dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. It is conceded that the policy was purchased for the purpose of avoiding the sanctions of Section 39-16-05, N.D.C.C. It is also apparently conceded that the application for the insurance was falsified because the true owner of the vehicle, Bye, had a previous conviction for driving while intoxicated and the insurance premium would be higher if he applied for it in his own name.
This is a dispute between insurance companies and under the circumstances of the case I feel no compulsion to stretch the provisions of Section 39-16.1-ll(6)(a), N.D. C.C., or extend the decision of this court in Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870 (N.D.1975), to policies of insurance issued for the purpose of avoiding the sanctions of Section 39-16-05, N.D. C.C. Although it may be contended that to not do so is inconsistent with Hughes, the decision in that case is based in part upon public policy. I seriously doubt it was the intent of the Legislature, and therefore the public policy of this State, to in any manner encourage the falsification of insurance applications. The summary in the majority opinion, at footnote 9, of the statutes which must be subverted to conclude otherwise, is sufficient to convince me that we should not so construe and apply the wording in Section 39-16.1-ll(6)(a). If, indeed, I am wrong and that is the intent of the Legislature, and the public policy of this State, it must, at least for me, be stated in more direct terms.