We granted leave to appeal in this case to examine the parking exception contained in § 3106(l)(a) of the no-fault liability stat*208ute.1 This exception allows recovery of benefits from an accident involving a parked vehicle, but only if the vehicle was parked in an unreasonably dangerous manner. We hold that where the facts are undisputed, the determination of whether an automobile is parked in such a way as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily injury within the meaning of § 3106(l)(a) is an issue of statutory construction for the court. Summary disposition in favor of the defendant insurance company is affirmed.
i
On January 26, 1985, at approximately 10:00 p.m., a snowmobile traveling north along the shoulder of highway M-19 struck an unoccupied automobile. The automobile was facing oncoming traffic with its lights off. The plaintiff’s husband, a passenger on the snowmobile, was killed. The snowmobile was unlawfully traveling along the shoulder of the highway. The plaintiff sought survivor’s benefits through State Farm Insurance Company, her husband’s no-fault insurer.
State Farm denied benefits, and the plaintiff sought recovery in circuit court. The court granted summary disposition in favor of the insurance company, holding that the plaintiff offered no facts to support the conclusion that the vehicle was unreasonably parked. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that even if the car had been unreasonably parked, it was not in use as a motor vehicle and summary disposition, therefore, was proper.2 We granted leave to appeal.3
The issue before this Court is whether it can be *209determined, as a matter of law, whether an automobile parked on the shoulder of a highway is unreasonably parked under § 3106(l)(a).
n
No-fault benefits, including survivors’ benefits, are available for "accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle . . . MCL 500.3105(1); MSA 24.13105(1). Since snowmobiles are not motor vehicles for purposes of the no-fault statute,4 it must be determined whether the parked vehicle was in use as a motor vehicle.
Under § 3106 of the no-fault act, parked vehicles are declared not to be in use as motor vehicles unless one of the stated exceptions is satisfied. In this case, the plaintiff is relying on § 3106(l)(a) which allows recovery when the vehicle "was parked in such a way as to cause unreasonable risk of the bodily injury which occurred.”
A
In its decision, the Court of Appeals cited Autry v Allstate Ins Co, 130 Mich App 585; 344 NW2d 588 (1983), which has been cast into some doubt because of this Court’s ruling in DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich 32; 398 NW2d 896 (1986). The DiFranco reasoning does not operate to create a question of fact in this case because the statutory *210provisions involved are distinguishable on several grounds.
In DiFranco we overturned prior case law by declaring that the "question whether the plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function must be submitted to the trier of fact whenever the evidence ... is such that reasonable minds could differ as to the answer.” Id. at 69. This rule is in opposition to the customary rule requiring the jury to decide the facts and the judge to construe the law by interpreting statutory language. While there were compelling reasons for departing from that rule in DiFranco, there are no such reasons for abandoning it when construing the parking exclusion.
One of the underlying policy considerations behind the no-fault insurance legislation was to reduce the number of cases seeking damages for economic loss.5 The serious impairment clause is a threshold requirement which must be satisfied before the plaintiff can recover for noneconomic loss such as pain and suffering; what the plaintiff seeks here is economic loss, specifically survivor’s benefits. The policy of keeping down the number of lawsuits applies to the plaintiff’s effort to recover economic loss and favors a determination as a matter of law.
Furthermore, the Court in DiFranco opined that the phrase "serious impairment of body function” was not definable and that the Court of Appeals decisions had not been successful in clarifying the definition. Id. at 50. In contrast, the question whether a parked vehicle creates an "unreason*211able risk” is the type of question that confronts trial courts routinely, and there is no disparity among the Court of Appeals panels in their interpretation of § 3106. Each panel addressing the issue has appropriately held that a vehicle, parked in a prudent fashion and out of the flow of trafile, does not create an unreasonable risk of injury under § 3106.6 We are persuaded that it promotes judicial economy and uniformity to determine this issue as a matter of statutory construction.
