This cause comes to us on a criminal petition to transfer from the First District Court of Appeals. Petition is brought by Appellee, Ray A. Garcia. The Hendricks Superior Court, No. 2, granted Appellee's motion to suppress evidence of driving while intoxicated obtained at a roadblock in Hendricks County. The State of Indiana appealed the trial court's order to suppress. State v. Garcia (1985), Ind.App., 481 N.E.2d 148. The Court of Appeals, First District, reversed, holding the roadblock procedures used were constitutional. Ap-pellee petitions this Court to transfer. We now grant Appellee's Petition to Transfer, however, fully agreeing with the holding of the Court of Appeals. We grant transfer for the purposes of addressing an issue in need of clarification and to resolve an apparent conflict created between State v. Garcia, supra, and State v. McLaughlin (1984), Ind.App., 471 N.E.2d 1125, trans. denied.
'The sole issue addressed herein is whether the Hendricks County roadblock procedures violated Appellee's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures such that evidence obtained pursuant to the procedures should have been suppressed.
The pertinent facts of this case were well summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:
"The Indiana State Police, pursuant to a state-wide program in cooperation with the Hendricks County Sheriff's Depart ment, conducted a roadblock on U.S. 40, two and one-half miles east of Plainfield in Hendricks County. The purpose of the roadblock was to check for improperly licensed operators, improperly registered automobiles, under-age drinking, and persons driving while intoxicated. The State Police released prior publicity *160in various newspapers concerning the general plan to conduct roadblocks, but not of roadblocks in any specific location. The particular spot at issue was selected by Officer James B. Cramer, Supervisor of the Indiana State Police in Hendricks County, and Lt. Daniel Williams of the Hendricks County Sheriff's Department. Their decision was based upon information obtained from State Police records which reflected that this location in the road generated numerous fatal and nonfatal accidents involving alcohol, including an incident where a deputy sheriff was struck by a drunk driver while supervising a wreck. The roadblock was implemented in accordance with a pre-ar-ranged plan generated by Marion County and Morgan County, which was adopted by the Indiana State Police Department. The plan was developed in accordance with recent Supreme Court decisions.
Pursuant to the plan, the westbound traffic on U.S. 40 was stopped by approximately 11 uniformed officers who were visible on the highway. They blocked off the left westbound lane whereby all traffic was funneled into the right westbound lane, using flares and the lights from police cars to identify the roadblock. Non-selectively, - cars - were stopped in consecutive groups of five. Absent the detection of drinking or other violations, drivers were detained for no more than two or three minutes, during which time other traffic was permitted to pass. After a group of five was inspected and released, the next group of five cars traveling west was brought in, and the procedure was repeated. The drivers of the stopped cars were asked to produce operators licenses and registration certificates. If a violation was suspect ed, or alcohol consumption was detected, such operator was pulled over into a restaurant and motel parking lot. As relevant here, a driver suspected of alcohol consumption was given a field blood alcohol test. Any driver found to be over the presumptive limit of .10 blood alcohol content was then taken to the Hendricks County Jail where a breathalyzer test was administered. Upon failure of this second test, the operator was arrested. The berm near the roadblock was adequate for safety purposes, the area was lighted, and the roadblock was visible for a considerable distance. Additionally, the officers at the roadblock had absolutely no latitude or discretion to depart from the procedure set out in the plan. Numerous motorists, upon sight ing the roadblock, turned their vehicles around and fled.
Garcia, who exhibited no erratic or suspicious driving, was in the first group of five cars stopped. He could produce no operator's license, whereupon an officer who was present recognized him and stated Garcia's operator's license had been suspended. After detecting alcohol on Garcia's breath, the officer read him an implied consent statement. - Garcia agreed to take a field test, which he failed. Upon his subsequent failure of a breathalyzer test, Garcia was arrested. He was charged with his second offense of driving while intoxicated.
The roadblock was maintained for two hours. During this time, the officers stopped approximately 100 cars, issued 20 citations, and arrested seven persons for driving while intoxicated."
State v. Garcia, 481 N.E.2d 149-150.
The United States Supreme Court has most recently decided the following cases providing guidance as to the constitutionality of roadblock stops of vehicles: Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (random stop-and-identify statute held unconstitutional); Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (random and discretionary stops made to check for license and vehicle registration held unconstitutional); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976), 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (permanent roadblock checking for illegal aliens from Mexico held constitutionally valid); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (random stops of vehicles near Mexican border to detect entry of illegal aliens held *161unconstitutional). These cases have set forth limitations on the police when maintaining roadblocks. However, the United States Supreme Court explicitly recognized that roadblocks may be conducted in a constitutional manner for checking for driving violations in Prouse, supra. In Prouse, the Court struck down a random, discretionary stop made to check for vehicle license and registration, but stated:
''This holding does not preclude the ... States from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative. We hold only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that [license and registration checks] reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police officers." (emphasis added).
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d at 673. Thus, in Prouse not only did the United States Supreme Court recognize the legitimacy of the State's concern in checking for licenses and registrations, but they also recognized the need for non-discretionary procedures in obtaining such ends. Further, in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 50, 99 S.Ct. at 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d at 362, the Court enunciated three factors to be weighed in determining the reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest: (1) the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, (2) the degree to which seizure advances the public interest, and (8) the severity of interference - with - individual - liberty. Brown stated that a "central concern' in assessing the reasonableness of a traffic stopping scheme was to make certain, "an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field." Id. at 51, 99 S.Ct. at 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d at 362. Brown further stated, "[The seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." Id.
