I agree with the majority that plaintiffs may maintain a cause of action for inverse condemnation even though defendant lacks the power of eminent domain.
I am compelled to dissent, however, from their discussion and disposition of the nuisance cause of action. They effectively ignore principles that have guided the courts of this state and other jurisdictions in the task of classifying nuisances, and thus err in concluding that plaintiffs’ claim is timely. *874Moreover, they potentially subject this airport to repeated and vexatious litigation based on the same nuisance.
Plaintiffs allege that defendant’s activities became a nuisance as of January 29, 1978—the date defendant became a public entity. If a nuisance is deemed “permanent,” a plaintiff must—within the applicable statute of limitations—sue for all past, present, and future damages in one action. If, by contrast, a nuisance is deemed “continuing,” a plaintiff may sue only for damages suffered before the action was filed, but he will not be barred from pressing future claims so long as the nuisance continues.
In Spaulding v. Cameron (1952) 38 Cal.2d 265 [239 P.2d 625], Justice Tray nor prescribed the test for determining whether a nuisance is continuing or permanent, and discussed the policy of the law: “In early decisions of this court it was held that it should not be presumed that a nuisance would continue, and damages were not allowed for a decrease in market value caused by the existence of the nuisance but were limited to the actual physical injury suffered before the commencement of the action. [Citations.] The remedy for a continuing nuisance was either a suit for injunctive relief or successive actions for damages as new injuries occurred. Situations arose, however, where injunctive relief was not appropriate or where successive actions were undesirable either to the plaintiff or the defendant or both. Accordingly, it was recognized that some types of nuisances should be considered permanent, and in such cases recovery of past and anticipated future damages were allowed in one action.
“The clearest case of a permanent nuisance or trespass is the one where the offending structure or condition is maintained as a necessary part of the operations of a public utility. Since such conditions are ordinarily of indefinite duration and since the utility by making compensation is entitled to continue them, it is appropriate that only one action should be allowed to recover for all the damages inflicted. It would be unfair to the utility to subject it to successive suits and unfair to the injured party if he were not allowed to recover all of his probable damages at once.” (Id., at p. 267, italics added.)
Thus, if a use of property alleged to be a nuisance is likely to continue indefinitely because its owner cannot be compelled to abate, the nuisance is deemed permanent and the plaintiff is given a single cause of action for his damages past, present, and future. This test for classifying nuisances as either continuing or permanent turns on whether the nuisance is reasonably abatable. It is the rule followed not only in this state (see, e.g., Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 265, 269-271 [288 P.2d 507]; *875Spaulding v. Cameron, supra, 38 Cal.2d at p. 267), but in other jurisdictions as well (see, e.g., Maloney v. Heftler Realty Company (Fla.App. 1975) 316 So.2d 594, 595; City of Columbus v. Myszka (1980) 246 Ga. 571, 572 [272 S.E.2d 302]; Patz v. Farmegg Products, Inc. (Iowa 1972) 196 N.W.2d 557, 562; Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Company v. Charles (Ky.App. 1974) 514 S.W.2d 659, 664; Goldstein v. Potomac Elec. Power Co. (1979) 285 Md. 673, 688-690 [404 A.2d 1064]; Drybread v. City of St. Louis (Mo.App. 1982) 634 S.W.2d 519, 520-521; Rebel v. Big Tarkio Drainage Dist. (Mo.App. 1980) 602 S.W.2d 787, 792-793; Sundell v. Town of New London (1979) 119 N.H. 839 [409 A.2d 1315, 1320-1321]; Aguayo v. Village of Chama (1969) 79 N.M. 729, 731 [449 P.2d 331]; Krueger v. Mitchell (1983) 112 Wis.2d 88, 102-103 [332 N.W.2d 733]). It is also approved by commentators: “But if the nuisance can not be abated, or is such that the court will not enjoin its continuance, all damages must be obtained in one action. ” (1 Harper & James, The Law of Torts (1956) § 1.30, p. 91.)
Under these principles, the nuisance alleged here must be deemed permanent. First, injunctive relief is not simply inappropriate, it is unavailable. As this court observed in Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86 [160 Cal.Rptr. 733, 603 P.2d 1329], certiorari denied, 449 U.S. 820 [66 L.Ed.2d 22, 101 S.Ct. 77], “commercial flights which are conducted in strict compliance with federal regulations may not be enjoined as nuisances, both because of the continuing public interest in air transportation, and because of the likelihood of direct conflict with federal law.” (Id., at p. 94; see also Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 582, 591 [39 Cal.Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548].) Second, successive actions are plainly undesirable. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently held in Krueger v. Mitchell, an airport noise case, “The injured party must . . . present his . . . entire claim for past and future damages in one action. This limitation on such a damage action is necessary in order to protect airport proprietors from repeated and vexatious litigation based on the same nuisance.” (112 Wis.2d at p. 103.)