The phrase "serious impairment of a body function” refers to a particular injury, suffered by a particular plaintiff. Accordingly, it lends itself to individualized interpretation by a jury. In contrast, the phrase "unreasonable risk” examines not the action of the actor in parking the car, but the nature of the risk to unknown third parties, who are thereby put at risk. The standard must be objective and external, and it should be. the same for all persons. It is inappropriate to allow that standard to fluctuate with the vagaries of different jury panels. The phrase need not be individualized, and we accept the parking statutes and regulations to quantify the degree of risk to be deemed "reasonable.”7 This is an area of the law where a uniform standard should be applied.
Finally in this regard, we note that unlike the "serious impairment” standard, the Legislature *212has provided some guidance to the courts through its parking regulations. Since there are no statutory guidelines for the definition of "serious impairment,” DiFranco qualified its result by stating: "Without further guidance from the Legislature, we believe that juries are better suited to resolving threshold questions where reasonable minds can differ on the answer ” Id. at 57. Because there is statutory guidance relating to proper parking techniques, the court is well suited to resolving this threshold question when the facts are not in dispute.
Thus, when the facts are not disputed it becomes the function of the court, as a matter of law, to determine whether any of the statutory exceptions are satisfied. Whenever a vehicle is parked, it necessarily creates a degree of risk of collision with vehicles moving in proximity. That risk, however, is the same risk that inheres to any stationary object adjacent to the roadway. Recognizing that some risk is unavoidable, and respectful of the goal of the no-fault act to provide compensation for vehicular accidents, the court must examine the parking statutes and determine whether an alleged violation endangers a class of persons intended to be protected by the statutes.
B
To establish the unreasonableness of the parking in this case, the plaintiff has alleged a violation of the lighted-vehicle statute which requires vehicles parked on a highway to display their lights.8 Although there is some question regarding whether the vehicle did in fact violate the statute,9 the *213Court of Appeals was nevertheless correct in upholding the summary disposition.
On the basis of these facts, even if the Court were to hold that the automobile was parked in violation of a statute, the plaintiff could not prevail because the plaintiff’s decedent was not in the class of plaintiffs sought to be protected by the lighted-vehicle statute. In view of the purpose behind the lighted-vehicle statute, the plaintiff’s claim of unreasonable risk by virtue of a statutory violation must fail.
Use of the phrase "unreasonable risk” in the parking exception appears, at first blush, to create a question of fact.10 But where the facts are undisputed and the complainant is relying on a violation of a statute to establish that unreasonableness, it is a question of law for the court. The definition of proper parking techniques is provided by parking statutes and local parking ordinances. The court, as a matter of law, then applies those statutes and ordinances.
In applying the parking regulations, the court must establish that the statutory purpose doctrine is satisfied.11 The court can then determine whether the statute was intended to protect the *214person injured and to prevent the harm suffered. The statutory purpose doctrine remains unfulfilled on these facts. The lighted-vehicle statute was designed to protect the safety of other vehicles traveling on a roadway. This Court examined an earlier version of the lighted-vehicle statute in Ballinger v Smith, 328 Mich 23; 43 NW2d 49 (1950), and concluded that it was "intended to protect traffic on the highway.” Id. at 31. A passenger on a snowmobile, traveling unlawfully12 on the shoulder of a highway, is not in the class of persons intended to be protected by the lighted-vehicle statute.
We are persuaded that, by its use of the term "unreasonable,” the Legislature has allowed for this inquiry into the statutory purpose. The parking exception in the no-fault statute does not say "unlawfully parked” and, therefore, mere demonstration of a statute violation is not enough to satisfy the parking exception. There may be situations where an automobile is illegally parked, as, for example, in a handicapped parking space, but this status as an illegally parked vehicle would not be sufficient to determine that the vehicle was "unreasonably parked” for purposes of no-fault liability.