We now examine the constitutionality of the Hendricks County roadblock procedure in light of Prouse and Brown to determine if evidence seized pursuant thereto was seized unconstitutionally. The first determination to be made is whether this particular roadblock entailed random or discere-tionary stops, thereby running afoul of the rule in Prouse. This roadblock stopped five consecutive cars at a time, waving through for the following two to three minutes it took to conduct the check on the five cars being inspected. After a group of five was inspected and released, the next five consecutive vehicles were detained for the same procedure. All motorists of the stopped cars were asked to produce operators licenses or registration certificates. If a violation was suspected or alcohol consumption detected the driver was then pulled over to an adjacent parking lot. In our view, not only did this procedure adequately protect against the random and selective proscription of Prouse, but it further minimized the severity of interference with individual's liberties by not detaining motorists that the police could not inspect within a reasonable period of time.
Next, this roadblock procedure must be examined in light of the balancing factors enunciated in Brown. The first factor set out in Brown, the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, is weighed in favor of the State's roadblock procedure. As recognized in Prouse, the States have a legitimate concern in checking for automobile registration and certification. However, in our opinion this State has a much graver concern in detecting and deterring driving while intoxicated and under-age drinking. Approximately seven (7%) percent of the drivers checked that specific evening were intoxicated. The average number of deaths per year for the last ten (10) years attributable to drunk drivers in the United States is 25,000. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the current state of affairs has resulted in such terrible carnage wreaked upon society by drunk drivers that the slaughter exceeds that of all our wars. *162South Dakota v. Neville, (1983), 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748. Whatever the statistical comparison made, it is evidence our society has a grave concern in apprehending and deterring drunken driving and that traditional methods have not effectively combatted the problem. Consequently, public interest in detecting and deterring drunk driving is to be heavily weighed in favor of this particular roadblock procedure.
The second factor of Brown deals with the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest. This roadblock procedure advanced detection and prevention of drunken driving and detection of unlicensed driving to a successful degree, based on the available data. The State police released prior publicity in numerous newspapers concerning the plan to conduct roadblocks, but not of roadblocks in any specific location. This particular roadblock was maintained for two hours, during which twenty (20) citations were issued and seven arrests were made for driving while intoxicated. - Considering approximately one hundred (100) cars were stopped during the two hours, the success of detection of violations being sought was very high. Accordingly, the second balancing factor of Brown weighs heavily in favor of this roadblock procedure. Future deterrence can only be speculative, but as the Supreme Court of Virginia stated in Lowe v. Commonwealth of Virginia (1985), 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273, 277, cert. denied -- U.S. --, 106 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed.2d 720 (1986), in upholding a similar roadblock program:
"[T)he deterrent effect of such a highly publicized program is obvious; such a visible project is bound to increase the perceived risk of arrest in the minds of those drunk drivers who are never arrested."
The third factor enunciated in Brown must finally be considered: namely, the severity of interference with individual liberty. We are of the opinion that though a motorist's reasonable expectation of privacy is impinged upon to some degree, the severity of interference is minimal especially when considered in light of the great public concern involved here and the degree of successfully abating the social evil being addressed. Motorists involved in this roadblock were stopped for approximately two to three minutes. As a group of five consecutive cars were inspected, the following traffic was allowed to proceed. Despite announcements in local newspapers prior to the roadblock operation, the exact time and location was not announced. Obviously, such an announcement would have defeated the operation's purpose. Some citizens were undoubtedly delayed in their travels, however, numerous motorists, upon sighting the roadblock, turned their vehicles around and fled. Additionally, due to the high rate of arrests, the detained motorists not found to have violated any laws were directly benefitted by the removal of intoxicated drivers in the immediate vicinity. - Balancing the Brown factors, we must conclude that the gravity of the public concern and the degree to which this roadblock procedure advanced detection and abatement of drunken as well as unlicensed driving outweighed the low level of interference with individual liberties.
Because of the overwhelming concern voiced by the United States Supreme Court regarding procedures such as this roadblock, we note that this roadblock plan entailed a "plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." Brown, supra. The group of five cars, located in a well lighted area, were each asked to produce a license or registration. If a valid license or registration were produced and no indication of intoxication or underage drinking were detected, the car was allowed to proceed. All the officers were instructed as to this procedure and it was uniformly followed the entire two hours, thereby meeting the neutral plan requirement of Brown.
To the extent State v. McLaughlin, supra, conflicts with the law set out in this opinion, it is hereby overruled. MclLaugh-lin can be interpreted to stand for the ruling that patrolling the roads and observ*163ing traffic is an equally efficient way to apprehend intoxicated drivers as stopping all motorists at roadblocks and examining them, thus precluding the use of roadblocks. We disagree with this broad statement and find that roadblock procedures, conducted in a constitutional manner can be a more effective means of detecting and deterring the important public concerns of driving while intoxicated or without proper licensing. This is not to imply that traditional methods of detecting drunken driving are ineffective. The procedure used in the roadblock in the immediate case is a good example of constitutionally valid roadblock operation. Having found the roadblock procedure in the instant case constitutional, it follows that the trial court erred in granting Petitioner Garcia's motion to suppress evidence. Accordingly, the trial court is reversed and ordered to proceed consistent with the opinion set out herein.
GIVAN, C.J., and DICKSON, J., concur. DeBRULER, J., dissents with separate opinion in which SHEPARD, J., concurs. SHEPARD, J., dissents with separate opinion.