concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur in this court’s affirmance of the trial court’s order denying Hustler’s motion to disqualify Spence’s *783counsel, I dissent to that part of the majority’s opinion which reverses the trial court’s order granting Hustler’s motion for summary judgment.
The district court applied controlling authority and held correctly as a matter of law the Hustler article was not defamatory. The majority purports to remand in light of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). Yet, despite its acknowledgment that the “United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, is the supreme law of the land,” the majority creates and applies an analytical framework in conflict with the federal constitutional authority restated in Milkovich and labels the article’s contents as “clearly defamatory.” With that naked assertion and the reversal and remand for “further proceedings consistent with this opinion,” I am uncertain what those further proceedings should entail, and I suspect the trial court judge will also be uncertain. It appears the majority has not only reversed summary judgment for Hustler, but has decided the article is defamatory and strongly suggests a resolution of Spence’s status for purposes of a defamation action.
I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment as the Hustler article, by application of federal constitutional authority recapitulated in Milkovich, is a nonactionable statement of editorial opinion which enjoys absolute protection under the first amendment of the United States Constitution. Assuming the article was not absolutely protected, I would hold that Spence is a public figure for all purposes and must provide evidence of actual malice even were he to identify any “provably false factual connotation[s]” Milkovich, — U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 2706, 111 L.Ed.2d at 18, in the Hustler piece. He is a public figure by his own admission, by the evidence he produced during discovery, by his counsel’s concessions in the trial court and in this court, and by overwhelming legal authority.
Finally, I would have dismissed with prejudice the appeal because Spence failed to include appropriate page references to the record in his statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review. W.R.A.P. 5.01(3). This court has previously cautioned litigants practicing before it to comply with this well-known and easily followed rule. Jung-Leonczynska v. Steup, 782 P.2d 578, 581 (Wyo.1989); V-1 Oil Company v. The Honorable Robert B. Ranck, 767 P.2d 612, 613 (Wyo.1989). This court summarily dismissed with prejudice a pro se litigant’s appeal after oral argument for an identical rule violation. Condict v. Condict, No. 89-51, (Wyo., Jan. 24, 1990) (order dismissing appeal), reh. denied, Feb. 7, 1990. I see no reason for not applying the dismissal with prejudice sanction in this case. This court’s failure to apply it here justifiably exposes the court to accusations of patent unfairness for employing an unwritten double standard.
I shall now flesh out my views regarding the allegedly defamatory nature of the article about Spence and his status as a public figure. Keep in mind the basic libel calculus: “statements that cannot ‘reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts’ ” and “statement[s] of opinion relating to matters of public concern which [do] not contain ... provably false factual connotation[s] will receive full constitutional protection.” Milkovich, — U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 2706, 111 L.Ed.2d at 18. If the alleged defamation is not absolutely protected by the first amendment, a “private figure” who has been allegedly libeled by the publication of a false statement of fact on a matter of public concern may recover by proving the defendant was negligent; however, a “public figure” who has been libeled by the publication of a false statement of fact on a matter of public concern may recover only by proving that the defendant published the false statement of fact either with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether or not it was false. Id., — U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 2706-07, 111 L.Ed.2d at 19. See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 89 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 41 L.Ed.2d 745 (1974); Gertz v. Rob*784ert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967); New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964); Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.Cir.1984); Lewis v. Time, Incorporated, 710 F.2d 549 (9th Cir.1983); MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting, 612 P.2d 830 (Wyo.1980); Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting, 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo.1976).
HUSTLER’S ARTICLE AS NONACTIONABLE OPINION
The majority calls Milkovich the most important libel law decision since the cases of New York Times and Curtis Publishing. However, it fails to analyze the Hustler article about Spence in light of the holding in Milkovich that defamation must be based on a “provably false factual connotation” and does not apply to “statements that cannot ‘reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts’ about an individual.” Milkovich, — U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2706, 111 L.Ed.2d at 19. See, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988); Letter Carriers v. Austin; (use of the word “traitor” in literary definition of a union “scab” was not a basis for a defamation action since word was used “in a loose, figurative sense” and was “merely rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the contempt felt by union members”); and Greenbelt Cooperative, 398 U.S. at 14, 90 S.Ct. at 1542, 26 L.Ed.2d at 15 (holding that the word “blackmail” as used to characterize a real estate developer’s negotiations with a local city council for a zoning ordinance, the Court observed that “even the most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered [the developer’s] negotiating position extremely unreasonable”).
