(dissenting, with whom Kaplan, J., joins). While I agree that the appeal is now moot, I do not agree that the city’s award of the contract to Modern was proper or that Sciaba should be deprived of its bid preparation costs. Unlike the majority, I view the deletion of an item in the scope of the work by the city after the completion of the competitive bidding process as a substantive deviation from statutory bidding procedures. See Grande & Son, Inc. v. School Hous. Comm. of N. Reading, 334 Mass. 252, 258 (1956); Gil-Bern Constr. Corp. v. Brockton, 353 Mass. 503, 505-506 (1968).
Whether a deviation is considered one of substance or a minor technicality, which does not compel rejection of the bid or invalidation of a contract, will depend on whether invalidation is necessary to fulfil the legislative purpose. Phipps Prod. Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy., 387 Mass. 687, 692 (1982). The objectives of statutory bidding procedures are “to prevent favoritism, to secure honest meth*192ods of letting contracts in the public interest, to obtain the most favorable price, and to treat all persons equally.” Ibid. In determining whether the legislative purpose of the statutory bidding procedures has been thwarted in this case, the language of the Grande case cited in the majority opinion is particularly instructive, namely: “If, after bids are opened, the awarding authority could, either with or without negotiation with a selected general contractor, omit portions of the proposed work for reductions in price, the legislative intent to protect the public, all too easily, could be evaded.” 334 Mass. at 258. While the majority agrees that the same reasoning applies in this case, they assert that the city’s change in the scope of the work after the completion of the bidding process can be overlooked because the city’s action was not an attempt to manipulate the bids but a desire to secure punctilious compliance with its bid documents.
I do not agree that the city’s good faith is relevant to the issue before us. See Gifford v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 328 Mass. 608, 617 (1952) (absence of bad faith or of corruption does not excuse noncompliance with the procedure established by the Legislature for the award of public contracts); Grande & Son, Inc. v. School Hous. Comm. of N. Reading, 334 Mass. at 258. I also do not agree that the city sought punctilious compliance with its bid documents. The very reason the case is before us is that the city failed to follow the procedure set forth in its bid documents for dealing with the defect in Modern’s bid, which, as will be remembered, provides:
“In the case of a discrepancy between the prices written in words and those written in figures, the written words shall govern. In the event there is a discrepancy between the unit prices and the total sum of all of the Items, the unit prices shall govern.”
If this formula had been applied, Modern’s price for the deleted item would have been $96,000, and Sciaba would have been the lowest bidder. The majority seeks to justify the city’s action by construing the clause to apply only when an *193aid to interpretation is needed to understand the bid and not when the intent of the bidder is apparent. While I do not agree that the intent of the bidder in this case is apparent, I note that the majority’s reasoning ignores a basic tenet of contract interpretation, namely that “[pjlain words are to be given their plain meaning where no inconsistency results or there is no controlling indication in the instrument of other intent.” Forte v. Caruso, 336 Mass. 476, 480 (1957). There appears to be no ambiguity in this clause and no reason not to give these words their plain meaning since ascribing to them their plain meaning makes no other provision inconsistent, meaningless, or unreasonable. Id. at 481. In these circumstances, speculation as to possible different intent is barred. Ibid.
Even if one were to conclude that there was some doubt as to the clause’s meaning, the best evidence of intent is the city’s recognition that the clause applied to the defect necessitating their deletion of the item containing the defect from the scope of the work. See Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co. v. Danvers, 411 Mass. 39, 59 (1991) (conduct of the parties after signing the agreement is indicative of intent).
In sum, I conclude that the city’s invalid deletion of an item in the change of the scope of the work after completion of the bidding process (a point not disputed in the majority opinion) and the city’s failure to follow its own formula in its bid documents for dealing with the error in Modern’s bid creates an impression of favoritism, smacks of bid manipulation, and results in disparate treatment of the submitted bids contrary to the legislative intent and spirit of statutory bidding procedures. As a result, I conclude that the preliminary injunction should have been allowed, the award of the contract to Modern was improper, and Sciaba should be entitled to recover its bid preparation costs under the authority of Paul Sardella Constr. Co. v. Braintree Hous. Authy., 3 Mass. App. Ct. 326, 333-335 (1975), S.C., 371 Mass. 235, 243 (1976).