I dissent. The majority have wholly emasculated the provisions of section 13443, subdivision (d), of the Education Code which, until now, assured that a local school board’s decision as to the sufficiency of the cause for failing to reemploy a probationary teacher was conclusive and free from judicial interference. The “cause” which led defendant district to refuse to reemploy Lindros was his classroom use of improper, indecent language. Since the use of such language in a tenth-grade classroom obviously is a matter of relating to “the welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof . . .” (Ed. Code, § 13443, subd. (d)), the district’s determination concerning the sufficiency of that cause should have been “conclusive.” (Id.) Instead, the majority have rendered that determination wholly inconclusive, by relying upon a variety of supposedly mitigating *542factors (such as Lindros’ asserted “good faith”) which more properly were matters of sole concern to the district in appraising the sufficiency of the cause for terminating Lindros’ services. More importantly, however, and wholly apart from the particular circumstances surrounding this case, the majority’s approach can be employed in future cases involving probationary teachers to undermine and defeat the clear legislative intent to vest in the local school board plenary control over these matters.
Section 13443, subdivision (d), carefully allocates the respective responsibilities of the school boards and the courts in cases involving refusals to rehire probationary teachers. That section expressly makes the governing board’s determination as to the sufficiency of the cause “conclusive,” so long as that cause relates to the welfare of the school or its pupils. As stated in Griggs v. Board of Trustees, 61 Cal.2d 93, 96 [37 Cal.Rptr. 194, 389 P.2d 722], the landmark case in this area, “Nothing in the language of section 13444 [now § 13443] prevents the reviewing court from determining whether the board has proceeded in excess of jurisdiction, whether there has been a fair trial, and whether the board’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. However, where there is evidence to support the board’s findings of fact and where the cause for dismissal found by the board can reasonably be said to relate to the ‘welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof,’ the reviewing court may not consider whether the facts found are sufficiently serious to justify dismissal.” (Italics added.)
In Griggs, the “cause” for the board’s decision was the teacher’s “lack of self-restraint and tact in dealing with co-workers, pupils and parents.” Since substantial evidence existed to support the existence of that cause, and since that cause “is clearly a matter which relates to the welfare of the school and its pupils,” this' court held that “the trial court could not properly substitute its own judgment for that of the board on the question of the sufficiency of the cause for Mrs. Griggs’ dismissal.” (P. 97.) I stress the fact that this court did not purport to reappraise the “good faith,” “lack of significant adverse impact,” or other possible mitigating factors in Mrs. Griggs’ favor, unlike the majority’s approach in this case, for such matters were exclusively within the domain of the school board.1
*543Subsequent cases have uniformly employed the Griggs’ approach, namely, to determine only whether or not the type of conduct at issue (e.g., lack of tact) can be said to reasonably relate to the welfare of the school and its pupils. For example, in Raney v. Board of Trustees, 239 Cal.App.2d 256 [48 Cal.Rptr. 555], the “cause” relied upon by the school board was the teacher’s severe grading techniques and poor rapport with students. The court explained that were it at liberty to supervise the judgment of the board on the matter, the court “might well reach an opposite conclusion .... [B]ut our theory of government gives to the school trustees, for better or for worse, an almost absolute choice either to ‘hire or fire’ teachers who have not yet attained tenure.” (Italics added; p. 260.)
Similarly, in American Federation of Teachers v. San Lorenzo etc. Sch. Dist., 276 Cal.App.2d 132, 136 [80 Cal.Rptr. 758], the court held that a probationary teacher’s inability to accept responsibility and inadequate supervision of students “certainly relate to the welfare of the schools and the pupils . . . .” Accordingly, the court explained that it “cannot consider whether the charges justify dismissal.” (See also Governing Board v. Brennan, 18 Cal.App.3d 396 [95 Cal.Rptr. 712] [teacher advocated marijuana use]; McGlone v. Mt. Diablo Unified Sch. Dist., 3 Cal.App.3d 17 [82 Cal.Rptr. 225] [failure to supervise students]; Feist v. Rowe, 3 Cal.App.3d 404 [83 Cal.Rptr. 465].)
The two cases which reversed school board decisions in this area are not on point for they merely established that physical characteristics of a teacher, such as advanced age or obesity, cannot constitute “cause” under section 13443 since neither factor standing alone could involve the welfare of the school or students. In the instant case, on the other hand, the cause for Lindros’ termination was his classroom use of indecent language, a matter which (like the lack of tact in Griggs, the severe grading techniques in Raney, or the inadequate supervision in San Lorenzo) by its very nature relates to the welfare of the school and its pupils. Of course, depending upon the underlying circumstances in each case, including the teacher’s “good faith” or the lack of any “significant adverse impact,” the school board might determine that a particular act or impropriety is excusable and insufficient cause for refusal to reemploy. Yet that decision lies with the school board, not the courts.