In Milkovich, the Supreme Court analyzed statements in a newspaper column to determine whether or not a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the headline of the article and nine passages in the article implied an assertion that wrestling coach Milkovich perjured himself in a judicial proceeding. It also addressed the “type of speech” at issue, reaffirming that where “loose, figurative, hyperbolic language” is used the statement cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating facts. Milkovich, — U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2707, 111 L.Ed.2d at 19. The Milkovich analysis relies on “the same indicia that lower courts have been relying on for the past decade or so to distinguish between statements of fact and statements of opinion: the type of language used, the meaning of the statement in context, whether the statement is verifiable, and the broader social circumstances in which the statement was made.” Id., — U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 2709, 111 L.Ed.2d at 21 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see the majority opinion — U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 2707, 111 L.Ed.2d at 19-20, for these indicia. Inexplicably the majority eschews this principled and controlling analysis and instead creates its own methodology from the common law construct of “fair comment” and the unrelated “fighting words” doctrine of Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942).
Milkovich discusses “fair comment” as historical background, noting that it was the device used to achieve a balance of rights at common law. Milkovich, — U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 2703, 111 L.Ed.2d at 14. The concept is overborne by the series of Supreme Court decisions grounded in the first amendment that began with New York Times and that has continued through Milkovich. These decisions have enunciated and refined the federal constitutional rule that displaces state common law “fair comment” out of concern that a state law “rule compelling the critic [of public figures or persons] to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions would deter protected speech.” Milkovich, — U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2703, 111 L.Ed.2d at 15. Fair comment is thus limited by “the supreme law of the land,” and it is puzzling *785that the majority chooses to seize on it as significant to the Milkovich holding.
I have equal difficulty accepting the majority’s reliance on the “fighting words” doctrine from Chaplinsky. I strongly disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Chaplinsky “intimates’ that a civil libel action lies “for redress of the kind of grossly defamatory statements as those at issue here.” In the nearly fifty years since Chaplinsky was decided, it has never been used by any court for that purpose. The majority opinion cannot cite to one case where that has happened. Tellingly, no United States Supreme Court case has ever “intimated” what the majority now “intimates.” Milkovich does not once mention Chaplinsky, not even in a footnote.
According to the highly authoritative work, The Constitution of the United States of America—Analysis and Interpretation, 1099 (H. Killian & L. Beck, 1987), “Chaplinsky * * * [is] of little vitality.” This work comments:
Over the last two decades, the decided cases have reflected a fairly consistent and sustained march by the [United States Supreme] Court to the elimination of or a severe narrowing of the “two-tier” doctrine and protection of much expression that hitherto would have been held absolutely unprotected * * * fighting words, defamation, and obscenity***.
Id. at 1094-95.
Indeed that march is reflected in Lucas, et al. v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919, 94 S.Ct. 1917, 40 L.Ed.2d 277 (1974); Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 94 S.Ct. 1228, 39 L.Ed.2d 693 (1974); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 94 S.Ct. 970, 39 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972). In all of these cases various vulgar and profane epithets and insults were deemed not included within the category of “fighting words.” Chaplinsky is clearly inapposite.
Following Milkovich, I believe a proper defamation analysis must address the following four factors to determine whether the statement either cannot “reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts” or, if it is otherwise believable, contains any “provably false factual connotations:”
1. The full context of the statements in the article since other unchallenged language surrounding the allegedly defamatory statement will influence the average reader’s readiness to infer that a particular statement has factual content;
2. The broad social context or setting within which the allegedly defamatory statement appears;
3. The common usage or meaning of the specific language of the challenged statements;
4. Whether the statement is capable of being verified, that is, objectively characterized as true or false.
In this analysis I would keep in mind Justice Holmes’ epigram: “A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.” Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425, 38 S.Ct. 158, 159, 62 L.Ed. 372 (1918) (quoted in Oilman, 750 F.2d at 978 n. 13).
As I begin the analysis,1 I am reminded by Spence’s appellate brief that there are only a few selected statements contained in the entire article that he complains about. I would categorize these selected statements as follows:
The Word “Asshole” and Its Variations
• “vermin-infested turd dispenser”
• “shameless shitholes”
• “hemorrhoidal types”
• “reeking rectum”
Abusive Words
• “Members of that group of parasitic scum-suckers often referred to as lawyers.”
Alleged False Statements of Fact
• Spence is a lawyer and lawyers “are eager to sell out their personal values, *786truth, justice and our hard-won freedoms for a chance to fatten their wallets.”
• His “log-cabin image is as phony as a cum-dripping whore’s claim of virginity.”
