dissenting.
I agree with the court’s statements as to the imposition of a constructive trust where “one has acquired legal title to property under such circumstances that he or she may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest in the property.” I also agree with the statement as to the scope of our review as set out in the majority opinion.
I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s holding that the evidence in this case does not clearly and convincingly establish an abuse by the Jordans of the relationship that existed between them and Mrs. Ford and was cultivated by the Jordans. There is no question that in 1976 when Mrs. Ford met with a capable, impartial attorney (selected, however, by the Jordans) to draw her will, Mrs. Ford understood the nature and consequences of joint tenancy ownership. It should be here noted that on this early occasion the pervasive Jordan effect on Mrs. Ford was already in full bloom, because Mrs. Ford did not meet the attorney alone, but always in the presence of the Jordans. Later, many of Mrs. Ford’s stocks and bonds were sold and others bought and placed in joint tenancy with the Jordans through the Jordans’ stockbroker, whom Mrs. Ford never met.
On August 7, 1976, a will disposing of Mrs. Ford’s estate in such fashion that her assets remained in her family was executed by Mrs. Ford. After that date, in my judgment, there began a systematic conversion of what might be termed as *501testamentary assets directed to her family into joint tenancy assets between Mrs. Ford and the Jordans. The evidence shows that as Mrs. Ford aged, her eyesight and her once-clear understanding concerning joint tenancy dimmed, and the joint tenancy transfers to the Jordans increased. I believe the facts recited in the majority opinion fully support the conclusion I reach and that those facts, supplemented by other facts determined by the trial court, furnish more than ample evidentiary support for the trial court’s conclusion that the Jordans abused their confidential relationship with Mrs. Ford to such a degree that, as stated in the trial court’s written opinion, “equity must act in this case and the Court finds that the assets in question now held by the defendants must be placed in a constructive trust for the benefit and use of the plaintiffs.”
As further specific examples of the Jordans’ activities in this case, I join with the trial court in noting that during the psychiatric treatments that Mrs. Ford was undergoing in 1981, the medical records show that Mrs. Ford’s daughter called the psychiatrist’s office, stating that her mother “did not come in for appt because she has financial problems and can’t afford any more expense.” As noted by the trial court, Mrs. Ford did not have a daughter, and I agree with the trial court’s inference that Mrs. Jordan canceled the medical visit. The trial court stated that “[t]his does not show the concern of a mother-daughter relationship testified to by Lois E. Jordan.” I further agree.
I also believe it is significant that the Jordans completely disposed of the assets of Mrs. Ford’s friend and lodger, Harold Courtier, who died shortly after Mrs. Ford. Mr. Courtier, while not as financially secure as Mrs. Ford, did have some assets and some relatives. Before his death, and while he was in a coma, his automobile was sold, utilizing Mrs. Jordan’s signature as Mr. Courtier’s, and his assets were distributed by the Jordans to those whom they determined were entitled to those assets — all without the intervention of any probate court. I believe the Courtier situation merely presaged this case.
I would affirm.
Boslaugh, J., joins in this dissent.