dissents.
I dissent from the Court’s conclusion that due process precludes the district court in Idaho from exercising personal jurisdiction over the respondents.
The divorce in this case took place in California. At that time, the mother was granted primary physical custody of the child and Mr. Smalley was granted reasonable visitation and ordered to pay child support of $300.00 per month. Thereafter, he moved to Kootenai County, Idaho, and the mother moved with the child to Payette County, Idaho. In time the child moved to Kootenai County to reside with Mr. Smalley. The mother moved to the state of Missouri. Mr. Smalley filed a petition in Kootenai County seeking primary physical custody of the child. The mother answered but did not participate in the action. The Idaho court entered a custody and child support order awarding primary physical custody to Mr. Smalley and ordering that neither party pay child support to the other. Subsequently, the child traveled to Missouri to spend time with her mother, and the mother filed a petition in Missouri to obtain custody of the child. Mr. Smalley voluntarily sent child support at the level set forth in the California action, and he advised counsel for the mother that he objected to the proposition that he was subject to personal jurisdiction of the Missouri courts for the purposes of assessing child support. He has never been to Missouri and has had no contact with Missouri beyond the fact that his child moved there.
The question is whether the department in Missouri and its employees had enough contact with Idaho to meet constitutional standards of due process to allow Idaho to exercise jurisdiction under the Long Arm Statute. Those standards have been met in this case. The Department of Child Support Enforcement in Missouri was aware that Mr. Smalley was in Idaho and that any action that it took against him would affect him in Idaho. On December 2, 1995, the Department sent him a letter in Idaho notifying him of the support payments and stating that if he owed past due support:
DCSE MUST TAKE LEGAL ACTION AGAINST YOU. THIS ACTION MIGHT INCLUDE WITHHOLDING MONEY FROM YOUR INCOME, INTERCEPTING YOUR FEDERAL AND STATE INCOME TAX REFUND, ASKING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR ASSETS, OR SENDING YOUR CHILD SUPPORT DEBT INFORMATION TO A CONSUMER REPORTING AGENCY (CREDIT BUREAU). OTHER LEGAL ACTIONS MAY ALSO BE TAKEN. INTEREST MAY BE CALCULATED ON ANY PAST DUE SUPPORT AMOUNTS.
Mr. Smalley responded through counsel and explained his position that the Missouri judgment and order was invalid and unenforceable. The Missouri Department responded with a “Notice of Consumer Reporting Agency Referral” that was issued to Mr. Smalley. Counsel for Mr. Smalley wrote legal counsel for the Missouri Department stating his belief that the enforcement proceedings were improper because the judgment obtained in Missouri was void for lack of jurisdiction and that a report of delinquency in payment of child support to third parties would be defamatory. Subsequently, the director of the State of Missouri Department of Social Services Division of Child Support Enforcement issued an Administrative Order on an Existing Order and an Income Withholding Order directed to Mr. Smalley’s employer at its address in Vancouver, Washington. When Mr. Smalley applied for credit with a Kootenai County credit union, he learned that his credit rating had been damaged. An employee of the Missouri Department confirmed that she caused a copy of the Income Withholding Order to be sent to Mr. Smalley’s employer and that she caused the credit report to be released. It is indisputable that if the credit report was released, it would appear in Idaho. There would be no reason to release it except to compel action from Mr. Smalley in Idaho.
*915The following is a summary of the contacts that the Missouri Department has had with Idaho that make it fundamentally fair for an Idaho court to exercise personal jurisdiction: (1) a Department official contacted Mr. Smal-ley in Idaho, fully aware that any action against him would take place in Idaho; (2) the Missouri Department was aware from counsel in Idaho that Mr. Smalley contested Missouri’s right to act; (3) a Missouri Department official caused Mr. Smalley’s employer to withhold payment of wages to Mr. Smalley in Idaho by issuance of the Income Withholding Order; and (4) Missouri officials intentionally damaged his credit in Idaho by release of a credit report, knowing it would be transmitted to Idaho. Additionally, the alleged injuries to Mr. Smalley occurred in Idaho.
The Court notes the factors outlined in Western States which may be considered in determining whether traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are met by an Idaho court exercising jurisdiction under the Long Arm Statute. Among those are “the burden on the defendant.” Doubtless, it would be burdensome for Missouri to defend its actions in Idaho, but not very burdensome. A limited legal issue is presented. Did Missouri have jurisdiction to set child support? If so, Mr. Smalley’s complaints are at an end. That is an issue that can be decided on a motion with a limited burden on Missouri. The next step is “the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute.” An Idaho resident has been subject to significant action to his detriment in his home state. There is as much interest in Idaho adjudicating this issue as in any other case. The third step is “the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief.” Essentially, the court requires an individual of limited means to contest this case in a far away jurisdiction where he has never been, while the damage to his credit reputation continues in Idaho. Mr. Smalley has a great interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief that can be afforded in Idaho, not Missouri. The fourth and fifth issues are “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” and the “shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” These factors are a wash to either party. The issue is limited and can be determined in either state, and each has the same interest in fundamental social policies.
The result of this case is that an Idaho resident who has been injured by intentional acts of a Missouri department directed towards him in Idaho, utilizing credit reporting systems in Idaho, cannot have a limited legal decision determined in Idaho. He must go to Missouri. There may be reasons an Idaho court should not act or grant Mr. Smalley relief, but dismissal of his claim should not be on the basis of insufficient contacts with Idaho to meet due process standards.