• [“Considering that Dworkin advocates bestiality, incest and sex with children,] it appears * * * Spence is more interested in promoting his bank account than the traditional values he’d like us to believe he cherishes.”
• “In her latest publicity-grab, Dwor-kin has decided to sue Hustler* *
• “This case is a nuisance suit initiated by Dworkin * *
Among the passages in the article that Spence does not complain about are these:
• “Spence dudes himself up in western duds and calls himself a ‘country lawyer’ * * * ."
• He is “worth millions and owns a 35,-000 acre ranch.”
• “Spence’s claim to fame is that in the name of ‘the little guy’ he’s won some mighty big judgments against some mighty big corporations: $10.5 million against Kerr-McGee (the famous Karen Silkwood case), $26.6 million against Penthouse and $52 million against McDonald’s. He’d like to add Hustler to the list * * * for a whopping $150 million. His client is ‘little’ militant lesbian feminist Andrea Dworkin, a shit-squeezing sphincter in her own right * * *. Dworkin seems to be an odd bedfellow for ‘just folks,’ ‘family values’ Spence. After all, Dworkin is one of the most foul-mouthed, abrasive man-haters on earth * *
• “Spence, however, can demand as much as 50% of the take from his cases. And a possible $75 million would buy a lot of country for this lawyer.”
• “The real issue is freedom of speech, something we believe even Dworkin is entitled to, but which she would deny to anyone who doesn’t share her views. Any attack on First Amendment freedoms is harmful to all * * * Spence’s foaming-at-the-mouth client especially. You’d think someone of Spence’s stature would know better than to team up with a censor like Dworkin. Obviously, the putrid amber spray of diarrhea known as greed has clouded this Asshole’s senses.”
The first question considered, and the one determined against Spence by the district court, is whether reasonable readers would interpret the Hustler piece as stating actual facts, or whether it would be read as “rhetorical hyberbole.” This is la-belled in Milkovich as the “type of speech” standard. Milkovich, — U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 2704, 111 L.Ed.2d at 16. To make this determination it is necessary to consider the full context of the statements in the article, the broad social context within which those statements appear, and the common meanings of the language used.
1. Context of the Statement in the Article
I am convinced, as was the district court, that the average reader who reads Hustler’s “Bits and Pieces” column on the “Asshole of the Month” award is fully aware that the statements found there are not “hard news.” Readers of that magazine expect that Hustler’s writers will make strong opinionated statements in the confines of their own publication, a well-recognized home of opinion and comment. That proposition is inherent in the very notion of a “Bits and Pieces” page which is akin to an editorial opinion page. That the article appears under that heading “Bits and Pieces” and is a regular monthly feature renders it cautionary in nature; that is, the average reader is served notice that what is said cannot be read as stating actual facts. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 987. The general tenor of the feature also serves to emphasize it is a vulgar “expression of contempt” and not a serious statement of fact. Its scatological litany is more like an insult hurled across a barroom or schoolyard than a statement of fact.
2. Broad Social Context of the Article
For nearly 2,000 years individuals have published and circulated in one form or *787another sharp and biting comments on the role of lawyers. I have included a brief historical sampler:
Luke 11:46, in which Jesus says: “Woe unto you also, ye lawyers, for ye lade men with burdens grievous to be borne and ye yourselves touch not the burdens with one of your fingers.” Radin, The Ancient Grudge: A Study in the Public Relations of the Legal Profession, 32 Va.L.Rev. 734, 745-46 (1946).
Shakespeare’s Henry VI where Dick the Butcher said, “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.” Radin, supra, at 747.
Jonathan Swift in Chapter V of Gulliver’s Travels, at 295-97 (Oxford ed. 1919): “[T]here was a society of men among us, bred up from their youth in the art of proving by words multiplied for the purpose, that white is black, and black is white, according as they are paid. To this society all the rest of the people are slaves. * * * In pleading they studiously avoid entering into the merits of the cause, but are loud, violent, and tedious in dwelling upon all circumstances which are not to the purpose. * * * [T]hat in all points out of their own trade, they were the most ignorant and stupid generation among us, the most despicable in common conversation, avowed enemies to all knowledge and learning, and equally disposed to pervert the general reason of mankind in every other subject of discourse, as in that of their own profession.”
Sir Thomas More, on exclusion of lawyers from his Utopia “because they are ‘a sort of people, whose profession it is to disguise matters.’ ” R. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 Cal.L.Rev. 379 (1987) (quoting from T. More, Utopia 128 (G. Burnet Trans. 1821) (1516)).
