specially concurring.
The majority holds that the state may be liable for contribution under ORS 18.440(1) but that the trial court did not err in allowing summary judgment for the state because of the failure to satisfy the requirements of ORS 30.275. I disagree with the first holding and agree with the second. See my separate opinion in Scovell v. TRK Trans, Inc., 299 Or 679, 705 P2d 1144 (1985), for my view on the first holding.
I would add a further observation about the record in this case. The contribution (third party) plaintiffs had filed a second amended third party complaint against the state for contribution. The state filed a motion for summary judgment on the following grounds:
*675(1) There had been no timely notice under the Oregon Tort Claims Act.
(2) The state had not consented to be sued for contribution.
(3) The second amended third party complaint failed to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim.
The trial court allowed the motion for summary judgment and on June 27, 1983, judgment was entered for the state. That judgment did not comply with ORCP 67B. and ORCP 70.
On August 29,1983, the contribution plaintiffs filed a motion to modify the June 27,1983, judgment to comply with ORCP 67B. and 71B. so as to make the judgment appealable. Accompanying that motion was an affidavit that the underlying claims of plaintiffs had been settled by the contribution plaintiffs. The contribution plaintiffs did not ask leave of court to file, and did not file, a supplemental complaint to allege the settlements, the reasonableness of the settlements and the extinguishment of the state’s liability by the settlements.1 See ORS 18.440(3).
The record discloses a letter sent from contribution plaintiffs to the state containing details of the settlement of the underlying claims, but even that letter makes no claim that the state’s liability had been extinguished by the settlements.