(concurring). I write separately because, although I agree with the majority’s analysis of many of the issues raised by the parties and with the result reached by the majority, I do not agree with the interpretation given to the Supreme Court’s opinions, Denham v Bedford, 407 Mich 517; 287 NW2d 168 (1980), and Stockdale v Jamison, 416 Mich 217; 330 NW2d 389 (1982), in parts (2), #73078, and (2), #73100 of the opinion.
In part (2), #73078, the majority states that:
"the Supreme Court’s decision in Denham v Bedford, 407 Mich 517; 287 NW2d 168 (1980), restricts prejudgment interest to the face amount of the policy. * * * Contrary to the argument made in plaintiffs’ excellent and comprehensive brief, the Supreme Court specifically dealt with the question of whether Transamerica was liable for interest on the whole judgment or for interest on its policy limit. The Court noted that there was a split of authority on this question and noted the case law cited by defendant. Id. pp 533-534. After a discussion of the issue, the Court concluded that an insurer is liable for prejudgment interest only on that portion of the judgment representing the policy liability of the insurer. Even if that part of the Supreme Court’s opinion could be read as dicta because the Court was not asked to address the issue, the fact that the Court went out of its way to address the issue suggests that the Court’s conclusion to limit the judgment to the policy limits is more than mere dicta.” (Footnote omitted.)
*402From this interpretation, the majority reasons that no interest on the judgment should be computed on any amount exceeding $40,000.
I cannot agree that the Supreme Court, in any way, resolved the issue of whether an insurer is liable for interest on the whole judgment. The Court merely noted that that particular question was the only issue pertaining to an insurer’s obligation to pay costs or interest on a judgment recovered against the insured which remained unresolved at common law. Denham v Bedford, p 533. The Court noted that other courts have split on the issue although the majority trend is in favor of holding the insurer liable for interest on the whole judgment. The Supreme Court did not express an opinion in favor of either position but simply stated: "We note, however, that even those jurisdictions which do not follow that majority rule still require the insurer to pay interest on the policy limits, even if the total payment exceeds those limits”. 407 Mich 533-534. In addition, in footnote 9, p 533, the Supreme Court expressly stated that "[although there is some Michigan authority to the contary, see, e.g., Cates v Moyses, 57 Mich App 405; 226 NW2d 106 (1975), mod 394 Mich 762; 228 NW2d 380 (1975); Cosby [v Pool, 36 Mich App 571; 194 NW2d 142 (1971)], this Court has never fully addressed the issue whether an insurer should be held liable for interest on the entire judgment”. I note that this portion of the Supreme Courts’ opinion has been interpreted twice before to "mention but not resolve” the issue of whether an insurer would be required to pay all of the interest on the judgment. See Michigan Milk Producers Ass’n v Commercial Union Ins Co, 493 F Supp 66 (WD Mich, 1980), and Celina Mutual Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co of America, 133 Mich App 655, 659; 349 NW2d 547 (1984).
*403However, despite this interpretaion of Denham, I agree with the majority that neither pre- nor postjudgment interest should be computed on any sum exceeding $40,000. I reach this conclusion based on Cates v Moyses, supra; Cosby v Pool, supra, and Celina Mutual Ins Co v Citizens Ins, supra.
I also disagree with the majority’s interpretation of footnote 15 in Stockdale v Jamison, supra. The majority concludes that the footnote expresses the Supreme Court’s intent to limit damages for an insurer’s liability for breach of the duty to settle to the policyholder’s assets not exempt from legal process. I beleive that the footnote, when read in context, was not placed in the opinion to address the issue of liability for breach of the duty to settle but simply as support for the Supreme Court’s holding that "ordinarily an insurer’s liability for breach of its contractual duty to defend its insured is limited to an amount equal to the insured’s assets not exempt from legal process”. 416 Mich 228.
However, I agree that limiting an insurer’s liability to an amount equal to the insured’s assets not exempt from legal process is appropriate in a claim for bad-faith failure to settle. The advantages recited in footnote 15 are persuasive and address the reasons for permitting recovery beyond the policy limits in actions for bad-faith failure to settle.