Samuel Coleridge’s verse: “He saw a lawyer killing a viper on a dunghill hard by his own stable; And the Devil smiled, for it put him in mind of Cain and his brother Abel.” Post, supra, at 379 n. 3 (quoting from S. Coleridge, “The Devil’s Thoughts,” Complete Poetical Works 320 (1912)).
Carl Sandburg’s poem, “The Lawyers Knew Too Much,” included these sentiments:
In the heels of the higgling lawyers
Too many slippery ifs and buts and how-evers,
Too much herein before provided whereas,
Too many doors to go in and out of.
When the lawyers are through
What is there left, Bob?
Can a Mouse Nibble at it
And find enough to fasten a tooth in?
Why is there always a secret singing
When a lawyer cashes in?
Why does a hearse horse snicker
Hauling a lawyer away?
Radin, supra, at 751 n. 51 (quoting from Smoke and Steel, 85-86 (1921); K. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (1930)).
The contemporary lawyer’s negative public image is further revealed in other articles and books. Illustrative are: Law-scope, Public: ‘Shyster’ OK—If He’s On Your Side, 67 A.B.A.J. 695-96 (June 1981); Jost, What Image Do We Deserve, 74 A.B.A.J. 47-51 (Nov. 1988); M. Bloom, The Trouble With Lawyers, (1968); Verdicts on Lawyers (R. Nader & M. Green, 1976); and M. McCormack, The Terrible Truth About Lawyers (1987). Finally, I cannot avoid reference to ever popular lawyer jokes that are repeated and discussed in the journals of our profession. Sandberg favored lawyers with this joke: “Have you a criminal lawyer in this burg? We think so, but we haven’t been able to prove it on him.” (quoted in C. Selinger, Criminal Lawyers’ Truth: A Dialogue on Putting the Prosecution to its Proof on Behalf of Admittedly Guilty Clients, 3 The Journal of the Legal Profession 57 (1978)). I believe this is tame comment by today’s standards.
An apt analogy to the public’s perception of the lawyer’s role in society is found in the public’s perception of the umpire’s role in the great American pastime of baseball. Parks v. Steinbrenner, 131 A.D.2d 60, 520 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1987), was a defamation action involving “one of the most colorful of *788American traditions — the razzing of the umpire.” Id. 520 N.Y.S.2d at 375. Parks, an American League baseball umpire, alleged that George Steinbrenner, controversial former principal owner of the New York Yankees, had defamed him in a press release following a Yankee game in which Parks officiated. The press release contained such statements as: “My people tell me that he is not a capable umpire”; “He doesn’t measure up”; “it was ludicrous for Parks to eject two Yankee players on plays 'he misjudges’ ”; “I labeled him and several of the umpires as ‘scabs’ because they worked during the strike”; and “he is not capable of handling his job.”
In considering the historical perspective, the Parks court noted that harsh insults directed against the umpires are accepted commonplace occurrences in baseball. Id. 520 N.Y.S.2d at 376-77. Viewing Stein-brenner’s press release in this historical and contemporary context, the court easily concluded that the allegedly defamatory remarks “would be perceived by the average reader as statement of opinion, and not fact.” The remarks “are readily understood to be the kind of ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ that generally accompany the communication of displeasure at an umpire’s calls.” Parks, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 377. The court continued:
Moreover, on its face, and from its tone, it is immediately evident that the statement represents the view of the owner of an embattled baseball team who is obviously chafing at “the team’s [poor] play this season”, which has been exacerbated by a weekend of injuries and ejections of players, and who is venting his frustrations in the venerated American tradition of “baiting the umpire”. Indeed, even if the assertions in the statement implying that plaintiff was incompetent and biased in performing his duties were to be viewed as statements of fact, it is questionable whether they could be construed as defamatory — i.e., exposing the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion and disgrace and inducing an evil opinion of him in the minds of right thinking persons (Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., supra, 42 N.Y.2d [369] at p. 370, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 366 N.E.2d 1299 [1977])—in light of the generally “critical” attitudes which baseball umpires, in any event, ordinarily appear to inspire in both the game’s fans and its participants.
Parks, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 377. With a few minor adjustments in the quoted material, the court might just as well be commenting on Hustler’s statement about Spence. Hustler’s statement represents the view of the owner of an embattled magazine that is obviously chafing at an attack on its freedom of speech by Dworkin exacerbated by the legal tactics of her attorney Spence, one of America’s most skillful and flamboyant lawyers. Hustler is venting its frustrations in the venerated American tradition of “bashing the lawyer.” In light of the generally “critical” attitudes which lawyers, especially one’s opponent, ordinarily appear to inspire in litigation’s participants, these statements simply cannot, as a matter of law, be construed as defamatory.
