concurring.
I concur.
While I do not disagree with the majority’s decision, I would prefer to address squarely the constitutional issue raised in these cases: whether the Alaska Constitution permits criminal sanctions to be imposed without proof of any culpable mental state. I would resolve the issue by holding that the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution, art. I, § 7, precludes imposition of criminal sanctions for an offense in the absence of proof establishing a minimally adequate level of mens rea. My position, in effect, reflects the views expressed in Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821, 824-29 (Alaska 1980), and is fully in keeping with other decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 107-09 (Alaska 1981); Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25, 28-31 (Alaska 1978); Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d 77, 78-82 (Alaska 1969); Reynolds v. State, 655 P.2d 1313 (Alaska App.1982); Wheeler v. State, 659 P.2d 1241, 1249-1254 (Alaska App.1983).
The level of mens rea that satisfies due process will vary, depending on the nature of the specific offense charged. In Reynolds v. State, 655 P.2d at 1315, a commercial fishing case, we adopted a mens rea requirement equivalent to a civil negligence standard, indicating that the defendant was entitled to rely on reasonable mistake of fact as a defense to the prosecution. In other contexts, it is manifest that a civil negligence standard would not suffice to meet the requirements of due process. See, e.g., Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d at 80 (reversing felony conviction for theft where a statute would have permitted criminal liability to be based on a finding of negligence). Cf. AS 11.81.610(b) (where no mental state is expressly provided for under the revised criminal code, the applicable mental states are “knowingly” with respect to conduct and “recklessly” with respect to a circumstance or a result).
Commercial fishing, however, is a heavily regulated industry which involves one of Alaska’s most vital natural resources; I believe the state has a legitimate right to hold participants in the industry to a higher standard of care than might otherwise be appropriate as a predicate for criminal responsibility. Accordingly, I would follow our decision in Reynolds and hold that in commercial fishing eases the state may meet its burden of proving mens rea by establishing that the conduct of the accused was negligent.
Since, in the present cases, the superior court upheld the challenged regulations as constitutional, despite their express provi*1293sion for strict liability, I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse the superior court’s decisions.