(dissenting). In this case, Judge Connors exercised her inherent power as a judge and determined that justice required that this precomplaint hearing be closed to the public. I must dissent in this case, because I disagree with the majority’s holding that *514precomplaint hearings, pursuant to sec. 968.02 (3), Stats., are presumptively open to the public. I also object to the majority’s substituting its judgment for that of Judge Connors in holding that there are insufficient facts to justify Judge Connors’ decision to close the precom-plaint hearing. I would deny the petition for a supervisory writ and affirm the decision of the court of appeals, which held that no presumption of openness attaches to precomplaint hearings and that Judge Connors did not abuse her discretion in closing the hearing.
First, the majority provides two reasons for its holding that sec. 968.02(8) hearings are presumptively open to the public: (1) The statute itself contains no express provision for secrecy, and (2) the purpose of the statute — to scrutinize the district attorney’s decision to issue a complaint — would be defeated if the hearing were closed for other than compelling reasons. Pages 506, 507. I do not believe that these reasons justify the broad holding that sec. 968.02(3) hearings are presumptively open to the public. The majority erroneously reads something into the statute that clearly was not supplied in the statute by our legislature.
I am of the opinion that our legislature did not intend that the hearing be presumptively open to the public. Although the statute does not contain an express provision for secrecy, it also does not mandate that the hearing be open. I start with the premise that the public has no constitutional right to attend a precomplaint hearing. There is a limited public right to access to criminal trials under the first amendment to the United States Constitution. See, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). However, pretrial proceedings can often be closed to the public. See, Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (hearing on suppression of evidence). Exceptions to this have arisen only under limited circumstances that are not *515present in this instance. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984) (voir dire examination of prospective jurors in a criminal case). No case has extended the nonabsolute public right of access to a proceeding occurring prior to the issuance of a criminal complaint, such as here.
Additionally, the public has no statutory right to attend a precomplaint hearing. Section 757.14, Stats., mandates that “[t] he sittings of every court shall be public and every citizen may freely attend the same . . . .” The majority agrees that this statute does not apply in this case because a sec. 968.02(3) hearing is not a “sitting of a court.” Page 506. If the legislature had intended this hearing to be open, I believe it would not have called for the proceedings to be conducted merely by a judge. Also, sec. 807.04, requires that “[a] 11 trials, and all hearings at which oral testimony is to be presented, shall be held in open court.” This statute is equally, inapplicable to precomplaint hearings, because sec. 968.02(3) does not require that testimony be given under oath or affirmation. Finally, if open proceedings were contemplated by the legislature, it would not have had to specifically provide in the statute that the district attorney could attend the hearing. A construction which makes statutory language superfluous is to be avoided. Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Public Service Comm., 110 Wis. 2d 530, 534, 329 N.W.2d 178 1983). Since our legislature has not explicitly required that precomplaint hearings be open, the judge should not be restricted from exercising his or her inherent power in ordering closure of the precomplaint hearing. See, State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Ct., 115 Wis. 2d 220, 234-35, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983).
Second, the legislative history of sec. 968.02(3), Stats., supports the conclusion that precomplaint hearings are not presumptively open. Section 968.26, provides for a *516John Doe hearing which, by the words of the statute, allows for a secret hearing. Sections 968.02(3) and 968.26 share identical roots. This court has construed the predecessor of these statutes as authorizing a closed, secret hearing. State ex rel. Kowaleski v. District Court, 254 Wis. 363, 370, 36 N.W.2d 419 (1949).
Third, the nature of a sec. 968.02(3) hearing does not require that the hearing be open. Section 968.02(3) provides an avenue for a complainant in two separate circumstances. A circuit judge may permit the filing of a complaint if a district attorney refuses to do so or if he is unavailable to do so. The majority presumes that the judge cannot check the authority of the district attorney unless the precomplaint hearing is open. I disagree. Under sec. 968.02(3), it is the duty of the judge to determine if there is “probable cause to believe that the person to be charged has committed an offense . . . .” There is no reason to believe that the judge cannot conduct a thorough hearing and make an unbiased determination of probable cause in the absence of the press and the public. In issuing complaints, the district attorney uses his or her discretion to protect the reputation of those not yet charged with a crime. The reputation of such persons is of equal importance in a precom-plaint hearing before a judge, especially given the fact that they have no right of cross-examination. See, sec. 968.02(3). The judge at a precomplaint hearing acts as a surrogate district attorney; he or she must make a determination of probable cause. It would be unrealistic to require that the prosecutor’s charging conference be open to the public and, in the same regard, neither should a sec. 968.02(3) hearing be open to the public.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the principles of fundamental fairness necessitate a holding that sec. 968.02(3) hearings are not presumptively open. Although historically, adversarial proceedings are open to *517the public, precomplaint hearings are not adversarial. The majority reasons that sec. 968.02(3) hearings are subject to the same presumption of openness that applies to most judicial proceedings in Wisconsin. Page 505. However, the majority fails to distinguish precomplaint from post-complaint proceedings. I note that other criminal ex parte proceedings in this state are traditionally closed to the public. See, see. 968.12, Stats, (search warrants); sec. 968.04 (arrest warrants); secs. 968.28-968.31 (interception of wire or oral communications) ; sec. 756.147 (grand jury proceedings); and sec. 968.26 (John Doe proceedings). Again, no case has extended the nonabsolute public right of access to a proceeding occurring prior to the issuance of a criminal complaint.