Another apt analogy is found in Myers v. Boston Magazine Company, Inc., 380 Mass. 336, 403 N.E.2d 376 (1980), a case involving a defendant magazine’s best and worst sports awards. The magazine bestowed its award on Myers as the “worst” sports announcer in Boston. The article stated that he was “enrolled in a course for remedial speaking.” Id. 403 N.E.2d at 377. In holding that the article could not reasonably be understood as an assertion of fact, the court found that the article “does partake of an ancient, lively tradition of criticizing, even lampooning, performers. To sharpen the bite of his rapier, a critic may resort to caricature or rhetorical license. So long as he excludes false statements of fact from his arsenal, the Constitution will shield him.” Id. 403 N.E.2d at 381.
Whether we care for it or not, lawyer bashing is a time honored tradition, which this article simply continues in an energetic and exceptionally vulgar “style.”
3. Common Usage or Meaning of the Language Used
With respect to the common usage or meaning of the specific language of the *789challenged statements, I would quickly dispose of those allegedly defamatory statements falling in the categories designated “The word ‘asshole’ and its variations” and “abusive words.”2 Under prevailing first amendment law, such abusive epithets, vulgarities and profanities are nonactionable. R. Smolla, Law of Defamation, § 4.03, pp. 4-9 to -10 and § 6.12[10], p. 6-52 (1989). See cases cited therein. Their ad hominem nature easily identifies them as rhetorical hyperbole which, as a matter of law, can not reasonably be understood as statements of fact. Consequently, they are privileged. Smolla, supra, § 4.04[1] at 4-11 And, from an ninety-nine year old case, “[t]he language, ‘You are a God damn lowdown son of a bitch,’ * * * is not ‘obscene and vulgar [language].’ ” Shields v. State, 89 Ga. 549, 16 S.E. 66 (1892).
These three considerations all point emphatically toward a finding that Hustler’s attack on Spence is the sort of “loose, figurative, hyperbolic language” that can*790not be taken as fact. The district court based its decision on just such reasoning.
4. False Statements of Fact
Because this “award” is rhetorical hyperbole there should be no need to proceed further in reviewing this appeal. However, the majority has wandered afield, and I hasten to call after them, entreating them to return to the proper path. Assuming there is more to Hustler’s attack than vigorous epithet, I would as readily dispose of the “alleged false statements of fact.” Under that category, the statements concerning a “publicity-grab” and a “nuisance suit” are not even directed at Spence. They are plainly referring only to Dworkin. The statements call the lawsuit Dworkin’s “publicity-grab” and a “nuisance suit initiated by Dworkin.” Even if these statements were directed at Spence, they are not actionable. See e.g., Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 45 Wash.App. 29, 723 P.2d 1195 (1986).
Also not actionable are the remaining statements that lawyers, including Spence, are eager to sell out for money, that it appears Spence is more interested in promoting his bank account, and that Spence’s log-cabin image is phony. The belief that lawyers are eager to sell out for money is not new with Hustler. As I said earlier, such opinion has been held and expressed in a variety of ways by countless persons throughout the world for at least 2,000 years.
In connection with this “sell-out” label, the statement about Spence promoting his bank account is obviously based on the facts that he charges a fifty percent fee, has made millions, owns a large ranch, and has won big judgments in celebrated cases brought on behalf of the “little guy” in the name of “family values.” The Hustler attack questions Spence’s motive in representing a perceived “anti-family values” client like Dworkin in an effort to chill the first amendment’s freedom of speech, which is obviously a “traditional value.” Based on disclosed facts, Hustler formed and expressed an opinion that Spence took the case to make big money, fifty percent of the $150 million for which Dworkin sued. The same analysis disposes of the statement that his log-cabin image is phony. It is obviously based on the disclosed facts that Spence is worth millions, owns a large ranch, and has won large judgments.
Stripped of the vulgarity-laden rhetorical hyperbole, Hustler’s article expresses the simple theme that Hustler, a chafing defendant in a lawsuit involving the ongoing conflict between freedom of speech and pornography, does not hold a high opinion of the famous, financially successful, highly skillful opposing lawyer who usually espouses the eases of the “little guy” and “family values” against the evil forces that would take from “the little guy” the freedom of speech. In Hustler’s opinion Spence has lost his way by representing a plaintiff who is the antithesis of “family values” and “constitutional values.” I have no trouble in finding that Hustler’s article is nonactionable opinion about a public figure on a subject of public concern.
