concurring.
I concur in Issue I of the majority opinion only to the extent it holds IC 35-34-1-13 (1988) does not include motions to dismiss revocation of probation proceedings. In my opinion, in most unambiguous terms, the statute addresses only indictments and information.
I concur in Issue II of the majority opinion only to the extent it holds the trial court denied Isaac due process by assuming the role of a fact-presenter rather than a fact-finder. The nature and extent of the trial court’s questions extend far beyond a trial court’s legitimate participation in the fact-finding process.
Although I do not concur in any other aspects of the majority opinion, I want to particularly express my disagreement with the dictum that states a preference for probation revocation petitions to be filed by prosecuting attorneys and with the implication of that dictum that the decision whether to proceed with a probation revocation is, in the first instance, a function of the prosecutor. See supra note 3. I also disagree with the majority opinion addressing the issue as fundamental error; Isaac objected to the trial court’s actions at the hearing, thereby preserving the issue for appeal.