I concur in the result on the second ground stated in the main opinion, viz., that the trust deed involved contains a provision authorizing the trustee or beneficiary, in case of default, “to commence any action or proceeding” affecting the security of the deed of trust or the interests of the beneficiary, and that under this authority the beneficiary could commence an action in foreclosure as provided in section 725a, pursuant to the contract. In my opinion the question of an impairment of the contract is therefore not properly in the case.
Furthermore, I am not persuaded that section 725a does not generally impose such additional burdens on the trustor as to render the section objectionable as against outstanding deeds of trust which do not contain the authorization to foreclose. The following are a few of them:
1. He is subjected to the expense of the foreclosure suit against which he has in effect contracted.
2. Under his contract he has the undisputed right of possession for three months (sec. 2924, Civ. Code), plus twenty days (sec. 692, Code Civ. Proc.), not only after default but after the notice of default has been recorded. Under section 725a the trustor may be subjected to foreclosure and sale within a few weeks.
3. Under his contract a deficiency judgment may be recovered against him only in an independent action.
4. He is subjected to costs of suit not recoverable under his contract.
The option of the beneficiary or trustee to foreclose instead of to sell as provided by the contract can hardly be said to be for the benefit of the owner of the land, and I cannot ascribe to the creditor the beneficent motive to pur*132sue a course less advantageous to himself. If the intention be to benefit the debtor, the law should provide that at his option, also, a foreclosure should be had. But no one would contend that the debtor could compel the creditor to pursue the course of court foreclosure unless the contract so provided.
Rehearing denied.
Shenk, J., voted for a rehearing.