PUBLIC FIGURE STATUS
Here again this appeal should be resolved without discussion of the question of public figure/private person status. As the majority opens this furrow and intimates the result it believes appropriate, I am obliged to attempt to straighten its course. Spence admitted he is a public figure in response to a request for admissions during discovery. In addition, in his answers to interrogatories he stated he had written and published several books, including Gunning for Justice (1982). This book, according to the jacket description and a reading of its contents, is “the autobiography of a man who struggled through a painful and desolate metamorphosis to become the leading spokesman for a new system of law and lawyers for the people.” The book chronicles how Spence “has fought — and won — some of the most important criminal and civil cases of our time.” In the book Spence tells his reader about his Silkwood, Cantrell, Hopkinson, and Bonnie cases on which the spotlights of public concern and the media shone in the 1970’s and 1980’s. He reminds the reader that he was prosecuting attorney for Fre*791mont County from 1953-1962 and an unsuccessful candidate for United States Congress. Styling himself as a “country lawyer” he candidly tells his readers about his fifty percent fee, his speechmaking across the country and television appearances. His public figure stature is further documented by the list of his television appearances since January, 1984, that he produced during discovery.3
The district court found Spence to be a public figure based on his admitted and conceded status. There is no wonder why. Wyoming libel jurisprudence relating to public figure status is settled. See MacGuire and Adams. It mirrors federal libel jurisprudence. Gertz; Curtis Publishing; New York Times. If Bob Adams of Adams was a public figure, and this court held that he was, then so is Spence. After reviewing Adams’ accomplishments, which pale in comparison to Spence’s, this court allowed that, “[q]uite likely he is a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts.” Adams, 555 P.2d at 559-62. If William M. Kunstler was held to be a public figure generally, and he was, then so is Spence. In Ratner v. Young, 465 F.Supp. 386 (D.V.I.1979), in determining Kunstler’s status, the court noted that “Kunstler was one of the leading lawyers in the country devoting his time to the defense of members of minority groups charged with crime.” The court observed that “[h]e styled himself ‘an itinerant lawyer’ ” Id. at 399. The court added that Kunstler’s lawyer in the motions hearing admitted that his client was a controversial figure on a national scale. Id. at 400. Is it overstating it to say that Spence’s celebrity compares favorably with Kunstler’s? I think not.
I add one final piece of evidence to make the case for Spence’s public figure status. At the beginning of the oral argument of this appeal, Spence’s lawyer informed this court that Spence is a public figure. He did so in the presence of all assembled, including Spence, a standing-room-only crowd and news reporters and television cameras.4
Based on the record and the law, Spence has assumed a role of “special prominence in the affairs of society.” He occupies a position of “such persuasive power and influence” that he is deemed a public figure for all purposes. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 94 S.Ct. at 3009, 41 L.Ed.2d at 808. In this regard it is curious that the majority studiously avoids dealing with this status of public figure for all purposes, instead limiting its discussion to the status of limited purpose public figures.
The majority justifies its refusal to acknowledge Spence’s status as a public figure by expressing concern over the need to protect advocates who are attacked merely because they represent clients embroiled in public controversies. I do not disagree with this concern, but note that such protection is the precise subject of Gertz. There, the Supreme Court held that Gertz, an attorney, was a private figure because “his participation related solely to his representation of a private client * * *. [H]e never discussed the * * * litigation with the press and was never quoted as having done so. He plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage the public’s attention in an attempt to influence the outcome.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. at 3013, 41 L.Ed.2d at 812. This standard protects most advocates, who are not public figures in their own right or have otherwise not injected themselves into the public controversy, but does not apply to Gerry Spence. It does not apply because Spence is, in the light of the evidence and his own admission, a public figure for all purposes.
If the Hustler feature were not considered rhetorical hyperbole, Spence, as a public figure, would have to prove that Hustler made false statements about him *792with actual malice. “Actual malice” does not mean “ill will”; its legal meaning in a libel context is “with knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; and Adams, 555 P.2d at 558. Arm waving, histrionics and speculation are not evidence. The record does not contain a showing of actual malice sufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
I am disappointed that this court, which professes a tradition of expanding rights beyond the requirements of federal constitutional requirements, See Washakie County School District No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. den. Hot Springs County School Dist. No. One v. Washakie County School Dist. No. One, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 28 (1980); Black v. State, (No. 90-128, circulated Dec. 14, 1990), would now attempt to constrict so fundamental a right as free speech to a level obviously below the federal constitutional floor established by Supreme Court first amendment decisions. The law is clear with respect to Hustler’s article being nonactionable because its hyperbolic epithets cannot reasonably be considered as stating actual facts, as well as with respect to Gerry Spence’s being a public figure for all purposes who has not made a showing of actual malice; the law was correctly applied by the district court.
