dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. While I recognize the out-of-state precedent cited by the majority, the totality of the circumstances in this case demonstrates the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
Whether a Terry stop was reasonable is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances. People v. Cordero, 358 Ill. App. 3d 121, 125, 830 N.E.2d 830, 834 (2005) (finding that mere presence of a car in a parking lot after hours was insufficient to justify a Terry stop where the officer did not testify that the area was a high-crime area or that she was aware of recent criminal activity in the area). While being parked in a high-crime area does not alone create reasonable suspicion, it is a factor to consider. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 576, 120 S. Ct. at 676.
In this case, given the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the initial seizure of defendant. Gannon testified that defendant had parked in a high-crime area in front of a house known as the hangout for a local gang. Gannon also testified that he had personally been involved in four weapon seizures from people either coming to or leaving 1128 East Leafland in the two months prior to this incident and had been involved in drug transactions “at that location.” Evidence of recent crime activity in the area can be a factor supporting reasonable suspicion. See People v. Rivera, 304 Ill. App. 3d 124, 128, 709 N.E.2d 710, 713 (1999) (finding the defendant’s presence in an airport parking lot at 8 p.m. when no airport offices were open and where prior burglaries had occurred supported reasonable suspicion justifying the stop). Moreover, Gannon testified he was familiar with drug transactions. Although Gannon did not observe drugs changing hands, he did testify that the actions of defendant and the other two men — meeting at a location, individuals exiting one vehicle and entering the other vehicle — were consistent with other drug transactions he had observed.
I would also find that the officers’ act of drawing their weapons was reasonable. When arrest-like measures are used, such as drawing weapons, the measures must be “ ‘ “reasonable in light of the circumstances that prompted the stop or that developed during its course.” ’ ” People v. Nitz, 371 Ill. App. 3d 747, 754, 863 N.E.2d 817, 823-24 (2007) (involving handcuffing), quoting 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure §9.2(d), at 304 (4th ed. 2004), quoting United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1998).
Individuals involved in the drug trade often carry weapons. People v. Austin, 365 Ill. App. 3d 496, 506, 849 N.E.2d 112, 121 (2006) (involving a pat down for officer safety). Because drug arrests have inherent dangers, it may be entirely reasonable for officers to draw their weapons if confronting a drug suspect. See United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 508 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that officers executed a Terry stop, not an arrest, when they surrounded the defendant’s car and approached with their guns drawn; such actions were reasonable in light of suspicion that one of the people in the car was about to commit a drug-related crime).
In this case, not only did the officers suspect defendant was engaged in a drug transaction, the officers knew that the area was a high-crime area where a number of weapon seizures had occurred. Moreover, when told to put his hands up, defendant reached down. On these facts, the officer’s actions were reasonable. Because the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant was committing or about to commit a crime, and because the officers acted reasonably when drawing their weapons, I would reverse the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence.