dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Because the statements made by Kenneth Howell to Detective Bontz were uncorroborated and were not those of a disinterested citizen informant, I would affirm the district court’s ruling that the detective lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant.
The majority describes Howell as a citizen informant, whose information is presumed to be reliable and trustworthy. A citizen informant, however, is one “who, with no motive but public service, and without expectation of payment, identifies himself and volunteers information to the po-lice_” People v. Saars, 196 Colo. 294, 299, 584 P.2d 622, 626 (1978); People v. Glaubman, 175 Colo. 41, 50, 485 P.2d 711, 716 (1971); see United States v. Gagnon, 635 F.2d 766 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018, 101 S.Ct. 3008, 69 L.Ed.2d 390 (1981). In the present case, the informant reported that he had been involved in a traffic accident with the defendant and wanted to lodge a complaint;1 only after he was told that the detective could not investigate the accident that occurred in Longmont did he report the defendant’s possession of cocaine. These circumstanc*523es remove Howell from the category of a disinterested citizen, acting only out of public spirit, and place him into the category of one whose information is motivated by self interest and a desire to cause the defendant trouble with the police. In such a- case, the informant cannot be classified as a citizen informant and his reliability cannot be presumed. See State v. Sweatt, 427 A.2d 940 (Me.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 831, 103 S.Ct. 71, 74 L.Ed.2d 70 (1982); 1 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 3.4(a) (1978 & 1985 Supp.). The detective lacked any evidence to corroborate Howell’s story, and therefore lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant.
The majority mischaracterizes the holding of the trial court in stating that the court held that the information given by Howell was insufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause. The trial court was concerned with Howell’s trustworthiness because of his spiteful motives, although he otherwise fulfilled the requirements for a reliable citizen informant. The trial court stated:
After the statements made by Mr. Howell, it seems apparent to me from the testimony that Mr. Howell seemed quite anxious to at least ensure some difficulty with the female occupants of the motor vehicle.
Even though known or identified citizens are presumably reliable and trustworthy, it seems in this circumstance that the officer did not at that stage have probable cause to either effect an arrest for possession or to inquire further.
This finding evinces considerable concern with Howell’s reliability, due to his motives for reporting the defendant’s possession of cocaine to the police. I would affirm the trial court’s ruling that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant and suppress the evidence and the defendant’s statements as fruits of the illegal arrest.
I am authorized to say that Justice LOHR and Justice NEIGHBORS join in this dissent.. The detective testified that Howell told him that the female driver of the Datsun (the defendant) had run into him in Longmont and he chased her from Longmont to Loveland.