dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent from the position taken by my colleagues in this case. Their analysis of the general law of extradition is not appropriate because of the unusual facts of this case. The parties were divorced in Michigan, and the wife moved to Indiana, while the defendant moved to Illinois. The wife did not attempt to enforce the original decree in Michigan. The wife, through the State of Indiana, commenced enforcement proceedings in the State of Illinois by initiating a proceeding in the circuit court of Lake County, the defendant’s place of residence, pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 1201 et seq.). Service was obtained on the defendant, hearings were held and orders were entered for payment of current support. The question of arrearages was raised in that proceeding, and, again, after a full hearing, orders were entered for the payment of all arrearages. Although the matter was pending in Lake County, Illinois, no further action was taken in that proceeding. Instead, the State of Indiana, disregarding the pending proceeding in Illinois, initiated proceedings to extradite the defendant for a criminal prosecution. These proceedings raised the same questions of nonpayment of child support and arrearages that had just been decided in our courts. This proceeding would attempt to relitigate in Indiana the determination of whether there was any valid reason for the arrearages and their payment. The pending proceeding in our State preempts the demanding State from proceeding upon the same matter under the same set of facts under its criminal code. While the defendant may have been in arrears, a court in Illinois selected by the petitioner has determined whether he was able to make the payments required by the Michigan decree; whether he is in arrears; the amount of the arrearages; and the amount that he can currently pay upon those arrearages. Our pending proceeding also provides for punishment for any wilful violation. To attempt extradition to Indiana, after the finding in Illinois, violates the most basic precepts of our own constitution about imprisonment for debt. The only purpose for extradition under this set of facts is to seek incarceration. The question of whether there are arrearages and whether nonpayment is wilful has been decided and continues to pend in Illinois, where the defendant lives. There is no issue for the Indiana courts to decide under these circumstances, and such action defeats the very purpose of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 1201 et seq.). Extradition is inappropriate while this matter is pending in the courts of Illinois. I would affirm the action of the trial court in granting the writ of habeas corpus.