dissenting.
Defendant lost the vision in his right eye when an unknown gunman shot him from a passing automobile. The car approached defendant from behind the corner of a building in a shopping center. The upper torso of a male, who apparently was the gunman, protruded from the car window. Defendant heard an explosion, which he described as “either the gun going off or my eye exploding, I don’t know which.” The car sped away.
Defendant’s policy affords coverage for the injury if it “arise[s] out of the ownership, maintenance or use” of the assailant’s uninsured motor vehicle. In Oakridge Comm. Ambulance v. U.S. Fidelity, 278 Or 21, 24, 563 P2d 164 (1977), the court said:
“The general rule for the interpretation of the words of the policy which are critical to the disposition of this controversy is set out in 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 144, § 4317, as follows:
“ Tt has been stated that the liability of an insurer under the “ownership, maintenance, or use” provision should be measured in accord with the terms of a policy as understood by a person of reasonable intelligence. Although ownership, maintenance, or use of the automobile need not be the direct and efficient cause of the injury sustained, liability does not extend to results distinctly remote, though within the line of causation. The words “arising out of” when used in such a provision are *298of broader significance than the words “caused by”, and are ordinarily understood to mean originating from, incident to, or having connection with the use of the vehicle * * *.’ (Footnotes omitted.)”
Under that test, defendant prevails. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to him, we must infer that the vehicle was used to approach defendant at an angle and speed that would thwart detection, to position the gunman for the shot and to achieve a successful escape. The insurer’s liability originated from, is incident to and has a connection with the vehicle’s use. That satisfies the test set forth in the Oakridge case.
The majority’s reliance on Jordan v. Lee, 76 Or App 472, 709 P2d 752 (1985), rev den 300 Or 545 (1986), is misplaced. In Jordan, the insured vehicle was a trailer. Two children played with a gun in it, and one was injured when the gun fired. We held, correctly, that
“[the accident] was the result of Kristina handling the gun, an act independent of the trailer’s use. We hold that an injury does not arise out of the use of an automobile when, as here, it was directly caused by some act wholly disassociated from and independent of the vehicle’s use.” 76 Or App at 475.
Jordan is distinguishable because, in that case, the travel trailer was merely the site where the injury occurred, whereas the driver used the vehicle in this case to approach defendant, inflict the injury and escape. For other cases denying coverage because the insured vehicle was only the situs of the injury, see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 264 Ark 743, 574 SW2d 265 (1978); Carter v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 10 Ark App 16, 660 SW2d 952 (1983). Although the gun accident in Jordan v. Lee was “an act independent of the trailer’s use” as a place for sleeping and storage, 76 Or App at 475, use of the vehicle here did play a substantial role in causing the injury, because the gunman used it to approach and ambush the victim and to escape. The injury was at least incident to the vehicle’s use as a means of transportation even though the immediate cause of injury was the gunshot. Under the Jordan formulation of the rule, we cannot say that the driveby shooting was an “act wholly disassociated from and independent of the vehicle’s use.”
*299Oakridge holds that the vehicle’s use need not be the direct and efficient cause of the injury for liability to attach. 278 Or at 25. The majority disregards that holding in declaring that
“[i]t is immaterial that the vehicle may have facilitated the shooting and the escape. Its use was not the ‘direct cause’ of the shooting.” 121 Or App at 295.
The majority is not free to impose a direct causation requirement in contradiction of the Supreme Court’s declaration that that test is inapplicable under these policy terms.
The majority also ignores helpful cases from other jurisdictions that involve gunshot wounds or other injuries inflicted by moving vehicle occupants. In Continental Western Insurance Co. v. Klug, 415 NW2d 876 (Minn 1987), a victim was shot during a car chase. The Minnesota Supreme Court considered three factors in concluding that the injury arose out of the assailant’s use of the vehicle: (1) the extent of causation between the automobile and the injury; (2) whether an act of independent significance occurred that broke the causal link between the use of the vehicle and the injuries inflicted; and (3) whether the vehicle was used for transportation purposes. It held that the driver’s acts of driving to maneuver the car and shooting were “inextricably linked.” 415 NW2d at 878.
In State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Davis, 937 F2d 1415 (9th Cir 1991), the Ninth Circuit applied California law and the Klug case in holding that a gunshot wound inflicted on a car’s driver by another car’s passenger was an injury that resulted from the use of a vehicle. The court distinguished cases like Jordan v. Lee “where the vehicle merely provides a situs for the tort,” and those in which “an assailant left his vehicle before assaulting the other party.” 937 F2d at 1422. The court held that the conduct of the assailant’s driver in moving the car into position to give him the opportunity to fire his gun supported the conclusion that “the vehicle was more than incidental to this shooting.” 937 F2d at 1421.
Although case matching is not always productive, I concur with the better reasoned decisions, such as the Klug and Davis cases, that hold that a gunshot injury, inflicted from a moving vehicle used for transportation purposes, *300arises from the ownership, maintenance or use of the vehicle unless some other fact occurs to break the causal connection. That is the view of the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed this question. See Cung La v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 830 P2d 1007, 1009 (Colo 1992) (notingthat “[a] majority of the states that have dealt with the issue have found a sufficient causal connection under similar facts to invoke uninsured motorist insurance coverage”); General Acc. Ins. Co. of America v. Olivier, 574 A2d 1240 (RI 1990) (uninsured motorist fatally shot victim while she stood beside road after their cars collided; uninsured motorist coverage sustained); Willard v. Kelley, 803 P2d 1124 (Okla 1990); Hulsey v. Mid-America Preferred Ins. Co., 777 P2d 932 (Okla 1989); Detweiler v. J. C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 110 Wash 2d 99, 751 P2d 282 (1988) (truck owner fired shots at his own vehicle as it was being driven away by a thief and was injured by bullet fragments. Held: Uninsured driver’s liability arose from use of the truck within uninsured motorist coverage); Ruiz v. Farmers Ins. Co.,_Ariz_, 847 P2d 111 (1992), rev granted_Ariz_(March 16, 1993); Fortune Ins. Co. v. Ferreiro, 458 So 2d 834 (Fla Dist Ct App 1984); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gillespie, 455 So 2d 617 (Fla Dist Ct App 1984); Ganiron v. Hawaii Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 69 Haw 432, 744 P2d 1210 (1987); Foster v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 504 So 2d 82 (La Ct App), writ den 505 So 2d 61 (La 1987); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Whitehead, 111 SW2d 198 (Mo Ct App 1986); Shouman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 42 Ohio App 3d 159, 537 NE2d 696 (1988).
Here, no fact broke the causal connection between the vehicle’s use and defendant’s injury. He is entitled to coverage, and the majority errs in holding to the contrary.
I dissent.