“[Njever send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee,”5 not just for Hustler. It tolls for all who are found within the borders of this state. It tolls for every person who speaks or writes — whether in a letter to the editor of the local newspaper or a conversation over the backyard fence. It tolls for any person, young or old, professional or unskilled, educated or illiterate, who rails in polysyllabic words or, heaven forbid, the rougher four-letter variety against those who would call the tune to which the rest of us must dance.
The right to freedom of speech has frost on it today. I am compelled to dissent lest tomorrow it be entombed in ice.
*793APPENDIX A
Hustler Magazine Article “Bits and Pieces”
(alleged defamatory article)
[[Image here]]
*794APPENDIX B
List of Television Appearances
TELEVISION APPEARANCES — GERRY SPENCE
Regularly Scheduled National Shows
(Network and city of origin)
60 Minutes — CBS
One on One — ABC—New York
Merv Griffin — Syndicated—Los Angeles
With Richard Hogue — Syndicated—Los Angeles
Today Show — NBC—New York
Crossfire — CNN—Washington, D.C.
David Letterman — NBC—New York
CBS Morning News — CBS—New York
Good Morning America — ABC—New York
Larry King, Live — CNN—Washington, D.C.
Take Two — CNN—New York
Media Report — CNN—New York
Kup Show — PBS—Syndicated—Chicago
Cromie’s Circle — WGN—Chicago
PBS Late Night — PBS—Detroit
Nightline — ABC
CBS Evening News with Dan Rather — CBS
CNN News — CNN
PM Magazine — Syndicated
Note: This list does not include unscheduled on-the-spot interviews usually conducted in a courthouse.
Specials or Series — National
“The Trial of Lee Harvey Oswald” — Showtime
Viewpoint — ABC—Boston
Constitution: That Delicate Balance — Media and the Law Libel — Princeton, NJ, and Philadelphia Insanity Defense — Philadelphia Prison Reform or Victims' Rights — Columbus CBS carried the Princeton show, PBS the rest.
Miller’s Court — PBS—Boston
Portrait of America — WTBS
LOCAL TELEVISION SHOWS — Station and City of Origin
People Are Talking — WJZ—Baltimore
Good Day — WCVB—Boston
Weekend with Dave Finnegan — WNEV—Boston
Daytime — WSBK—Boston
Weekday — WNAC—Boston
Morning Exchange — WEWS—Cleveland
Live on Five — WEWS—Cleveland
Dave Baum Today — WMAQ—Chicago
AM Chicago — WLS—Chicago
Midday News — WMAQ—Chicago
Chicago Today — WCIU-TV—Chicago
Live at & — KDFW—Dallas
N ewsmakers — KMGH—Denver
Midday — KWGN—Denver
Alan Berg Show — KOA—Denver
Town Hall Tonight — KWGN—Denver
9 News at 6 AM — KUSA—Denver
4:30 News — KUSA—Denver
*795Kelly & Company — WXYZ—Detroit
Good Morning Oregon — KEZI—Eugene
Eleven News Magazine — KTVT—Fort Worth
Good Morning Houston — KTRK—Houston
Houston Live with Roger Gray — KRIV—Houston
Wake Up, Houston — KHTV—Houston
Noon News — KIDK—Idaho Palls, Idaho
Mid-Morning Los Angeles — KHJ—Los Angeles
LA at 4 — KNBC—Los Angeles
MMLA — KHJ—Los Angeles
Midday News — KTTV—Los Angeles
A.M. Los Angeles — KABC—Los Angeles
Twin Cities Live — KSTP—Minneapolis
Straight Talk — WOR—Newark
Live at 5 — WNBC—New York City
Newsmakers — KWTV—Oklahoma City
Newswatch Omaha — KTO—Omaha
People Are Talking — KYW—Philadelphia
Weekend Magazine — KDKA—Pittsburgh
Noon News — WTAE—Pittsburgh
Newsroom 6 at Noon — KOIN—Portland
AM Northwest — KATU—Portland
Live at Noon — KATU—Portland
Take 2 — KUTV—Salt Lake City
Dimension 5 — KSL—Salt Lake City
Dave Baum Today — WMAQ—Chicago
Twin Cities Live — KSTP—Minneapolis
9 News at 6 AM — KUSA—Denver
4:30 News — KUSA—Denver
MMLA — KHJ—Los Angeles
Midday News — KTTV—Los Angeles
A.M. Los Angeles — KABC—Los Angeles
People Are Talking — KPIX—San Francisco
Noon News — KPIX—San Francisco
Good Company — KING—Seattle
Noon News — KIRO—Seattle
Front Row Video — KGO—San Francisco
Live on 4 — KRON—San Francisco
Northwest — KOMO—Seattle
Seattle Today — KING—Seattle
Charlie Rose Interview — WRC—Washington, D.C.
