For several reasons I cannot join in the conclusions of my associates in this case.
In the first place, the judgment from which this appeal was taken is based upon findings of the trial judge that the vault doors of the respective banks are personal property. These findings were made upon issues of ultimate fact framed by the pleadings, and are conclusive upon appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them.
It is a settled rule of law that whether a chattel is a fixture depends upon the circumstances concerning its annexation to real property and presents a question of fact. (Sec. 660, Civ. Code.) In Southern California Tel. Co. v. *154State Board, 12 Cal. (2d) 127, 134 [82 Pac. (2d) 422], this court pointed out that “a thing becomes a fixture when it is ‘permanently attached’ to the realty and permanence has reference to intent”. The character of the annexation and the use to which the article is to be put may be considered in this connection, but such evidence is received to throw light upon the intention in regard to permanence.
Although a vault without a door would be useless for all practical purposes, it certainly does not necessarily follow that a vault must always be fitted with the same door. Indeed, all of the evidence in this case supports a contrary conclusion. According to the testimony, vault doors in many different sizes are built by the manufacturers of safes and locks. Such doors vary in thickness, quality, efficiency and cost. They are kept in stock by the manufacturers of and dealers in such equipment and are usually sold from catalogues and photographs.
A complete vault door unit consists of the door and frame in which it hangs, which is called the “vestibule”. Vaults are built so that this entire assembly can be taken out by removing a concrete wedge, and the evidence shows that this is frequently done. One witness testified that he had been in the vault business in San Diego for more than 20 years and had removed many bank vault doors and replaced them with others, always without injury to the building or walls. It is also in evidence that one bank maintains warehouses in various cities of the state in which it keeps vault doors, burglar alarms and various other banking fixtures, which previously had been installed in banking premises and later removed therefrom for the purpose of replacement or change; that it keeps many vault doors on hand in these warehouses and makes a great many changes in its equipment each year, all without injury to the doors or the vaults or the buildings.
According to this testimony, a bank vault is built to allow not only the installation of one particular door but also of any other which may later be found more efficient in operation or more resistant to calamity and attack. Obviously, the growth of a bank’s business may require many changes in its physical structure and vaults and vault doors are designed and built to allow .for expansion and improvement. These facts not only negative any inference of permanence but affirmatively show an intention to attach vault doors in a *155manner which will allow them to be changed from time to time with a minimum of expense. The evidence, as I read it, not only amply supports the finding of the trial judge but compels it.
But, my associates say, as there is no conflict in the evidence, the finding of tlj,e trial court must be considered as a conclusion of law. This statement is an incomplete one. The rule is that where the facts are undisputed and only one rational inference may be drawn from them, an appellate court as a matter of law may determine the correct finding to be made upon those facts. (Gaston v. Hisashi Tsuruda, 5 Cal. App. (2d) 639, 642 [43 Pac. (2d) 355].) But if a finding of fact is based upon a reasonable inference drawn from the evidence, it may not be set aside by an appellate court. (County of Alameda v. Tieslau, 44 Cal. App. 332, 339 [186 Pac. 398].)
Here the finding of fact made by the trial judge rests upon his inference, drawn from the evidence before him, that the vault doors in controversy were not attached with the intention of permanence. This evidence includes the character of the doors, the means by which they were attached, their purposes, and the custom and practice of the respondents and other banks concerning such equipment. Another equally reasonable inference might possibly have been drawn from these facts. But it is the exclusive province of the trial court or jury to determine issues of fact, and an appellate court may only set aside a finding of fact when it is not supported by substantial evidence.
Moreover, in my opinion, the state has classified vault doors as personal property. The Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act (Stats. 1929, p. 19, as amended; Deering’s Gen. Laws, Act 8488) imposes a tax upon banks which shall be in lieu of all other taxes “except upon their real property”. The Bank Act (Stats. 1909, p. 87, as amended; Deering’s Gen. Laws, Act 652) specifies the property which a savings bank may purchase and hold as follows: " The lot and building in which the business of the bank is carried on; furniture and fixtures, vaults and safe deposit vaults and boxes and other personal property such as may be necessary or proper to carry on its banking business: ...” (Sec. 61.) This law also limits the amount which a commercial bank is permitted to invest “in the lot and building in which the busi*156ness of the bank is carried on, furniture and fixtures, vaults and safe deposit vaults and boxes necessary or proper to carry on its banking business ...” (Sec. 84.) Here are two legislative classifications of vault doors as personal property, in so far as the right of banks to purchase or own them is concerned.
It is said that these definitions or classifications are not controlling as against the provisions of section 3617 of the Political Code, which specifies the different classes of property which are subject to taxation. But this section contains no definition of a fixture, and the meanings of the terms mentioned in it are expressly restricted to the title of the code in which it is found. The Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act, supra, is not a part of this title.
Stated in its essential particulars, the position of the taxing authorities is that, although a bank must carry on its business in accordance with the legislative requirements which classify vault doors as personal property, it must pay taxes upon them as real property. This is both legally unsound and morally unfair.
For still another reason I believe that the judgment of the trial court should be upheld.
The Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act, supra, subjects the real property of banks to local taxation. It also grants to the state’s subordinate agencies the right to levy taxes upon the real property of banks. In its application to either of these purposes, the rule, strictissimi juris, applies. Grants of power from a sovereign to a subordinate are always strictly construed against the grant. (23 Cal. Jur. 804.) And statutes imposing taxes in invitum are always strictly construed against the state and in favor of the taxpayer. (Barker Bros. v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. (2d) 603 [76 Pac. (2d) 97] ; Uhl v. Badaracco, 199 Cal. 270 [248 Pac. 917].) Thus we have these two settled rules coming together in the present situation, each reinforcing the other, with the result that, for the purposes of the instant case, the phrase “real property” must be given the strictest definition and the narrowest application to which it is susceptible. Such a definition assuredly does not include bank vault doors under the facts in evidence.
Appellants may possibly contend that this case falls within the converse rule of statutory construction, that statutes grant*157ing exemption from taxation are to be construed in favor of the state and against the taxpayer. But this case does not fall within that rule. Section 3 of the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act, supra, provides that the franchise tax paid by banks “shall be in lieu of all other taxes and licenses . . . This court has held that such an “in lieu” tax is not to be regarded as granting an exemption. (San Francisco v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 Cal. 244 [135 Pac. 971]; Northwestern M. L. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 8 Cal. (2d) 42 [63 Pac. (2d) 814].)
Moreover, so far as the respondent national banks are concerned, this is a case “arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States”; in such a case the federal statutes are paramount, and the relevant decisions of the federal courts construing and applying those statutes are controlling upon the courts of this state. This is because national banks are immune from state taxation, except in the manner and to the extent that such taxation is authorized by congress. The sole congressional authorization for state taxation of national banks is contained in Revised Statutes, section 5219 (12 U. S. C. A. 548) which authorizes taxation of their real property. This grant from the national government to the states, of permission to tax' the real property of national banks, must be strictly construed against the grantee, as are-all grants from a sovereign. (23 Cal. Jur. 804.) It follows that a state which imposes a tax upon property of a national bank must bring itself within the boundaries of this narrow and strictly limited congressional permission.
For these reasons I am of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Rehearing denied. Traynor, J., did not participate.