In some cases classification may be doubtful; in such cases, the Spaulding court observed, a plaintiff should be allowed to elect whether to treat the alleged nuisance as continuing or permanent. (38 Cal.2d at p. 268.) Recognizing that their claim here would be barred by limitations if the asserted nuisance is characterized as permanent, plaintiffs insist this case is within the class defined in Spaulding as “doubtful,” and hence that they may avoid the limitations bar by treating the alleged nuisance as continuing.
Spaulding allows such an election only if, inter alia, “the defendant is not privileged to continue the nuisance . . . .” (Ibid.) As Greater West-*876Chester establishes, defendant’s use of its property may not be enjoined as a nuisance: there are no allegations that defendant either is not subject to or has failed to comply with federal regulations. (26 Cal.3d at p. 94.) Thus, defendant is privileged to continue the nuisance alleged here.1
Nor is defendant’s privilege to continue the alleged nuisance diminished by its ability to adopt means within its power to mitigate the allegedly offensive noise. Although the federal government has apparently not preempted all facets of noise control (Greater Westchester, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 93-100, and authorities cited; Bennett, Airport Noise Litigation: Case Law Review (1982) 47 J. Air L. & Com. 449, 464-469; Werlich & Krinsky, The Aviation Noise Abatement Controversy: Magnificent Laws, Noisy Machines, and the Legal Liability Shuffle (1981) 15 Loyola L.A. L.Rev. 69, 83-91; Comment, The 1980 Airport Noise Act: Noise Abatement or Just More Noise? (1981) 14 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 1049, passim), it is clear that permissible local regulation may be imposed only by airport proprietors, and not by third parties. (See Bennett, supra, 47 J. Air L. & Com. at pp. 469-473, and cases cited.) Thus in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal (1973) 411 U.S. 624 [36 L.Ed.2d 547, 93 S.Ct. 1854], the United States Supreme Court invalidated a municipal ordinance that purported to regulate noise by imposing a take-off curfew on a privately owned airport. City of Burbank plainly establishes that the delicate federal/local-proprietor noise control scheme currently in effect will not tolerate private suits seeking mandatory imposition of local noise controls. (Cf. San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco (9th Cir. 1981) 651 F.2d 1306, 1316-1319, cert. den. (1982) 455 U.S. 1000 [71 L.Ed.2d 866, 102 S.Ct. 1631] [state may not direct an airport proprietor to exercise its noise abatement power].)
Thus, plaintiffs may not elect to treat the alleged nuisance as continuing: defendant is privileged to continue the nuisance and it must therefore be classified as permanent. (See Krueger v. Mitchell, supra, 112 Wis.2d at pp. 102-103 [injunctive relief against airport noise unavailable; plaintiff may claim damages for permanent nuisance only].)2
*877Claims against public entities alleging injuries to persons or personal property must be brought by the 100th day after the accrual of the cause of action; all other claims—including those for real property damage—must be brought within 1 year after accrual of the cause of action. (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) As plaintiffs implicitly admit, their nuisance cause of action accrued when the public entity undertook operations on January 29, 1978; from that date, plaintiffs claim, defendant’s operations have “substantially interfered” with the use and enjoyment of their properties. Because the limitations period began to run at that time, it is clear that plaintiffs’ 1982 complaint is untimely.
I would accordingly affirm the order dismissing the nuisance cause of action.
Lucas, J., concurred.
Since “privileged” in this context merely means not reasonably abatable (see Spaulding, supra, 38 Cal.2d at pp. 267-268), the majority’s claim to the contrary (ante, at pp. 870-872) is manifestly specious.
Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920 [101 Cal.Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d 480], does not support a contrary conclusion. In Nestle we held, inter alia, that a nuisance action based on airport noise was improperly dismissed on the basis of government immunity, and suggested that the plaintiffs on remand might be able to demonstrate a continuing nuisance. This dictum, of course, preceded the United States Supreme Court’s noise control preemption decision in City of Burbank (1973) supra, 411 U.S. 624; moreover, the court was not asked to consider Spaulding’s first requirement for election: a nuisance may not be treated as continuing if the defendant is privileged to continue it.