dissenting.
I cannot agree with the result of the majority opinion, which affirms the grant of a partial summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of the respondents. According to the majority, the waiver of immunity for negligence in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act set forth in Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-105 controlled over the provisions of Wyo.Stat. § 1-39-120, which maintains governmental immunity for “the maintenance, including maintenance to compensate for weather conditions, of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area.” The effect of the majority opinion is that the substantive impact of the Governmental Claims Act before the amendment of § 1-39-120 was identical to its substantive impact after the amendment. I cannot agree that the legislature did not intend a change in the law in 1991, and I dissent. I would not grant the motion for summary judgment sought by the State, however, because I perceive a factual issue as to whether § 1-39-105 or § 1-39-120 should control immunity in this instance.
At the time of the occurrence that led to this case, Wyo.Stat. § 1-39-120 (1988) read:
Exclusions from waiver of immunity.
(a) The liability imposed by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 does not include liability for damages caused by:
(i) A defect in the plan or design of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area;
(ii) The failure to construct or reconstruct any bridge, culvert, highway, *371roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area; or
(iii) The maintenance, including maintenance to compensate for weather conditions, of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area.
In 1991, Wyo.Stat. § 1-39-120 (Supp.1992) was amended to read:
Exclusions from waiver of immunity.
(a) The liability imposed by W.S. 1-39-106 through 1-39-112 does not include liability for damages caused by:
(i) A defect in the plan or design of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area;
(ii) The failure to construct or reconstruct any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area; or
(iii) The maintenance, including maintenance to compensate for weather conditions, of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area.
Obviously the only change was to delete the reference to “W.S. § 1-39-105” in this statutory provision. Wyo.Stat. § 1-39-105 (1988), at the time of this occurrence and now, reads:
Liability; operation of motor vehicles, aircraft and watercraft.
A governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation of any motor vehicle, aircraft or watercraft.
Neither of these statutory provisions is ambiguous, and there is certainly nothing ambiguous about the number 5, which later was changed to the number 6 by amendment. The majority opinion seems to treat the reference in Wyo.Stat. § 1-39-120 (1988), to “W.S. § 1-39-105 [(1988)]” as nothing more than a typographical error.
In Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Comm’n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Wyo.1993), in connection with a comprehensive review of rules of statutory construction, we said:
For example, “It is generally held that statutes authorizing suit against the state are to be strictly construed, since they are in derogation of the state’s sovereignty.” Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Comm’n, 63 Wyo. 13, 24-25, 177 P.2d 397, 399 (1947); accord Retail Clerks Local 187 v. Univ. of Wyoming, 531 P.2d 884, 886 (Wyo.1975). Thus, we require in this particular area of the law that evidence of legislative intent be both unequivocal and textual. Retail Clerks Local 187, 531 P.2d at 886 (“We find no words of clear or direct consent to suit against the state contained in these statutes, and consent must be clearly shown”). (Footnote omitted.)
We also have frequently repeated the rule that every word, clause, and sentence must be construed so that no part is inoperative or superfluous when read in pari materia. E.g., Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993 (Wyo.1993); Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Comm’n, 845 P.2d 1040 (Wyo.1993); Wyo. Ins. Guar. v. Allstate Indem., 844 P.2d 464 (Wyo.1992); Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner’s Office, 838 P.2d 158 (Wyo.1992); Matter of ALJ, 836 P.2d 307 (Wyo.1992); Schulthess v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552 (Wyo.1992); State By and Through Dep’t of Family Services v. Jennings, 818 P.2d 1149 (Wyo.1991); Matter of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256 (Wyo.1991); City of Laramie v. Facer, 814 P.2d 268 (Wyo.1991). By contrast, the majority opinion offers a liberal construction of the Wyoming Tort Claims Act, and does not give effect to the unambiguous provisions of § 1-39-120.
This case is a peculiarly appropriate one in which to apply the doctrine articulated in Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1061 (Wyo.1984):
We further must assume that the legislature did not intend futile acts and that its amendment of the statute indicated some change in the existing law was intended. DeHerrera v. Herrera, supra [565 P.2d 479 (Wyo.1977) ]; Jordan v. Delta Drilling Company, supra [541 P.2d 39, 78 A.L.R.3d 1215 (Wyo.1975)]; and In re Kosmicki, Wyo. 468 P.2d 818 (1970).
*372See also, Barcon, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 845 P.2d 373, 380 (Wyo.1992).
There seems little question that the New Mexico Tort Claims Act was available to the Wyoming legislature when the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act was adopted, and at least one scholar has suggested that it served as a model for the Wyoming statute. Lawrence J. Wolfe, Wyoming’s Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity With Exceptions — A Statutory Analysis, 15 Land and Water L.Rev. 619, 623 (1980). Yet, the New Mexico Tort Claims Act never has provided immunity for maintenance of highways. N.M.Stat.Ann. § 41-4-11 (Michie 1989). Obviously, this fact was known to the Wyoming legislature and, in 1986, when Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-120 (1988) was adopted, a studied choice was made to extend immunity to maintenance activities despite the waiver in Wyo.Stat §' 1-39-105 (1988). In 1991, that choice was revisited and a change was made.
In the Brief of Plaintiffs/Respondents the following argument appears:
If a Wyoming snowplow driver is immune from liability, regardless of the circumstances, just because he is involved in “maintenance”, § 1-39-105 and § 1-39-120 are in conflict. Therefore, to reconcile the language of these statutes, § 1-39-120 must be read and applied only to exclude liability when damages are “caused by the maintenance”.
Brief of Plaintiffs/Respondents at 7.
It is in following this analysis that I am persuaded the plaintiffs are entitled to a trial in this case. The apparent conflict between the two statutes, both of which are to be given effect if reconciliation is possible, is resolved by recognition that the facts must determine which statute applies. If the accident was caused by Romero while acting negligently in the operation of the snow plow as a motor vehicle, there is no immunity. If the accident was caused by Romero while acting negligently in “[t]he maintenance, including maintenance to compensate for weather conditions, of any * * * highway, * * then immunity pertains. The jury must decide what Romero was doing at the time of the accident. This resolution affords recognition, and application, of the foregoing principles of statutory interpretation.
I would reverse the decision of the district court granting a partial summary judgment on the question of sovereign immunity. The presence or absence of immunity should be resolved by the finder of fact based upon proper instructions.