concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The majority determines that the State’s decision to “permissively join” the charges of aggravated criminal sexual assault to the original home invasion charge, some 217 days after defendant was taken into custody on the home invasion charge, did not thwart the purposes behind the speedy-trial act. I disagree.
Section 103 — 5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103 — 5(a) (West 1996)) implements the substantial right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions, and therefore must be liberally construed. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8; U.S. Const., amend. VI; People v. Woolsey, 139 Ill. 2d 157, 165 (1990); People v. Reimolds, 92 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (1982). Indeed, this court has held that the purpose of that section should not be avoided by technical evasions, such as dismissing and refiling the same charges. People v. McAdrian, 52 Ill. 2d 250, 255 (1972); People v. Fosdick, 36 Ill. 2d 524, 528 (1967); see also Woolsey, 139 Ill. 2d at 170-71. In this same spirit, the appellate court held, in People v. Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d 241, 248-49 (1981), that “[wjhere new and additional charges arise from the same facts as did the original charges and the State had knowledge of these facts at the commencement of the prosecution, the time within which trial is to begin on the new and additional charges is subject to the same statutory limitation that is applied to the original charges.”
The majority declines to “extend the Williams rule” to cases where the charges are not subject to compulsory joinder (189 Ill. 2d at 218), ignoring the fact that Williams itself is not a case where compulsory joinder was involved. Although the defendants in Williams were tried in a single prosecution for having committed, in sequence, an unlawful restraint, a kidnaping, an aggravated battery, a sexual assault, and then further aggravated batteries and sexual assaults against the victim, the State was not required to join the various offenses because they did not arise from the same act. See People v. Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d 378, 385 (1985). While the origins of the rule stated in Williams may indeed stem from the provisions of the compulsory joinder statute (see People v. King, 8 Ill. App. 3d 2, 5 (1972)), Williams focuses on knowledge by the State that new and additional charges arose from “the same facts as did the original charges” (Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 248), rather than on whether “the several offenses *** are based on the same act,” for compulsory joinder purposes (720 ILCS 5/3 — 3(b) (West 1996)). See People v. Hinkle, 234 Ill. App. 3d 663, 667-68 (1992). Therefore, the majority’s refusal to apply the Williams rule to cases where compulsory joinder is not required is, in reality, a rejection of the decision in Williams.
This implicit overruling of Williams is not supported by this court’s decision in People v. Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d 1 (1998), which cited the Williams rule with approval. The majority states that because Quigley recognized the interplay between compulsory joinder principles and speedy-trial principles in holding that the Williams rule applies in cases of compulsory joinder, compulsory joinder law must dictate the result in this case. Quigley mandates no such finding. While the majority correctly states that in Quigley this court relied upon the interaction between the compulsory joinder and speedy-trial principles, we did not have occasion to reach the scenario presented here, a speedy-trial violation arising from multiple charges which the State chose to try together, though it was not required to do so. Thus, contrary to the majority’s holding herein, Quigley does not preclude the finding that speedy-trial violations can also originate in non-compulsory-joinder situations if the State, with knowledge of the facts at the commencement of the prosecution, chooses to bring multiple charges in a single prosecution.
Here, as in Williams, while the State chose to try defendant for multiple offenses in a single prosecution, the State was not required to do so. I agree with the majority that had the State chosen to prosecute these offenses separately, they would not be subject to the same speedy-trial limitation. See 725 ILCS 5/103 — 5(e) (West 1996); Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d at 13-14. However, having known since the filing of the original home invasion charge that both that offense and the aggravated criminal sexual assault arose from “the same facts,” and having elected to try both offenses in a single prosecution, the State may not seek to avoid the purpose of the speedy-trial statute through “technical evasion.” See People v. Lyles, 106 Ill. 2d 373, 411-12 (1985) (it is the prosecutor’s duty to safeguard the constitutional rights of all citizens, including the defendant’s).
The majority argues that defendant was not denied a speedy trial on the sexual assault charges, as he was tried on those charges within 30 days of their being filed. Sadly, this ignores the reality of the situation, i.e., that defendant had been in custody for over 200 days on a charge “aris[ing] from the same facts” as the sexual assault charges, that the State had known “these facts at the commencement of the prosecution,” and that defendant had not contributed to any delay with regard to the new and additional charges. Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 248-49. Because it had chosen to proceed on the home invasion charge alone, the State, and only the State, was responsible for the separation of charges and the long delay in filing the sexual assault charges. See People v. Williams, 2 Ill. App. 3d 993 (1971) (upholding dismissal of new and additional attempted murder indictment based on same facts as original murder indictment, because defendant had been in custody for more than 120 days and was not responsible for any part of nine-month delay in filing the attempted murder indictment). Thus, to contend that defendant was tried on the sexual assault charges in a timely manner and that speedy trial considerations do not apply here is, in my opinion, patently wrong and tends to “circumvent the very protection the statute aimed to provide.” Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 249.
The majority also wrongly concludes that applying the Williams rule to cases like the one at bar would compel the State to join charges that are otherwise not mandated to be joined under the compulsory joinder statute. The State retains the power to decide whether to join related offenses or to try them separately. However, if the State voluntarily joins offenses in a single prosecution, it must adhere to the speedy-trial rule as if those offenses were subject to compulsory joinder.
In the case at bar, if the State incurred problems obtaining evidence necessary to the prosecution of the aggravated criminal sexual assault charges, the State could have avoided a speedy-trial violation by prosecuting defendant in separate cases, or by applying for an additional period of time in which to obtain this evidence, as was its prerogative under section 103 — 5(c). However, the State took no action, despite its continuing burden to take the necessary steps to bring about a prompt trial in conformance with the provisions of the speedy-trial act. See Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 249. Thus, where only the State’s tardiness in filing the new and additional charges of aggravated criminal sexual assault precluded commencement of prosecution on these charges within the original charge’s speedy-trial term, the State violated defendant’s rights under section 103 — 5. Therefore, because the charges of aggravated criminal sexual assault should have been dismissed by the circuit court, I would vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence for that offense. In all other respects, I concur.
JUSTICES HEIPLE and RATHJE join in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.