On Rehearing
In brief in support of appellant’s application for rehearing, counsel urges our reconsideration of the effect of our opinion in affirming the lower court’s decree in the aspect of not lifting from the appellant the obligation to live in Lebanon, Tennessee, if the child support payments were to continue, and in not here entering a decree that the appellant be relieved of the obligation to transport the child to Alabama to visit the father and grandparents.
These provisions were incorporated into the decree of 11 March 1964, as a result of a solemn and firm agreement by the appellant and appellee, and their respective parents during the pendency of contempt litigation in which much testimony had been taken. The object of the agreement and its incorporation into the decree appears to have been for the welfare of the child. The appellant now argues that Susan’s change of attitude, i.e., her procuring work and her desire for a separate home, is such a change in condition as would necessitate a modification of the decree in this aspect. Considering as paramount the welfare of the child, we are not in accord with these contentions, and adhere to our original opinion in this regard.
Counsel asserts that we did not respond to appellant’s assignment of error 18. This assignment reads:
“The court erred in its decree of October 28, 1965, in sustaining demurrers to that aspect of the amended petition which sought to ‘destroy or diminish the visitation of said child with its paternal grandparent.’ ”
It appears from a reading of this record that regardless of the ruling on demurrer the appellant had proof of this aspect under .the evidence.
In argument in brief on original submission, counsel for appellant has argued in ex-tenso that grandparents, as such, have no legally enforceable rights of visitation and part-time custody. In no wise was the sustaining of the demurrer argued other than at the conclusion of the argument when it is stated that “the decree of the court sustaining the demurrers in this aspect of the petition should be reversed.”
Counsel cites two propositions of law in support of his argument under assignment 18. Each are short quotations from Sections 14 and 63 of 39 Am.Jur., Parent and Child, to the effect that grandparents have no legally enforceable rights to visitation or part-time custody of a child, and that any moral duty there may be upon a parent to send his child to visit its grandparents is not a subject of judicial enforcement.
While ab initio the grandparents may not have rights to custody, counsel’s ar*533gument overlooks the provisions of the decree in this aspect which incorporated the agreement of appellant and her parents and the respondent and his parents. Legal validity and enforceability were thereby created, and counsel for appellant became one of the signatories on the bond insuring faithful performance of the agreement and decree as to the deliverance and relinquishment of the custody of the child between the parties as provided in the agreement and decree.
Further, the child had been in the Brock, Sr., home for a number of years, and it is apparent that ties of affection existed between the senior Brocks and the child.
As stated in Kewish v. Brothers, 279 Ala. 86, 181 So.2d 900:
"Ties of affection springing from years of association of a child with its custodian, particularly if the custodian be a relative, cannot but be given regard in determining the welfare of the child.”
Counsel requests we respond to his assignment 13, which we pretermitted in our original opinion. This assignment asserts as error the failure of the Chancellor to decree that the Brock grandparents be liable for increased support payments beyond the agreement and decree of 28 October 1965. Counsel states he has found no precedent to support this argument, nor have we. We consider this assignment without merit.
Counsel complains that we did not write to assignment 20. In his original brief counsel states that:
“This assignment of error raises a point of no practical importance to anyone.”
We agree with that observation, and feel no useful purpose would be served by writing to it.
One or two other matters are argued in appellant’s brief on rehearing. We have examined these alleged errors and consider them without merit.
Application overruled.
SIMPSON, MERRILL and COLEMAN,' JJ., concur.