In this case, charges have not yet been issued against the accused. The accused are not yet defendants in this action, although the majority improperly identifies them as defendants (at page 512). The accused in this case desire closure to protect their privacy and reputational interests, which would be jeopardized by an open hearing should a criminal charge not result. Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 430, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979), stressed that there is a public policy interest in protecting the reputations of citizens. Section 968.02 (3) mandates that “[t]he hearing shall be ex parte without the right of cross-examination.” There is no right to any rebuttal nor the right to present counter evidence in the course of this ex parte hearing. False accusations could be made in detail with no possibility of contemporaneous rebuttal. If this stage of the criminal process were public, before there is even a finding of probable cause or a determination to issue a charge, the potential for damage to reputational interests would be enormous.
*518For these reasons, I would hold that sec. 968.02(3) does not require that precomplaint hearings be open to the public. I believe that the majority is wrongly legislating when it holds to the contrary. Thus, the issue on appeal becomes whether the judge abused his or her discretion in closing the hearing. Contrary to the majority’s position, I do not believe that this court must find a substantial, compelling reason to close the hearing before it will affirm the judge’s discretion of closure. Page 501. Therefore, I move to the issue of whether Judge Connors abused her discretion in closing this hearing.
The majority summarizes the reasons provided by Judge Connors as to why she believed the hearing in this case should be closed. Pages 503, 504. I believe that the last factor is sufficient to compel closure in this case, which is the following:
“5. This was only an accusatory hearing and even if no charges were eventually issued, revelation of the details of the incident to the public would cause defendants ‘unnecessary agony or suffering.’ ” Page 504.
I agree with Judge Connors and the accused that their reputations would be further irreparably damaged by a public hearing, even if no criminal charges were ultimately issued. As I have stressed above, these accused have no right to rebut or present counter evidence in the course of this proceeding. False accusations could be made in detail, with no possibility of contemporaneous rebuttal.
The majority falsely assumes that because the district attorney in this case has publicly released his statement and because the press has printed dozens of articles disclosing the details of the alleged incident, no further harm can come to the reputations of these accused. I *519strongly disagree. First, further significant publicity is inevitable if the hearing is open. Second, although two newspapers have disclosed the names of these accused, who are not yet defendants, as the majority suggests, these disclosures were limited. The names of these accused have not been highly publicized.
I believe that injury to the reputation and privacy of these accused can be, as a matter of law, a compelling reason for closing a sec. 968.02(3) hearing. While another judge or the majority in this case might reasonably have reached a different conclusion, there were sufficient facts in the record upon which Judge Connors could reasonably conclude that the protection of reputational and privacy interests of these accused compelled closure. I strongly object to the majority’s substituting its judgment for that of Judge Connors. Media counsel conceded before the judge that defendants were people of “substantial reputation.” The record reflects that one of the papers owned by petitioner Newspapers, Inc. has stated it will publicly identify the accused if there is “some official action or court proceeding” that names them. An open sec. 968.02(3) hearing will do just that, regardless of whether or not charges are issued here. Based upon the facts as developed to date, the arguments of their counsel and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, Judge Connors could in the exercise of discretion conclude that given their reputations and the likely additional damaging publicity an open sec. 968.02(3) hearing would engender, there was a compelling reason for a closed proceeding. Her decision to do so was not an abuse of discretion, particularly in light of the fact that the procedure, which is only a charging matter in the nature of a prosecutor’s conference, does not permit any counter evidence. The procedure is not a mini-trial, for only the complainant has the right to produce evidence. When this stage of the criminal process *520is made public, before there is even a finding of probable cause or a determination to issue a charge, the threat to reputational interests is enormous, not only for the target of the accusation but also for the accuser. Victims should be able to discuss their perceived grievances with a judge with the assurance that their accusations will not be spread before the public if the judge declines to authorize the issuance of a complaint.
The legal principles involved are not dependent upon the veracity of the accusations by this publicity-seeking “complainant.” No matter what the outcome is of these open proceedings, these accused are obliged to submit to the odium of the accusations, based, perhaps, upon insufficient evidence, without ever having, as in a trial, the opportunity to meet their accuser and reply to her attack. This situation is one that should offend everyone’s sense of fair play and is certainly not conducive to the decent administration of justice.
The holding of the majority smacks of the star chamber inquisitions, condemning without the opportunity to be heard, which weakens reputational and privacy rights of those not yet charged with a crime. In our republic of freedom-loving people, reputational interests and privacy, rights should be paramount in precharging inquiries.
The petition for a supervisory writ should be denied in this case, and, therefore, I must dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice William G. Callow joins in this dissenting opinion.