prohibiting possession of one controlled substance is more likely to violate that law as to another substance. That is the prohibited purpose and inference; similar acts evidence is not admissible to prove a character trait or propensity to commit offenses generally or of a particular kind and the trier of fact is precluded from drawing the inference that because a person has committed one crime he might have or has committed another.4
A number of courts have held in similar cases that evidence of possession of marijuana is not admissible. One noted that the effect of the admission of such evidence "would be to generate heat instead of diffusing light” and that such evidence had a "minute peg of relevancy” which is "entirely obscured by the dirty linen hung upon it”. State v Portrey, 6 Wash App 380, 384; 492 P2d 1050, 1052 *386(1972) (possession of marijuana held improperly admitted in prosecution for possession of LSD); Sweatt v State, 251 Ark 650, 652; 473 SW2d 913, 914 (1971) (evidence of past sales of marijuana held improperly admitted in prosecution for sale of LSD); and State v Spraggin, 77 Wis 2d 89; 252 NW2d 94 (1977) (in prosecution for delivery of heroin, possession of marijuana held improperly admitted).
II
The Court has no basis for concluding that the error in admitting the marijuana was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not know the views of those comprising the jury on possession and use of marijuana. If the jury represented a cross-section of the community, it was comprised of persons who use or have used and persons who have a deep aversion to users of marijuana. Persons who have such an aversion might well have resolved a reasonable doubt about McCarver’s guilt against him. The danger of unfair prejudice becomes particularly evident when this evidence is considered with the testimony5 characterizing McCarver as a convicted felon and associating him with criminal activity in general.
III
The Court of Appeals did not regard the action of McCarver’s lawyer in withdrawing his objection to the admission of the marijuana as significant. He may have done so because the argument over his objection took place in the presence of the jury and, after the cautionary instruction was given, *387the judge asked him, again in the jury’s presence, whether he wished to maintain his objection. Counsel might have concluded that it would only have compounded the prejudice to have insisted on the objection.
Moreover, the purpose of requiring an objection is to provide the judge with an opportunity to rule on the objection and avoid the error and an unnecessary new trial. That purpose was served when the lawyer made his objection.
The error was preserved by objection. The judge had an opportunity to avoid error; he did not. The objection was overruled and a "cautionary” instruction was given. There is a record which we can review. Withdrawal of the objection was wholly gratuitous.
IV
The cautionary instruction, mandatory whenever similar acts evidence is admitted, was not adequate. It was given, as required, when the evidence was admitted; it was not repeated in the charge to the jury. The judge said: "the fact that he had marijuana would not — if he had that, would not make him guilty of the charge here”, but he also said "in examining the credibility and plausibility of a claim, perhaps, that he didn’t know that he had the amphetamines and the like, you may have this in evidence for such weight as you feel it is worth, for such assistance”. (Emphasis supplied.)
The instruction was subject to the construction that the jury was to consider the other offense evidence on the issue of credibility. Moreover, the judge failed to instruct the jury specifically that although McCarver may have committed another *388offense it should not draw the prohibited inference that he committed this offense, nor did he instruct it not to convict McCarver because he may appear to be a person of bad character or guilty of other improper conduct.
V
A cautionary instruction on the limited use of other offense evidence, in contrast with most cautionary instructions, is not given because such evidence was inadvertently brought to the jury’s attention, but, rather, because it is deliberately admitted.
Such a cautionary instruction cannot cure an error in the admission of other offense evidence. The caution is that the jury is not to draw the prohibited inference or convict the defendant because of bad character or other improper conduct. The instruction, however, is also that the jury is to consider the evidence for the purpose for which it was admitted — here, to show knowledge that the pills were amphetamines. The caution does not relate to the use of the evidence on the issue of knowledge, but against mis-use as evidence of a propensity to commit offenses. The instruction which told the jury that it could consider the other offense evidence on the issue of whether McCarver knew he possessed amphetamines did not cure but only compounded the error of admitting such evidence for that purpose.
We would deny leave to appeal.
Kavanagh, C.J., concurred with Levin, J.People v McCarver, 72 Mich App 311, 318; 249 NW2d 403 (1976).
See People v Duncan, 402 Mich 1, 12; 260 NW2d 58 (1977) (Ryan, J.).
MCL 335.341(4); MSA 18.1070(41)94).
See McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 447; MRE 404(b).
It was the prosecution’s theory that the defendant was a' trafficker in drugs. While possession of a large quantity of marijuana might be some evidence that the defendant was a "trafficker”, possession of a small quantity of marijuana does not permit that inference. The ubiquitous use of marijuana by persons who do not traffic in drugs precludes such an inference.
See the per curiam opinion.