(dissenting).
I dissent because I cannot accept the interpretation employed in the majority opinion with respect to the scope of the religious exemption granted by Iowa Code section 299.24. The present case involves the interpretation of a statutory religious exemption from compulsory attendance in the public schools the basic tenor of which is much broader than the area of constitutional protection recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder.
The narrow interpretation which the majority opinion places on section 299.241 would deny the statute any meaningful application. The determination of whether the principles or tenets professed by an organized religion differ substantially from the “objectives, goals, and philosophy of education” embodied in the required curriculum of the public schools requires much more than a review of what courses are required and for what period of time. The forum passing on the request for exemption, in this case the state board of education, must scrutinize the substantive content of the various required courses of study and determine whether such content in any way offends against the principles or tenets of the religious group requesting the exemption. Clearly, the state board of education has not done this in the present case.
The matter of certified teachers is irrelevant to a proper analysis of the right to a religious exemption under section 299.24. There is no requirement that religious organizations claiming an exemption under section 229.24 must first seek equivalent instruction by certified teachers outside the public school system. Nor does the fact that the applicants may have attempted that alternative have any bearing on the elements to be considered in passing on the claim for exemption. The exemption is predicated upon conflict between religious tenets and the compulsory curriculum of the public schools. That is the only basis upon which such claims should be decided.
While I agree with the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Schultz, J. that there is much evidence from which a determination favorable to the religious group can be made, it is for the state board of education to make such determinations and not this court. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case to the state board of education with directions to reconsider the appellant’s claim for religious exemption under those standards which I believe the statute imposes.
. In my opinion, the interpretation of the exemption contained in the majority opinion matches that which was applied by the state board in the present case.