Simpson v. Logan-Moore Lumber Co.

Per Curiam:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court denying the claimant-appellant’s claim for disability and medical benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The claim had previously been denied by the Examiner and by the Director.

The claimant-appellant was employed by the appellee, Logan-Moore Lumber Co., as a laborer. It is admitted by both sides that the claimant-appellant’s job was to load and unload lumber and sheetrock. On June 29, 1969, the claimant-appellant was unloading sheetrock at a construction site and sustained a heart attack. On the day in question claimant-appellant had to carry the sheetrock from the street level to a porch and then up a flight of stairs, a somewhat longer distance than usual when unloading sheetrock. Claimant-appellant thus contends he sustained a compensable disability by reason of the heart attack because of the greater exertion.

K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 44-501 provides in part as follows:

". . . Compensation shall not be paid in case of coronary or coronary artery disease or cerebrovascular injury unless it is shown that the exertion of work necessary to precipitate the disability was more than the workmans usual work in the course of the workman’s regular employment.” (Emphasis supplied.)

This court has interpreted K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 44-501 on several occasions. In Calvert v. Darby Corporation, 207 Kan. 198, 483 P. 2d 491, the claimant raised an argument similar to that of this claimant-appellant. This court held the question is one of fact and that as long as there is substantial competent evidence supporting the district court’s judgment, the decision must be upheld.

*405Applying the aforementioned rule of law to the case at hand, it is clear that there was substantial competent evidence to support the lower court’s decision. The Examiner found that there “was no more than the workman’s usual work in the course of the workman’s regular employment.” The Director found, “The claimant’s usual work consisted of loading and unloading materials normally found in lumber yards. He and his co-worker both testified carrying sheetrock up a flight of stairs was not unusual in claimant’s work.” In the present case it was admitted by the claimant that his job consisted of loading and unloading sheetrock. The claimant testified he had carried sheetrock up stairs of various lengths since 1960. The claimant-appellant sustained his heart attack while in the process of unloading sheetrock. It is true that claimant-appellant did have to walk up stairs but this was not out of the ordinary. It was the claimant-appellant’s job to unload sheetrock and deliver it to a particular destination.

The claimant-appellant was doing his usual work in the course of his regular employment. The exertion of the work necessary to precipitate the disability was no more than that of his usual work.

The judgment is affirmed.