Defendants-appellants Linda Dubreuil (Dubreuil) and Regina Wilson (Wilson) appeal a jury award in favor of plaintiff-appellee Trevor Pinnick (Pinnick). We affirm.
Pinnick brought this action for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. Defendants contend that the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence and was contrary to law.
In determining whether a judgment is supported by sufficient evidence, this Court neither weighs the evidence nor resolves questions of credibility of witnesses. Rather, this Court views only the evidence most favorable to the appellee, together with all logical inferences flowing therefrom. Rieth-Riley Construction Co., Inc. v. McCarrell (1975), 163 Ind.App. 613, 325 N.E.2d 844. In addition, it is only where the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial court has reached an opposite conclusion, that its decision will be disturbed as being contrary to law. Chaney v. Tingley (1977), [174] Ind.App. [191], 366 N.E.2d 707.
Utica Mutual Insurance Company v. Ueding (1977), 175 Ind.App. 60, 370 N.E.2d 373, 376. If there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict on either theory, the verdict will not be disturbed. See Brockman v. Detroit Diesel Allison Division, etc., (1977), 174 Ind.App. 240, 366 N.E.2d 1201; Utica, supra.
As properly construed, the evidence adduced at trial established that Pinnick was the minister of the Antioch Church in French Lick, Indiana, for several years. The defendants were associated with this church which conducted but two meetings per year. Apparently, during the meetings in September of 1973 and May of 1974, the defendants found themselves *528at odds with Pinnick over various church issues. Prior to the September 8,1974 meeting, Dubreuil and Wilson sought the advice of counsel concerning the possibility of getting a restraining order to prevent Pin-nick’s attendance. Dubreuil informed her attorney that she would be afraid and threatened by Pinnick’s presence because of his alleged violent propensities. Counsel informed her that no restraining order could be had, but that she could procure a surety of the peace bond from the justice of the peace. Thereafter, Dubreuil filed an affidavit pursuant to IND. CODE 35-1-5-1, and a surety bond issuance was docketed.
September 8th arrived and Pinnick performed a morning service. Wilson, believing Dubreuil had obtained a restraining order, went to the courthouse to secure a copy thereof. However, no restraining order was sought or issued, nor had a warrant been issued for the surety bond proceeding. Nevertheless, Wilson got a copy of the only document on file (Dubreuil’s affidavit), believing it to be a restraining order.1 She then sought the assistance of a deputy sheriff who promptly arrested Pin-nick on the misapprehension that the affidavit was either a warrant or a restraining order.
In Stine v. Shuttle (1962), 134 Ind.App. 67, 186 N.E.2d 168, we defined false imprisonment as:
It is the general rule of law that a tort action for... false imprisonment, is based upon deprivation of one’s liberty without legal process that may arise when arrest or detention is without warrant or a warrant that charges no offense ... and all that must be averred or shown [is] the deprivation of one’s liberty without legal process. [Citations omitted.]
124 Ind.App. at 72, 186 N.E.2d at 171. Accord Brickman v. Robertson Brothers Department Store (1964), 136 Ind.App. 467, 202 N.E.2d 583.
Under the foregoing facts, we believe the evidence was sufficient to *529establish that Pinnick was deprived of his liberty unlawfully. See Brickman, supra. A defendant may be brought before the court in a surety of the peace proceeding in one of two ways. First, if an affidavit is filed, the justice of the peace must issue a warrant to be served on the defendant, and cause the defendant to be arrested and brought before him for trial. IC 35-1-5-1, supra. Secondly, a justice of the peace may require a defendant to post a bond if a breach of the peace is committed in his presence. IC 35-1-5-13. In this case no warrant was issued and the uncontradicted evidence established that Pinnick did not cause any type of disturbance on September 8. These facts, coupled with the deputy sheriffs misapprehension concerning the legal effect of the affidavit, leads to the conclusion that the deputy did not have the authority to arrest Pinnick. Hence, the arrest was illegal and could therefore be reasonably construed as false imprisonment. See State v. Whitney (1978), 176 Ind.App. 615, 377 N.E.2d 652. As such, we hold there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of false imprisonment.
Defendants also contend that there was insufficient evidence to render them jointly liable. This contention is without merit. In Brickman, supra, we declared:
It is also well-established law that, as a general rule, ‘all those who, by direct act or indirect procurement, personally participate in or proximately cause the unlawful restraint or detention are liable therefor as joint-tortfeasors, jointly and severally, regardless of the degree or extent of the individual activity, and each is so liable although he did not know that the detention was illegal in its inception. * * *’ [Citations omitted.]
136 Ind.App. at 472-3, 202 N.E.2d at 586. Thus, the gravamen of analysis is whether the jury could find that Dubreuil and Wilson, by direct act or indirect procurement, were responsible for the deprivation of Pin-nick’s liberty without legal process.
Dubreuil’s affidavit was filed pursuant to IC 35-1-5-1, supra, which provides:
AFFIDAVIT. When complaint is made in writing, upon oath, before any justice of the peace, that the complainant has just cause to fear, and does fear, that another will destroy or injure his property, or injure, by violence, himself or some member of his family or ward, and that he makes such affidavit only to secure the protection of *530the law, and not from anger or malice, any justice with whom such affidavit is filed shall issue his warrant, and cause the person complained of to be arrested and brought before him for trial.
(Emphasis added.)
We think Dubreuil’s testimony is significant with respect to her motive in filing the affidavit. She openly admitted that they did not care if Pin-nick came any other day, but that on September 8 they “wanted to have a meeting and see whether the congregation wanted to retain him [Pin-nick] as minister.” Dubreuil’s testimony did not reveal any direct evidence that she had a reasonable cause to believe Pinnick would injure her or others. As such, we believe the jury could properly infer that Dubreuil filed the affidavit because of her ill-feelings towards Pin-nick and for the purpose of voting him out as minister, but not because she had “just cause to fear” Pinnick. Of course, an improper motive or malice is not an element of false imprisonment. See American Express Co., et al. v. Patterson (1881), 73 Ind. 430. Also, a person should not generally be held liable for the mere filing of an affidavit. But where, as here, the legislature has forbidden the execution of an affidavit out of “anger or malice,” we believe a finding of an improper motive or malice on the part of Dubreuil is relevant to the determination of whether the conduct of Dubreuil was indirect procurement of Pinnick’s arrest. The jury could find that the fact the affidavit was filed in violation of IC 35-1-5-1 was causally related to the arrest of Pinnick in a manner sufficient to impose liability. In sum, we do not assert that Dubreuil’s liability is based on malice as an element of the tort; rather, we are of the opinion that motive was relevant in establishing the fact of the indirect procurement of the deprivation of Pinnick’s liberty without legal process. As such, we áre unable to say, as a matter of law, that the jury could only have found Dubreuil’s conduct so de minimus as to excuse her from liability.
With respect to Wilson, her testimony revealed that:
“Q. Now Mrs. Wilson, would you tell the Court what your part was in the September 8th 1974 arrest of Mr. Pinnick?
A. My sister [Dubreuil] had obtained the restraining order to keep him from appearing at the church that particular time.
*531Q. But you believe[d] there was an order for him not to appear at church and have him arrested right?
A. That’s right.
Q. And you called the police, did you?
A. Mr. Stroud was already there and he told me that the next procedure was to go back to Mr. Shortridge and get a copy of the restraining order, to pick up a policeman, and go back out to the church and arrest.
Q. Which you did?
A. Which I did.
Q. Even though he was causing no problems at all?
A. Not at the time.
Q. Okay, now he caused problems before that time, the same day?
A. Not at that time on that day.
Q. Right. And so you went to the Justice of the Peace office and got a copy of Linda’s affidavit it looks like, isn’t it?
