Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, C.J.I again find myself unable to agree with the opinion of this Court. This Court is, for the third time in eight months, faced with an appeal in a criminal case wherein appellate counsel, in his brief, is urging this Court to consider an alleged error which was not argued in the memorandum to appellant’s motion for a new trial, as required by Supreme Court Rule 1-14B. And the Court is again determining that appellant has thereby waived his right to urge that alleged error on appeal. I dissent from this determination of waiver. See my dissent in Graham v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 367, 249 N. E. 2d 25.
The majority bases its adherence to Supreme Court Rule 1-14B upon the policy underlying it, namely, that the trial *195judge should have an opportunity to consider and correct his own alleged errors, and further rejects the request of appellate counsel to abrogate the Rule. It is not necessary to abrogate the Rule in order to avoid the waiver of rights. The trial judge can be afforded the opportunity to consider the errors raised in appellant’s brief, by a simple order of this Court, remanding the cause to the trial judge for the sole purpose of ruling upon the errors argued by appellate counsel in his brief. The trial judge would then be required to certify his ruling back to this Court. Opportunity would be granted to appellee to amend its brief if necessary. This simple procedure would be inexpensive, fair to the trial judge, and conserve the work already done by appellate counsel.
The practical effect of the disposition of this appeal by a dismissal without prejudice with leave to pursue a post-conviction remedy is to generate expensive and time-consuming litigation which could be avoided by using the remand procedure outlined above.
Note. — Reported in 252 N. E. 2d 420.