dissenting, with whom CARDINE, Justice, joins.
The court begins its opinion by concluding that the issue here involved is the propriety of probation revocation. The court discusses in detail the wide latitude the district court possesses in those decisions, with which I have no disagreement. However, that is not the only or even the most significant issue presented. The court fails to adequately address the constitutionally important procedural issue — whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant appellant’s counsel a continuance of the revocation hearing so that the attorney could meet his professional and constitutional duty in criminal representation. See Haselhuhn v. State, Wyo., 727 P.2d 280, cert. denied — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 1321, 94 L.Ed.2d 174 (1987), Urbigkit, J., dissenting.
On February 12, 1982, Appellant Schmidt pleaded guilty to forging a $10.00 check, and was sentenced to confinement in the Wyoming State Penitentiary for a term of not less than eight years nor more than 14 years. That sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for a period of eight years, with the customary conditions of probation including abstention from the consumption of alcoholic drink and conduct in conformity with the ordinances and laws of towns, the State of Wyoming, and the United States. An eight-year sentence of “on the dry” for a confirmed alcoholic is more than a life sentence for many, and unfortunately this defendant was not the desired exception.
On September 10, 1986, Schmidt’s probation officer filed a petition for revocation of probation and bench warrant. On Friday, September 12, 1986, the district court issued a bench warrant, and appellant was arrested. Wyatt Skaggs, of the State Public Defender’s office, was apparently notified of the impending revocation of probation on that day, and the hearing was scheduled for the following Monday, September 15, 1986. Thus, defending counsel had only the weekend to travel to Torring-ton and to prepare to present his client’s case to the court — only a weekend to prepare to represent an appellant who was facing action which could result in penitentiary confinement of between eight and 14 years.
Appellant now properly claims that the trial court, by failing to give counsel adequate time to prepare for the revocation hearing, denied due process guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Mason v. State, Wyo., 631 P.2d 1051, 1055 (1981). The utilized process also requires review under the due-process provision, Art. 1, § 6 of the Wyoming Constitution, and the right to defend guaranteed by Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution.
In Mason v. State, supra, this court relied on Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), and *1109Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and stated:
“Due process requires that the defendant in revocation cases be given a two-party hearing to determine if (1) there are verified facts proving a violation of the release agreement; and (2) whether in light of a proven violation the probation should be revoked. This hearing must be preceded by a written notice of the claimed violations. Other protections that attach to this hearing include the guaranty of disclosure of the evidence against the defendant, the right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence and the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” 631 P.2d at 1055.
I agree with appellant that in order to comport with these due-process requirements, counsel should have been given time to (1) consider the possibility of calling witnesses, (2) acquire and review the documentary evidence, and (3) prepare for an adequate cross-examination of anticipated witnesses. The district court’s insistence that the hearing take place on Monday, September 15, 1986, when defense counsel was notified of the hearing on Friday, September 12, 1986, is clearly a violation of appellant’s right to due process of law. With due deference to the trial court, this process capsulizes the “don’t bother me with the facts or your defense, the decision is irretrievably determined” adjudicatory standard. See Pote v. State, Wyo., 733 P.2d 1018 (1987), Urbigkit, J., dissenting.1
I am aware that in Morrissey, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, stated:
“We do not reach or decide the question whether the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or to appointed counsel if he is indigent. [Fn. 16]
“[Fn. 16] The Model Penal Code § 305.-15(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) provides that ‘[t]he institutional parole staff shall render reasonable aid to the parolee in preparation for the hearing and he *1110shall be permitted to advise with his own legal counsel.’ ” 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 2604.