A. Apparently so.
Q. And then the Sheriff'arrested him, right?
A. Someone arrested him. I don’t know who.
Q. And it turns out there was no reason to arrest him because there was no order, no warrant, no nothing, right?
A. If there wasn’t, it was of no fault of my sister and myself.
Q. Okay, because you tried to do it right and have him arrested right, right?
A. We tried to take care of all the paper work right so far as we’re able.”
We believe a reasonable inference, in favor of Pinnick, could be drawn by the trier of fact that Wilson actively sought out and procured the assistance of the deputy with a view towards the arrest of Pinnick. In short, it would be reasonable to infer that Wilson did, by her words and/or course of conduct, “request” the arrest of Pinnick. Furthermore, even if Wilson thought the arrest would be consummated in full accordance with the law, liability will nonetheless attach “although [the defen*532dant] did not know the detention was illegal in its inception. . Brinkman, supra, 136 Ind.App. at 473, 202 N.E.2d at 586. Hence, we believe the jury could reasonably find that the participation of Wilson in Pinnick’s arrest was sufficient to impose liability therefor.
From the foregoing, therefore, there were a trilogy of actors — Dubreuil, Wilson and the deputy sheriff. Again, the jury could have found that (1) Dubreuil filed the affidavit out of her ill-feelings towards Pin-nick (2) Wilson misunderstood the legal effect of the affidavit and “requested” Pinnick’s arrest, and (3) the deputy sheriff illegally arrested Pinnick. We cannot agree with the assertion that liability should be visited solely upon the deputy. The conduct of Dubreuil and Wilson was not, as a matter of law, so remote as to preclude the trier of fact from finding their active participation as being at least “indirect procurement” which resulted in the unlawful restraint of Pinnick.
Lastly, we believe our appellate function prevents us from reversing the court below on the grounds of excessive damages. In Kavanagh v. Butorac (1966), 140 Ind.App. 139, 221 N.E.2d 824, we declared that:
By nature, injuries personal to the individual, are incapable of a more definite rule for measurment [sic] of damages. Each action is unique and it must be so treated and determined on the facts peculiar to that matter. Because our law seeks to individualize the solution to the problem of properly compensating the victim of torts, no overall expedient applies in every case.
For a formula then, our common law sets only the general guidelines for compensating the victim, each in its own way to be considered by the trier of facts and weighed to determine what the total compensation will be. Because of this personal nature of each case and since the decision is unique to the particular set of facts our courts have said the trier of facts is to be given ‘sound discretion,’ and ‘liberal discretion’ where damages cannot be defined and calculated with mathematical certainty or by any exact standard. [Citations omitted.]
140 Ind.App. at 145, 221 N.E.2d at 828. In a tort action, “[t]he jury has the right to use human experience in determining anguish, anxiety and other suffering both physical and mental____” New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company v. Henderson (1957), 237 Ind. 456, 477, 146 *533N.E.2d 531, 543. Further, in an action for false imprisonment, the plaintiff may recover for wounded pride and humiliation. Harness v. Steele, by Next Friend (1902), 159 Ind. 286, 64 N.E. 875. Since we will not set aside a verdict on the basis of excessiveness unless it appears “that the amount fixed by the jury is so large that it cannot be explained upon any reasonable hypothesis other than prejudice, passion, partiality, corruption, or some improper element taken into account,” Safety Cab, Inc. v. Ferguson (1965), 137 Ind. App. 644, 654, 205 N.E.2d 827, 833, we are unwilling to substitute our judgment for that of the jury. See also State, et al. v. Collier (1975), 165 Ind.App. 239, 331 N.E.2d 784.
For all the foregoing reasons, therefore, the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Lowdermilk, J. concurs.
Young, J. (sitting by designation) dissents with opinion.
. Dubreuii’s affidavit was entitled on the cover “Affidavit For Surety Of The Peace." The contents recited:
Linda Dubreuil- being duly sworn says: That she has just-cause to fear, and does fear, that one Trevor Pinnick may cause some disturbance to people in and near the plaintiff in a manner so as to cause some one or more people mental or bodily injury, and request an order for the said defendant to keep off the premises of said church on the date of Sunday, September 8th, 1974.
(Emphasis added.)