specially concurring:
Since I find the maintenance award was excessive in light of the factors contained in section 504(a) of the Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2004)), I agree the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of maintenance and remand is warranted. However, I write separately to emphasize a particular point.
In accordance with a plethora of case law, the trial court bore a duty to determine maintenance based upon “ ‘the reasonable needs of the spouse seeking maintenance in view of the standard of living established during the marriage.’ ” In re Marriage of Selinger, 351 Ill. App. 3d 611, 615, 814 N.E.2d 152, 157 (2004), quoting In re Marriage of Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d 965, 972, 605 N.E.2d 670, 676 (1992). Neither of the trial court’s letter rulings demonstrates it considered this well-settled benchmark in fashioning its maintenance award.
While petitioner submitted an “Imputed Financial Affairs Affidavit” and the trial court considered it in determining maintenance, the evidence at trial failed to show the affidavit had any relationship to the standard of living established during the marriage. Moreover, even if the affidavit accurately represented petitioner’s needs in view of the standard of living established during the marriage, income from the rental property awarded to petitioner would by itself generate a substantial portion of the “needs” set forth in the affidavit. Although the rental property was not fully leased at the time of hearing, the trial court’s letter ruling on the motion to reconsider appears to essentially disregard this valuable asset. I note petitioner herself testified it was important she receive the parties’ commercial property because the rental income from the property could offer her “long-term security.” Further, as was recognized in the majority opinion, petitioner also received an award of $876,759 in cash, which presumably will generate significant additional income. See 383 Ill. App. 3d at 391.