dissenting.
I respectfully dissent on the basis that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Evelyn Gibson, an acquaintance of Burns, had been convicted in a separate and unrelated proceeding of promoting prostitution. I agree that this evidence was improperly admitted but cannot agree that the error was harmless. When evidence of this nature is improperly admitted, we must determine whether the properly admitted evidence, "in the aggregate, substantially and overwhelmingly supported the convictions." Fox v. State (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 221, 224. Our legal system requires that convictions be based on the acts committed by the defendant, not on the reputation of the individuals with whom he associates. See United States v. Romo (1982), 5th Cir., 669 F.2d 285, 288; United States v. Singleterry (1981), 5th Cir., 646 F.2d 1014, 1018. The mere fact that a person "is married to, associated with, or in the company of a criminal does not support the inference that the person is a criminal or shares in the criminal's guilty knowledge." Romo, supra at 288 (quoting United States v. Forrest (1980), 5th Cir., 620 F.2d 446, 451).
In the present case, there was no evidence as to the substance of the conversation between Burns and Kelly. It was not shown that Burns asked Kelly to his office for the purpose of engaging in sex with Beatty. There was also no evidence that Burns and Gibson were partners in any prostitution endeavor. There was only evidence that they had discussed the possibility of sending Beatty to Florida, and Beatty herself testified that Burns told her she *1251would not have to prostitute for Gibson because he would take care of her. (R. 728) Evidence also revealed that Beatty was a prostitute for Gibson, but there was no evidence that Burns was involved in any of Gibson's operations. Burns did, however, visit Gibson and talk with her. The evidence of Gibson's unrelated conviction . was prejudicial because it created an inference that Burns must also be guilty since he frequently associated with Gibson. The properly admitted evidence did not "substantially and overwhelmingly" support Burns' conviction. I would therefore reverse and remand the case for a new trial.