*544As I interpret section 13443, the Legislature intended to vest the school board with sole discretion in appraising the sufficiency of the cause, but to assure that the cause asserted has some reasonable relation to the school and its pupils rather than pertaining solely to the teacher’s private life, unrelated to school affairs. For example, a court might properly hold that a teacher’s persistent refusal to obey his parents, his inability to teach his wife how to drive, his failure to keep timely dental appointments, or his intemperate language with his neighbors, were acts of a type which could not reasonably relate to the welfare of the school or its pupils under section 13443. Yet similar acts of insubordination, incompetence, tardiness or use of indecent language, when occurring in a classroom setting or otherwise affecting school affairs, clearly would meet the statutory test.
In the instant case, Lindros used language in his classroom which many persons deem objectionable in any context.2 Indeed, it is well established that even permanent, tenured teachers are subject to appropriate discipline, including dismissal, on account of their classroom use of indecent or profane language. (See Board of Trustees v. Metzger, 8 Cal.3d 206, 212 [104 Cal.Rptr. 452, 501 P.2d 1172]; Palo Verde etc. Sch. Dist. v. Hensey, 9 Cal.App.3d 967 [88 Cal.Rptr. 570].) Accordingly, the district certainly had statutory authority to refuse to reemploy Lindros for the coming year.
The majority stress such factors as Lindros’ “good faith,” his “bona fide educational purpose,” the lack of complaints from his students, and the absence of school rules or regulations prohibiting the use of crude and vulgar language by teachers. Once again, it is apparent to me that consideration of such allegedly mitigating factors is for the school board, not the courts. If the board, in the exercise of its discretion and expertise, chooses not to reemploy a probationary teacher who uses such language, on what basis can this court interfere with that decision? Certainly there is no rule of law, statutory or otherwise, which would require advance publication of elaborate regulations and guidelines anticipating all possible infractions or misconduct which a probationary teacher might commit.3 As the trial court pointed out, Lindros’ language was “manifestly coarse and vulgar.
*545. . . [Petitioner should have known that such language by a teacher was totally unacceptable in a Tenth Grade English class.”
The Court of Appeal, Second District, in the vacated opinion in this case written by Presiding Justice Ford (103 Cal.Rptr. 188), aptly disposed of plaintiff’s contention regarding lack of notice: “There is no ironclad rule of law that regulations or rules be promulgated which specify in minute detail the various kinds of misconduct which will subject a teacher to disciplinary action. It is not unreasonable to assume that a person engaged in the profession of teaching will have a reasonable concept of generally accepted standards relating to propriety of conduct, including the avoidance of vulgarity, and will adhere to such standards in his relationship with his pupils. . . .
“Adhering to an objective standard, in the present case it was not unreasonable to determine that the plaintiff was on notice that in teaching his tenth grade English classes the art of writing a short story and in affording his students aid by using as a model a short story written by him, resort to a particular story embodying vulgarity would not serve a substantial educational purpose but would constitute a serious impropriety because of the extraneous matter of an unexemplary nature. Since manifestly inherent in such conduct was the probability of an effect adverse to the welfare of students, it was reasonable to assume that the teacher was aware that he was thereby subjecting himself to the hazard of disciplinary measures. Consequently, his contention as to the lack of adequate notice to satisfy the concept of due process is untenable.”
I would conclude that the trial court properly denied mandate in this case, and, accordingly, would affirm the judgment.
McComb, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied July 12, 1973. McComb, J., Burke, J., and Clark, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
The majority have substantially misstated the test set forth in section 13443 and the Griggs case. Although correctly explaining that the role of the courts is limited to determining whether the cause for termination relates to the welfare of the school or its pupils (ante, pp. 532-534), the majority purport to apnly that test by inquiring whether in fact the teacher’s conduct adversely affected the welfare of the school or its pupils. (Ante, at p. 527, line 10, p. 533, line 9, p. 535, line 5, *543pp. 535-537.) Yet the question of adverse effect is precisely the question reserved to the school board by section 13443—otherwise a court could in every case reverse the board’s decision by finding that particular conduct had no “significant adverse impact” (ante, at p. 527, line 10) on the school or its pupils.
Since the district’s action in this case can be sustained on the basis of Lindros’ improper language in his classroom, I do not reach the question whether that action could also be upheld on the independent ground that Lindros permitted unauthorized departure of students from his class.
The majority’s reliance upon the so-called “free-speech” cases (e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 [29 L.Ed.2d 284, 91 S.Ct. 1780]), seems wholly misplaced, for no attempt is made to subject Lindros to criminal liability for his conduct. As conceded by the majority (ante, p. 537), “these rulings by no means legitimize the general use of offensive language in the classroom . . . .”