None of the cases wherein the Morrissey principle has since been discussed by the United States Supreme Court has directly considered this reserved inquiry. However, the subject has been clearly determined in Wyoming by § 7-1-110(a)(i) and (c)(i), W.S.1977 which affords a right to counsel, and specifically extend that right to revocation of probation or parole proceedings. Restated by Ch. 157, S.L. of Wyoming 1987, these subsections now renumbered read:
§ 7 — 13—408(c)(i):
“(c) With respect to any hearing pursuant to this section, the probationer, parolee or conditional releasee:
“(i) Shall have reasonable notice in writing of the nature and content of the allegations to be made including notice that the purpose of the hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a violation that may lead to a revocation of probation, parole or conditional release; * * * ”
§ 7-6-104(c)(i):
“(c) A needy person who is entitled to be represented by an attorney under subsection (a) of this section is entitled: “(i) To be counseled and defended at all stages of the matter beginning with the earliest time when a person providing his own counsel would be entitled to be represented by an attorney and including revocation of probation or parole; * * *”
The constitutional understanding of the Wyoming legislature in providing a right to counsel at either parole or probation revocation is implicit in Art. 1, § 6 and Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution. These constitutional guarantees, applied in consonance with Morrissey and the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, confirm the Wyoming constitutional right to counsel at probation revocation proceedings.
Furthermore, the district court violated appellant’s right to the effective representation of counsel. The probation revocation statute specifically provides that the probationer “[sjhall be permitted to consult with any persons whose assistance he reasonably desires, prior to the hearing * Section 7 — 13—409(c)(iii), W.S.1977. This right does not attach in a vacuum.
In order to properly protect appellant’s right to representation, appellant is entitled to reasonably effective assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court held that
“ * * * [Government violates the right to effective assistance when it interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense.” 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2063.
The Strickland court also stated that “counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. In other words, “Rome was not built in a day.” I would now similarly add, “Adequate preparation cannot be completed over a weekend,” nor should any attorney, no matter how dedicated, be requested to make that likely fruitless effort.
Mr. Skaggs was given the weekend to prepare his case, during which time, as an example, he had no access to the municipal court records he believed were material to his client’s position. Recognizing the problem, he initially moved the district court for leave to withdraw as counsel on the basis that he could not effectively represent appellant because the refusal to grant a continuance precluded him from making a realistic investigation pursuant to his duty. The district court denied the motion, stating:
“I don’t believe that you are ineffective counsel because I don’t know that counsel can do an awful lot from what I have heard of the abstract, so the motion is denied.”
We should not ignore the distinction between the obligation of counsel — to be an advocate, as compared to the evenhanded *1111adjudicatory responsibility of the trial judge. If all trial judges knew everything, we would not need any advocacy participation. This subject of the relationship of continuances to trial requirements of due process and counseled defense concerns was more exhaustively considered in my earlier dissent in Haselhuhn v. State, supra, to which those warning comments now even more pertinently apply. For an excellent perspective on pressured disposition to resolve cases, see Sarokin, Justice Rushed is Justice Ruined, 38 Rutgers L.Rev. 431 (1986).
I am not unaware of the precedent of this court that the trial court is accorded discretion when addressed by a motion for a continuance. Chapman v. State, Wyo., 728 P.2d 631 (1986); Tageant v. State, Wyo., 683 P.2d 667 (1984); James v. State, 27 Wyo. 378, 196 P. 1045, 19 Wyo. 493, (1921); Hollywood v. State, 19 Wyo. 493, 120 P. 471, reh. denied 19 Wyo. 493, 122 P. 588 (1911). However, the exercise of discretion in a criminal case cannot eclipse constitutional rights assured by due-process requirements to be achieved by the effective assistance of counsel. Writing for the court in Martin v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 894, 897 (1986), Justice Brown succinctly rephrased the definition of discretion:
“Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.”
This clear and validated standard of discretion is not achieved in this case by the denial of counseled hearing. I would further add, under Martin, that when a trial court ignores a constitutional right it has not exercised its discretion since it lacks that authority to so act. In that circumstance there is an error of law.
