concurring and dissenting.
I respectfully dissent in part for I believe the majority has reweighed the evidence on Count I.
According to O’Connor’s charging information:
Douglas O’Connor on or about the 16th day of April, 1991, at and in the County of Morgan and State of Indiana did knowingly and forcibly resist a law enforcement officer, to-wit: Jon Davis, Martinsville Police Office [sic], while Jon Davis was lawfully engaged in his duties as a law enforcement officer ...
Record, p. 3.
In order to establish that O’Connor violated the statute dealing with resisting law enforcement, the state was required to show that O’Connor forcibly interfered with Officer Davis: “that is, the State had *150to demonstrate that the interference was effected through the use of force.” White v. State (1989), Ind.App., 545 N.E.2d 1124. The evidence indicates that O’Connor led two police officers in a high-speed chase through the streets of Martinsville and the state roads of Indiana, drove around roadblocks, drove through stop signs and stop lights, and cut through residential yards at speeds upwards of 60 miles per hour. As Officer Davis was pursuing O’Connor on State Road 44, albeit in the police car immediately behind Officer Riffel, the cars reached speeds of up to 80 miles per hour. On the three occasions that Officer Riffel tried to pass O’Connor so as to slow him down or stop him, O’Connor moved into the center of the road and forced Officer Riffel to fall back behind him.
In my opinion, the jury could have reasonably concluded from this evidence that O’Connor’s use of force against Officer Riffle additionally interfered with Officer Davis’s efforts to apprehend him. In other words, the jury could have reasonably concluded that each of the times O’Connor forced Officer Riffel to fall in behind him, O’Connor forcibly interfered with and resisted not only Officer Riffel but also Officer Davis. For this reason, and because we are prohibited by our standard of review from reweighing the evidence, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of O’Connor’s motion for judgment on the evidence on Count I.
I concur with the majority on the other issues.