Panorama — WTTG—Washington, D.C.
. The subject matter of our analysis, the allegedly defamatory article, is appended to this dissent in the form in which the article appeared.
. In P. Farb, Word Play (1974), the author first informs us that “People living in western cultures have long looked upon their verbal taboos as hallmarks of their advanced ‘civilization.’” Id. at 78. Then, he reminds that
[m]any scholars have concluded that prohibiting the use of taboo words is not a hallmark of refinement and civilization, but rather a wound in the body of language. When a speech community isolates certain words and designates them as taboo, it debases natural things like sexual intercourse and the bodily functions; it spreads guilt by causing people to repress words and even any references at all to the natural acts of the body these words describe; it encourages the exhibitionist, who then goes out of his way to use the taboo words; and it provides an excuse for low forms of scatological and sexual humor.
Id. at 82-83.
As Farb points out, "[a]ny word is an innocent collection of sounds until a community surrounds it with connotations and then decrees that it cannot be used in certain speech situations * * *.’’ Id. at 91. One of the reasons people in the American speech community "talk dirty”
is to attract attention to the speaker because of the jolting effect of obscenity in places * * * considered inappropriate. Closely related to this reason is another: to display the speaker's contempt for the standards that his society upholds. Such a speaker often regards civil speech as the behavior of those who uphold the status quo, whereas talking dirty is a symbol of "honest” rebellion against the power structure. Further, militants of every persuasion have shown that talking dirty is an effective rhetorical device for verbal aggression, an easy way to provoke confrontations. Finally, talking dirty is a way to sexually mock authority figures — parents, teachers, clergymen, policemen, political leaders — thereby relieving the speaker of his own feelings of inadequacy.
The extremely obscene remark or joke, which is often signaled by an unusually gross and obscene vocabulary, often hides by means of laughter the speaker’s anxiety about certain taboo themes in his personality or his culture.
tó. at 85-86.
Finally, Farb comments, “Prohibiting certain words actually elevates them in a neurotic way by encouraging the strategy of talking dirty; it endows them with titillation, shame, and a vulgarity that the things they stand for do not themselves possess.” Id. at 94. Farb reminds us that in 1934, Allen Walker Read of the University of Chicago suggested we get rid of taboo words "in a very simple way — by using the words.” Id. Perhaps Read was prophetic. Consider Justice Powell’s observation that:
It may well be, in view of contemporary standards as to the use of vulgar and even profane language, that this particular petitioner had no reason to believe that this expletive ["chicken shit”] would be offensive or in any way disruptive of proper courtroom decorum. Language likely to offend the sensibility of some listeners is now fairly commonplace in many social gatherings as well as in public performances.
Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 700, 94 S.Ct. 1228, 1231, 39 L.Ed.2d 693, 696-97 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring opinion). And, further, consider Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) ("Fuck the Draft" emblem on jacket worn into federal courtroom) and F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978) (because of its content of patently offensive "seven dirty words,” the government may regulate a radio broadcast, but in a different context, such as a writing, the government probably may not regulate those words.) In Pacifica, the majority held that the F.C.C. can regulate “the pig that has entered the parlor,” referring to radio waves unsuspectingly intruding the privacy of the home where tender ears of children might hear. Id. 438 U.S. at 750-51, 98 S.Ct. at 3041, 57 L.Ed.2d at 1094. In contrast, with reference to Hustler’s article about Spence, and with due apologies to pig farmers and pig lovers everywhere, one is tempted to observe that the "pig never left the sty” since the vulgar words appeared within the four-corners of the "farmer’s” own magazine. It is hard to believe that Hustler magazine could unsuspectingly intrude upon the privacy of the parlor unless the parlor owner intended it to be there.
. The list of television appearances is included as an appendix.
. It is noteworthy in considering Spence’s status as a public figure that the media, with cameras and microphones unfurled, showed up in the courtroom along with a large crowd. That in itself further emphasizes the public figure status of Gerry Spence. The presence of a large crowd and the media at oral arguments is very unusual.
. J. Donne, "Devotion” in The Great Thoughts (G. Seldes comp.1985).