(concurring specially) .
As I understand the opinion, it makes no difference whether there is a valid working agreement or not; that if the leaving of employment is in connection with a “labor dispute”, a finding of such fact is alone sufficient to constitute “good cause” for leaving, irrespective of any other consideration. With this I cannot agree. I find no basis in the statute for holding that the legislature intended that a leaving in violation of a valid agreement not to leave, for instance, a contract containing a “no-strike” provision, should be considered a leaving “with good cause”. To so hold imputes to the legislature, it seems to me, an intent to invite, or at least condone, contract violation. I fail to see anything in the statute justifying that imputation.
Subsection B of Sec. 214, Tit. 26, Code 1940, as amended, provides that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits “if he has left his employment voluntarily without good cause connected with such work.” In determining whether benefits are due under this subsection, a factual finding necessarily must be made in each instance as to whether the leaving was with or without good cause. Is there good reason why it would not be proper and administratively practicable, in passing on eligibility for benefits, to determine whether a leaving is in violation of a contract? As I see it, there is no fundamental difference in determining eligibility under those circumstances and in determining eligibility when other circumstances are involved.
The Court of Appeals made a factual finding that there was a waiver of the working agreement. On certiorari we do not review such findings of fact. My concurrence in denial of the writ is based on said! finding of fact by the Court of Appeals.