I concur in the result reached by the Court in this case, and I am in general agreement with the reasoning of the per curiam opinion that while consideration of regular disciplinary credits is not permissible in determining an appropriate sentence at the outset, see People v Fleming, 428 Mich 408; 410 NW2d 266 (1987), such consideration is permissible for the specific, limited purpose of determining whether an otherwise appropriate sentence falls within the outer limits set by People v Moore, 432 Mich 311; 439 NW2d 684 (1989). As the per curiam notes, see ante, p 156, n8, Moore itself plainly presaged this result by noting that "[accumulating disciplinary credits will not cause [the defendant’s] minimum sentence to expire prior to the end of [his] life.” 432 Mich 322, n 18. I note, finally, that it goes without saying that it is also the trial court’s duty, not merely the "appellate court’s duty,” cf. ante, p 156, to ensure that the limits set by Moore are complied with.
Levin, J. (separate opinion). I agree with my colleagues that neither People v Fleming, 428 Mich 408; 410 NW2d 266 (1987), nor People v Moore, 432 Mich 311; 439 NW2d 684 (1989), require that disciplinary credits be ignored in deciding whether, having in mind the defendant’s age, *158it is reasonably possible for the defendant to serve a particular indeterminate sentence.
The rule stated in Fleming, that a judge may not "consider the effect of disciplinary credits in determining what sentence to impose”1 (emphasis added) does not in terms bar a judge from in fact imposing a sentence that, because of its length, is likely to preclude the defendant from obtaining the benefit of disciplinary credits. Similarly, Moore, in requiring that the sentence not be longer than it is reasonably possible for a defendant to serve, does not bar a judge from imposing a sentence that it is reasonably possible for the defendant to serve although it is likely that the length of the sentence will preclude the defendant from obtaining the benefit of disciplinary credits.
Nevertheless, the 75- to 150-year sentence imposed in the instant case violated both Fleming and Moore.
A
The majority states that Rushlow "has a reasonable prospect of actually serving”2 a sentence of 75 to 150 years. Rushlow was, as set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, twenty-six years old at the time of sentencing. The Court of Appeals said that, according to Rushlow’s brief, "he must serve at least sixty years, nine months, and seven days before becoming eligible for parole, taking into account all possible disciplinary credits,” and would thus be "approximately eighty-seven years old when he could first become eligible for parole.” People v Rushlow, 179 Mich App 172, 181; 445 NW2d 222 (1989).
Neither the Court of Appeals nor the majority *159in this Court states on what basis it has been concluded that it is reasonably possible for Rush-low to live to the age of eighty-seven years in state prison. The record is silent concerning the longevity of prisoners. There is no basis, however, for concluding, on the basis of what anecdotal evidence we have of the food, shelter, medical care, safety, and ambience in state prison, that prisoners have a greater life expectancy than the populace at large.
Unless this Court focuses on what constitutes a sentence it is reasonably possible for a defendant to serve, and declares a limitation that makes meaningful the concept that the sentence should not exceed a sentence that it is reasonably possible for a defendant to serve, Moore is eviscerated.
This application arrived as a request for review.3 This Court ordered that a lawyer be appointed to brief the issues whether the defendant’s sentence "violates the principles stated” in Moore, and whether "the possibility of disciplinary credits should be considered when applying those principles.” These issues are of little or no importance, either to the people, Rushlow, or anyone else, and are essentially academic, if, in assessing whether it is reasonably possible for a defendant to serve a sentence, the sentencing judge and the Court of Appeals may or must proceed on the assumption that the defendant has a life expectancy in state prison of eighty-seven years.
B
Even if a minimum sentence of seventy-five years does not violate Moore, it violates Fleming. The only rational reason for imposing a sentence *160as long as seventy-five years is to assure that Rushlow would not be eligible for parole before he is eighty-seven, and thus to assure that he is not, because of disciplinary credits earned, considered for parole at an earlier date. Since that is the only rational reason for imposing such a sentence, the Court of Appeals and this Court should infer that the sentencing judge so sentenced the defendant for that reason, rather than to infer that he did so for an irrational reason or no reason at all. Drawing that rational inference, I conclude that the sentencing judge violated Fleming by considering the effect of disciplinary credits in determining the sentence that was imposed,4 and would remand the case for resentencing.
c
The statute, as distinguished from Fleming and Moore, may bar a judge from imposing a sentence that is likely to preclude a defendant from obtaining the benefit of disciplinary credits. The statute provides that all prisoners "shall be eligible to earn” disciplinary credits.5 If the length of the sentence makes it unlikely that the defendant will obtain the benefit of disciplinary credits, the length of the sentence may deprive the defendant of a right conferred by the statute entitling him to “earn” disciplinary credits. That issue has not been briefed or argued. It would be appropriate for the Court to consider that issue were it to be duly presented.
Mallett, J., took no part in the decision of this case._Ante, p 156.
Ante, p 156.
MCR 7.303, Review in Indigent Criminal Cases, rescinded 434 Mich cxlviii (1990).
Since a judge may not, consistent with Fleming, consider the effect of disciplinary credits, the sentencing judge imposed a sentence that would postulate that the twenty-six-year-old defendant would live until he was at least 101 years old.
MCL 800.33(3); MSA 28.1403(3).