“While it is true that a denial of a motion for continuance rests in the sound discretion of the court, and the defendant has the burden of showing an abuse of that discretion [citation], it is also true that the defendant has a fundamental, constitutional right to due process of the law. * * * The due process right carries with it the right to a reasonable amount of time to prepare a defense, ***'*** coupled with the right to compulsory process for the attendance of necessary witnesses.’ State v. Webb, 67 N.M. 293, 297, 354 P.2d 1112, 1114 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 804, 81 S.Ct. 470, 5 L.Ed.2d 461 (1961). To deny those rights is more than an abuse of the trial court’s discretion; it is a denial of due process. [Citation.]
# * * # * *
“The State urges us to accept the argument that defendant was not prejudiced by the court’s rulings. Denial of a likely defense cannot be anything other than prejudicial. A basic tenet of American jurisprudence is that a defendant is entitled to a fair trial with the right to appear and defend himself. * * * Moreover, the prejudice which must be raised in a case such as this is minimal. ‘No more prejudice need be shown than that the trial court’s order may have made a potential avenue of defense unavailable to the defendant.’ State v. Orona, 92 N.M. 450, 452, 589 P.2d 1041, 1043 (1979).
“In deciding whether denial of a continuance violates due process, an appellate court looks to the circumstances of each case as those circumstances appear from the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request was made and denied. [Citation.] Failure to grant a continuance here to allow the defendant a reasonable time to prepare and present a defense * * * invaded defendant’s constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.” March v. State, N.M., 734 P.2d 231, 233-234 (1987).
In reviewing the facts of this case and the circumstances with which counsel was faced, and in consideration of the exposure existent for penitentiary confinement of the defendant, any conclusion that justified exercise of discretion countenances denial of the continuance request is unsupportable in logic or just plain hard, cold facts of *1112the real world of attorney responsibility. See Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 Mich.L.Rev. 282 (1962).
Again, language employed by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland is helpful:
“ * * * Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. So are various kinds of state interference with counsel’s assistance.” (Emphasis added). 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067.
The district court’s refusal to grant the motion of the public defender to withdraw was clearly a recognition of determined denial of the assistance of counsel in absolute terms. In effect, the district judge said to appellant: “You don’t need a lawyer to represent you because from what I know about your case, no lawyer could help you.” Is this due process? I emphatically answer, “NO!” The denial of assistance could hardly be more clear, and the Wyoming Constitution determines that this failure to uphold that basic right is presumed to be prejudicial. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, and Strickland v. Washington, supra. As Chief Justice Warren observed after first defining the right to counsel:
“By denying petitioner any opportunity whatever to obtain counsel on the habitual criminal accusation, the trial court deprived him of due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 75 S.Ct. 1, 99 L.Ed. 4 (1954).
As Justice Black said in Avery v. State, 308 U.S. 444, 446, 60 S.Ct. 321, 322, 84 L.Ed. 377 (1940):
“But the denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer, to consult with the accused and to prepare his defense, could convert the appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing more than a formal compliance with the Constitution’s requirement that an accused be given the assistance of counsel.”
Appellee, in its brief, utterly fails to address appellant’s due-process arguments based on the district court’s failure to postpone the hearing and the denial of counsel’s motion to withdraw. The majority opinion glosses over those arguments, concluding only that appellant was not prejudiced by the denial of the continuance. The court seems to justify its perfunctory af-firmance despite the procedural deficiencies in this case by observing that the correct result was obtained. But if the result was correct, then there is no reason to suspect that a procedurally sufficient hearing would produce a different result. I cannot agree that what this court perceives to be a correct result should affect its determination of procedural sufficiency under the Constitution. As we view the perspective of our legal history from English and Colonial precedent, it must never be forgotten that the thin line between free men and arbitrary repression is only the effectuated institution by which we are all protected and governed, and in which we take special interest in this bicentennial year, as the Constitution of the United States and of this, the sovereign state of Wyoming.
