(dissenting). Since the only error alleged is in connection with the admission of defendant’s confession, we examine the entire record and independently determine voluntariness. People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551, 557; 194 NW2d 709 (1972); we reverse where we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed. People v McGillen, #1, 392 Mich 251, 257; 220 NW2d 677 (1974). See People v Sparks, 82 Mich App 44; 266 NW2d 661 (1978). On the record presented I am not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed, and, therefore, dissent.
The trial court resolved the conflict of testimony between defendant and Officer Cline, noted by the majority, in favor of the testimony given by Officer *456Cline. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, when confronted with a similar Miranda issue, noted:
"The trial court, which had the advantage of observing the witnesses and their demeanor, implicitly found that the investigating officer had acted in good faith, without guile or subterfuge, in conducting this inquiry, and such a finding is not to be lightly disturbed.” United States v Grant, 549 F2d 942, 947 (CA 4, 1977). See also United States v Pheaster, 544 F2d 353, 364 (CA 9, 1976), cert den, 429 US 1099; 97 S Ct 1118; 51 L Ed 2d 546 (1976), United States v Charlton, 565 F2d 86, 89 (CA 6, 1977).
I recognize that there are conflicting theories among the courts which have ruled upon the validity of a waiver of counsel after the suspect has made a request to be represented by counsel. One line of cases holds that a subsequent waiver without the presence of counsel is involuntary per se, while the prevailing view maintains that a subsequent waiver could be voluntary depending on the facts of the individual case. See Nash v Estelle, 560 F2d 652, 655 (CA 5, 1977), United States v Charlton, supra. See also Biddy v Diamond, 516 F2d 118, 122 (CA 5, 1975), United States v Womack, 542 F2d 1047, 1050 (CA 9, 1976), State v Greene, 91 NM 207; 572 P2d 935 (1977).
Where a suspect requests counsel during questioning, and the police ignore that request and continue the interrogation, a finding of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is impossible. Nash v Estelle, supra, at 656. If, however, the police terminate the interrogation, subsequent circumstances may provide a basis for a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. Id. Another panel of this Court has recently stated:
*457"We therefore hold that, when a person asserts his right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present, or, after the lapse of a signiñcant period of time, the person knowingly and intelligently waives his counsel right. See, e.g., United States v Pheaster, 544 F2d 353, 367-368 (CA 9, 1976).” People v Sparks, supra, at 49-50. (Emphasis added.)
The facts of the instant case are unusual, and whether or not there was a lapse of a significant period of time between defendant’s request for counsel and his eventual waiver is not relevant to the disposition of the Miranda issue. Here we are dealing with a defendant who prior to his request for an attorney was advised that he was under arrest for possession of marijuana. Nothing in the record indicates that defendant was advised that he was a suspect for the instant crimes. After defendant requested an attorney, having been advised of his rights under the marijuana charge, the record establishes that there was absolutely no interrogation about the marijuana charge. Furthermore, a review of the testimony of both defendant and the interrogating officer reveals that there was no interrogation or reference made about the instant crimes prior to defendant’s waiver of counsel and subsequent confession. The court in United States v Grant, supra, at 946, noted:
"It does not follow, though, that Miranda erects an absolute per se bar on any conversation with the accused by the investigating officers after the former has requested counsel. It only inhibits investigative interrogation related to the specific crime itself.”
The reasoning of the Grant court is applicable in the present circumstances. Even though the interrogating officer had focused on the defendant as a *458prime suspect in the instant crimes, he had not related that information to the defendant. The deféndant was unaware of the fact that he was focused on in the instant crimes, but voluntarily made a statement confessing to them. Officer Cline asserted that defendant did so only after a subsequent waiver of the right to counsel, after again being read his Miranda rights. Defendant denies that the officer read the rights again prior to the initial confession. There was no investigative interrogation expressly inquiring into defendant’s involvement in the instant crimes.
Finally, my opinion is bolstered from the following passage in United States v Pheaster, supra, at 368, which involved a much closer Miranda question than the one present here. The court found a proper waiver of counsel based upon the following reasoning:
"Our examination of the record in this case has revealed that the decision regarding waiver was a close one; yet, on balance, we believe that the district court was correct in deciding that the Government had met its 'heavy burden’ in establishing Pheaster’s waiver. Because it was not possible for the F.B.I. agents who arrested Pheaster to provide him with an attorney at the moment that he demanded one, the key question is whether the failure of the agents to sit mute during the ride to county jail, where an attorney could be provided, mandates the exclusion of Pheaster’s statements. On the particular facts of this case, we are convinced that such exclusion was not. mandated. This conclusion would have been significantly easier had there been an express waiver of rights but the absence of such a waiver is not determinative, for this Court has held that in appropriate circumstances a waiver of Miranda rights can be implied rather than express. United States v. Hilliker, 436 F.2d 101, 103 (9 Cir.), cert denied, 401 U.S. 958; 91 S.Ct. 987; 28 L.Ed.2d 242 (1971); see also United States v. Vigo, 487 F.2d 295, 299 (2 Cir. *4591973) (statement after defective Miranda warning held to be volunteered). Although this question is not specifically addressed in Mosley, the recitation of the facts indicates an implied, rather than an express, waiver by Mosley. 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. 321 [46 L Ed 2d 313 (1975)]. We think that this is a case in which waiver can be implied. It is critical to focus on the fact that Pheaster agreed to cooperate with the agents after he had been in the car for only fifteen to twenty minutes— a point not challenged in his brief. Thus, although he was in the car for a longer period, his cooperation was not the result of lengthy incommunicado detention. This is not a case in which there was an intentional delay in providing an attorney in the hope that the suspect would yield to pressure and recant his demand for an attorney. It is also important to note that Pheaster’s statements came as a result of an objective, undistorted presentation of the extensive evidence against him, particularly the positive identification of his fingerprint on the ninth note. As in Hodge [487 F2d 945 (CA 5, 1973)] and Davis [527 F2d 1110 (CA 9, 1975)], the questioning did not really begin until Pheaster had clearly indicated his willingness to cooperate. Finally Pheaster was reminded early in the evening that he did not have to talk to the agents but he continued to talk because of his expressed desire to help them find Larry Adell. Under all the circumstances of this case, we conclude that waiver of the Miranda rights, including the earlier demand to see an attorney, was properly found.” (Footnote omitted.)
The preceding last quoted sentence reflects my disposition of this case. I find a valid waiver.
I would affirm.