Christensen v. Fiberite Corp.

PER CURIAM.

Relator, Fiberite Corporation, obtained a writ of certiorari to review a decision of the commissioner of the Department of Employment Services filed on March 30, 1977. We reverse.

Claimant, Larry J. Christensen, was hired by relator on August 13, 1974, as a general *21laborer. He served the customary probationary period before formally joining the Teamster’s Union; by virtue of that membership, he became subject to the conditions of the collective bargaining agreement containing the following provision:

“Laid off employees shall be notified by registered mail addressed to the employee’s last known address to return to work, and he or she must report to work within a week after receipt of such notice or lose all seniority rights.” Art. VI, Sec. 3.

Upon claimant’s first layoff from employment on October 28,1974, he completed the “Recall from lay-off” form provided to and required of all employees by relator. The form notified the employee that:

“It is very important that we have your current address and phone number for re-call purposes. If you do not have a phone, try to provide a phone number of a relative, friend or neighbor so that we can leave a message. Also inform the party that they could receive a message for you regarding a call back to work.”

Claimant was rehired on a “call back” on November 27, 1974.

The second layoff, upon which this claim petition is predicated, occurred on February 14, 1975. Claimant again completed the recall form, listing a Winona, Minnesota, address as his current address. On June 24, 1975, approximately 4 months after the layoff, relator mailed a registered recall letter to claimant’s Winona address. As claimant had moved to Minneapolis during the interim without notifying relator, the letter was returned without delivery. Relator’s subsequent attempts to contact claimant through his father and by another registered letter to a Minneapolis address were also unsuccessful.

Upon claimant’s petition, the commissioner held that, although relator had made every reasonable effort to locate claimant, the latter’s move to Minneapolis without notification did not constitute a disqualifying event because he had no opportunity to refuse an offer of reemployment. The unemployment compensation benefits were charged against relator’s experience rating account, and this appeal followed.

Relator essentially argues that claimant’s conduct constituted a statutory disqualification since it was unable, despite extraordinary efforts, to notify him of its reemployment offer. It relies upon Minn.St. 268.09, subd. 1, which enumerates the situations in which a claimant may be disqualified from receiving benefits and provides in pertinent part:

“(1) If such individual voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer discontinued his employment with such employer * * *.
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“(4) If the commissioner finds that he has failed, without good cause, either to apply for available, suitable work when so directed by the employment office, or the commissioner or to accept suitable work when offered him, * *

The purpose of these provisions is to disqualify an employee whose unemployed status is volitional and not a result of circumstances beyond his control. While we have liberally construed these provisions where the spirit and purpose of our unemployment compensation statutes would be furthered,1 a construction which would place an unreasonable burden on an employer does not advance the purpose of the statute and should be avoided. Here, it was the employee’s conduct in failing to provide sufficient information of his whereabouts which prevented the employer from reaching him. His unemployed status was the result of his own neglect and not because of facts and circumstances which he was powerless to *22control. Accordingly, we hold his actions constitute a voluntary termination, disqualifying him from immediate benefits and precluding benefits paid or subsequently due the employee from being charged against the employer’s experience rating account. § 268.09, subd. 1(1, 3).

Reversed.

. Di Re v. Central Livestock Order Buying Co., 246 Minn. 279, 74 N.W.2d 518 (1956) — employees refused to accept employment with a parent corporation; Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 219 Minn. 306, 18 N.W.2d 249, 158 A.L.R. 389 (1945) — termination for sickness caused by the employment; Hanson v. IDS Properties Management Co., 308 Minn. 422, 242 N.W.2d 833 (1976) — refusal of employer to withhold union initiation fee pursuant to authorization signed by the employee.