Irrespective of the majority’s perception of the substantive issues in this case, appellant was denied his constitutionally required procedural rights. In effect, the majority say to this appellant, “It doesn’t make any difference whether or not your procedural rights were violated because the district court was justified in revoking probation anyway.” That course ignores the issue presented. This court is charged with upholding constitutional procedural safeguards. The entire history of constitutional jurisprudence in Wyoming and in the federal courts mandates that protecting rights guaranteed by those constitutions is paramount to the results obtained in a single case.
The district court’s refusal to grant the continuance and its denial of counsel’s motion to withdraw was more than a disservice to appellant’s counsel. It was a flagrant violation of appellant’s due-process right to effective assistance of counsel, and the realistic right to resist probation revocation. Without any authentic right to re*1113sist, appellant’s probation was revoked and this chronic alcoholic was sentenced to the penitentiary for an extended term for what originally began with a $10.00 check forgery.
I have no reason to question that in 1982 as well as 1986 appellant was an alcoholic with all the characteristics implicit in that medical condition. If this behavioral status, without much more and without effective right to counseled defense, can serve to justify penitentiary confinement to this extent, it may be that neither Carbon County (men’s penitentiary) nor Niobrara County (women’s penitentiary), with their many thousands of square miles, can be large enough to accommodate our societal capacity to provide those presumptively justified with incarceration.
I would conclude that the district court’s refusal to grant a continuance of the hear-' ing violated appellant’s due-process rights under Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, and Mason v. State, supra. I would also conclude that the district court’s denial of counsel’s motion to withdraw violated appellant’s rights under § 7-13-409, W.S.1977, and the constitutional requirements of Strickland v. Washington, supra. This case should be remanded to the trial court to hold a hearing which comports with constitutional due-process requirements.
I dissent, and maintain that legal representation is denied if adequate opportunity to prepare and present a defense is foreclosed.
. The status of due-process implementation of the Morrissey requirements is something less than explicitly defined in Wyoming rule and statute or, for that matter, in the case law where the conflicts between Justices Rose and Rooney were well portrayed. Lacking the specificity of Rule 32.1, F.R.Cr.P., Rule 33(f), W.R.Cr.P. only provides:
"The court shall not revoke probation except after a hearing at which the defendant shall be present and apprised of the grounds on which such action is proposed. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such hearing.”
Nothing is provided in the rules for revocation of parole. Case law, rule and statute apparently contemplate revocation of probation by the court in accord with retained jurisdiction, and revocation of parole by the state board of probation and parole in accord with § 7-13-409, W.S. 1977. That statute involves both parole and probation, but in Knobel v. State, Wyo., 576 P.2d 941 (1978) this court denied application to judicial revocation, and then in Weisser v. State, Wyo., 600 P.2d 1320, 1323-1324 (1979), Justice Rose stated in applying the statute:
While there is dicta in Knobel to the effect that the statute is applicable only where the agency or its representative initiates the proceeding, a completion of that thought would be that it can be applicable only where the agency initiates and conducts the final revocation proceeding.
"It would be too tenuous and gossamer a distinction for this court to make — a web too finely spun — were we to hold that § 7-13-409 is not applicable where the county attorney files the revocation petition with the court but does apply when the petition is filed with the court by a probation officer.”
Conversely, in discussing Morrissey and Gagnon, this court had earlier stated in Knobel v. State, supra, 576 P.2d at 942, that by virtue of Rule 33(f):
" * * * probation shall not be revoked except after hearing with the presence of the defendant, and with his having notice of the grounds of such action and his release upon bond. The required hearing under said rule in itself provides an inherent sort of fairness which is not achieved through administrative procedures * *
The cases also exhibit something less than clarity in differentiating parole and probation. See definitions, § 7-13-401, Ch. 157, S.L. of Wyoming 1987:
"(vii) ‘Parole’ means permission to leave the confines of the institution in which a person is confined under specified conditions, but does not operate as a discharge of the person;
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"(x) ‘Probation’ means a sentence not involving confinement which imposes conditions and retains authority in the sentencing court to modify the conditions of the sentence or to resentence the offender if he violates the conditions.”