Finally, to establish the unreasonableness of the parking in this case, the plaintiff points to the inability of the snowmobile driver to see reflector-type taillights because the automobile was parked facing oncoming traffic. We conclude that it is not unreasonable to park a vehicle without regard to the protection of persons who may not legally be *215on the shoulder where the vehicle is parked. The trial court in this case correctly determined that the vehicle was not unreasonably parked. It was completely off the roadway, it was not impeding traffic flow, and it was plainly visible.13 The trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiff’s action.
hi
We conclude that where the facts are not in dispute, the court is to determine whether a parked automobile satisfies one of the parking exceptions to allow for the recovery of no-fault, first-party benefits for personal injury resulting from the involvement of that parked automobile.
Although we employ different reasoning from that of the Court of Appeals, we reach the same conclusion. The vehicle was not in use as a motor vehicle for purposes of § 3105(1) because it was a parked automobile and none of the exceptions of § 3106(1) applied. Accordingly, the grant of summary disposition in favor of the defendant insurance company is affirmed.
Boyle, J., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J.MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq.
178 Mich App 263, 267; 443 NW2d 396 (1989).
434 Mich 900 (1990).
For purposes of the no-fault act, "motor vehicle” is defined as "a vehicle, including a trailer, operated or designed for operation upon a public highway by power other than muscular power which has more than 2 wheels.” MCL 500.3101(2)(e); MSA 24.13101(2)(e). Snowmobiles are not primarily designed for operation upon public highways and do not have wheels. See McDaniel v Allstate Ins Co, 145 Mich App 603; 378 NW2d 488 (1985), and Schuster v Allstate Ins Co, 146 Mich App 578; 381 NW2d 773 (1985).
[N]o-fault acts were designed primarily to reduce the number of cases seeking damages for economic loss, e.g., wage loss, survivor’s loss, and medical expenses. [DiFranco at 55. Emphasis in original.]
Hackley v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 147 Mich App 115; 383 NW2d 108 (1985) (unreasonable risk, blocking traffic flow); Williams v Allstate Ins Co, 144 Mich App 178; 375 NW2d 8 (1985) (unreasonable risk, protruding onto traveled portion of roadway); Autry v Allstate Ins Co, supra (no unreasonable risk, in violation of statute but safely and prudently parked).
The issue of negligence may be removed from jury consideration if the court concludes that overriding considerations of public policy require that a particular view [on this issue] be adopted and applied in all cases. [Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 450; 254 NW2d 759 (1977).]
MCL 257.694; MSA 9.2394.
There is a dispute with respect to whether an automobile parked on the shoulder is located "upon a highway” for purposes of the *213lighted-vehicle statute, see Wills v State Farm Ins Cos, n 2, supra at 266, n 7.
Although this legal dispute was not resolved below, in light of our determination that the statutory purpose doctrine bars this action, it is unnecessary to resolve the dispute here.
While we recognize that "unreasonableness” in the general, negligence sense is a question for the jury, the statutory concept here, assuming undisputed facts, is a question of law in the first instance.
In Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117, 138; 243 NW2d 270 (1976), the Court stated: "By its interpretation of the statutory purpose a court may in effect excuse an individual from the consequences of violating a statute. For example, the court may find the statute’s purpose was not to protect the person allegedly injured, or, even if it was, that [protection against] the harm suffered was not what the Legislature designed the statute to do.”
Because this doctrine applies to the determination at issue here, it would not be enough to merely examine whether the vehicle was *214parked in conformity with all parking statutes and ordinances. There must also be evidence that the statute was intended to prevent the type of harm which occurred and was intended to protect this class of claimant.
The counsel for plaintiff conceded in oral argument before this Court that the snowmobile was traveling unlawfully on the shoulder.
A police officer testified: "[T]he vehicle being on the shoulder as it was, we felt it was not, in fact, a hazard to any driver driving up and down M-19. They would have clearly seen it; and, it would not have been in their way, to impede traffic ... so there was no citation issued.”