(concurring). I concur in the mandate. I too affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Only intended injuries flowing from an intentional act are excluded under an intentional acts provision in a homeowners policy.1 I do not join the majority opinion because I believe the majority opinion incorrectly states that intent to harm can be tested under either a subjective or objective standard. See majority op. at 168-169.1 conclude that a subjective standard applies to intent to harm.
Prosser explains intent to harm as follows:
(1) it is a state of mind
*193(2) about consequences of an act (or omission) and not about the act itself, and
(3) it extends not only to having in the mind a purpose (or desire) to bring about given consequences but also to having in mind a belief (or knowledge) that given consequences are substantially certain to result from the act.2
Relying on the evidence, the trier of fact determines whether the actor's purpose was to bring about the consequences or whether the actor knew that the consequences were substantially certain to result from the act. The factfinder need not accept the actor's assertions about purpose or knowledge. If the factfinder concludes that a reasonable person in the actor's position would have known that the consequences in question were substantially certain, the factfinder may infer, but need not infer, from the evidence that the actor's state of mind was the same as that of a reasonable person.3 Thus a subjective standard is applied to determine intent to harm.
When the factfinder could reach only one reasonable conclusion from undisputed facts, namely that the actor knew (or did not know) that consequences were substantially certain to result, then the circuit court determines intent to harm as a matter of law and grants a summary judgment.4 In other cases the factfinder decides the question of intent. I believe the issue of intent to harm *194in this case was properly submitted to the jury for determination.
For the reasons set forth, I concur in the mandate.
Once again we have to interpret the intentional injury exclusion in a homeowners insurance policy, a provision that has caused much litigation. Raby v. Moe, 153 Wis. 2d 101, 115-16, 450 N.W.2d 452 (1990) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
Prosser and Keeton, Law of Torts, sec. 8, p. 34 (5th ed. 1984). See also 1 Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 8A (1965).
It would, however, be incorrect to instruct the jury that an actor is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of the actor's conduct. Prosser and Keeton, Law of Torts, sec. 8, p. 36 (5th ed. 1984).
In N.N. v. Moraine Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Wis. 2d 84, 450 N.W.2d 445 (1990), the court concluded that it could infer, as a *194matter of law, an intent to harm when the actor intentionally sexually assaulted a nine-year old girl.